

**CITATION:** YG Limited Partnership and YSL Residences (Re), 2021 ONSC 4178  
**COURT FILE NOS.:** CV-21-00655373-00CL/BK-21-02734090-0031,  
CV-21-00661386-00CL & CV-21-00661530-00CL  
**DATE:** 20210629

**SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE – ONTARIO  
(COMMERCIAL LIST)**

**RE:** IN THE MATTER OF THE *BANKRUPTCY AND INSOLVENCY ACT*,  
R.S.C. 1985, C. B-3, AS AMENDED

**AND:**

IN THE MATTER OF THE NOTICES OF INTENTION TO MAKE A  
PROPOSAL OF YG LIMITED PARTNERSHIP AND YSL RESIDENCES

APPLICATION UNDER THE *BANKRUPTCY AND INSOLVENCY ACT*,  
R.S.C. 1985, C. B-3, AS AMENDED

**AND RE:** 2504670 CANADA INC., 8451761 CANADA INC. and CHI LONG INC.,  
Applicants

**AND**

CRESFORD CAPITAL CORPORATION, YSL RESIDENCES INC,  
9615334 CANADA INC., YG LIMITED PARTNERSHIP and DANIEL  
CASEY, Respondents

**AND RE:** 2583019 ONTARIO INCORPORATED AS GENERAL PARTNER OF  
YONGESL INVESTMENT LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, 2124093 ONTARIO  
INC., SIXONE INVESTMENT LTD., E&B INVESTMENT CORPORATION  
and TAIHE INTERNATIONAL GROUP INC., Applicants

**AND**

9615334 CANADA INC. AS GENERAL PARTNER OF YG LIMITED  
PARTNERSHIP and YSL RESIDENCES INC., Respondents

**BEFORE:** S.F. Dunphy J.

**COUNSEL:** *Harry Fogul and Miranda Spence*, for YG Limited Partnership and YSL  
Residences Inc.

*Shaun Laubman and Sapna Thakker*, for 2504670 Canada Inc., 8451761  
Canada Inc., and Chi Long Inc.

*Alexander Soutter*, for YongeSL Investment Limited Partnership, 2124093 Ontario Inc., SixOne Investment Ltd., E&B Investment Corporation, and TaiHe International Group Inc.

*David Gruber, Jesse Mighton, and Benjamin Reedijk*, for Concord Properties Developments Corp. and its affiliates

*Jane Dietrich and Michael Wunder*, for 2292912 Ontario Inc. and Timbercreek Mortgage Servicing Inc.

*Robin B. Schwill*, for KSV Restructuring Inc. in its capacity as the proposal trustee

*Roger Gillot and Justin Kanji*, for Kohn Pedersen Fox Associates PC

*Reuben S. Botnick*, for Royal Excavating & Grading Limited COB as Michael Bros. Excavation

*Daniel Naymark and Jamie Gibson*, for Sarven Cicekian, Mike Catsiliras, Ryan Millar and Marco Mancuso

*Brendan Bowles and John Paul Ventrella*, for GFL Infrastructure Group Inc.

*Mark Dunn and Carlie Fox*, for Maria Athanasoulis

*George Benchetrit*, for 2576725 Ontario Inc.

*Joshua B. Sugar*, for R. Avis Surveying Inc.

*Paul Conrod*, for Restoration Hardware Inc.

*James MacLellan and Jonathan Rosenstein*, for Westmount Guarantee Services Inc.

*Albert Engle*, for Priestly Demolition Inc.

**HEARD at Toronto:** June 23, 2021

### **REASONS FOR INTERIM DECISION**

[1] The debtors are seeking approval of a bankruptcy proposal that has obtained the near unanimous approval of those affected creditors who cast a vote. Two groups of limited partnership unitholders have challenged the actions of the General Partner of the debtor YG Limited Partnership for much of the past year and urge me to annul the

bankruptcy entirely or to reject the proposal and, if need be, to allow a Receiver or Trustee in bankruptcy to canvass the market fairly and objectively. Another unsecured creditor urges me to disregard much of the appraisal evidence tendered because she has been excluded from examining it and the result is a record that casts grave doubt as to whether fair value for stakeholders is being realized by this process.

[2] For the reasons that follow, I have decided that I will not approve the Proposal in the form it has been presented to me. The Proposal is yet able to be amended pursuant to art. 3.01 thereof and it is possible that an amendment may be formulated to address the concerns raised by the findings I outline below before a final decision on the fate of the Proposal is made.

### **Background facts**

[3] A central issue in this case is the value of the “YSL Project” – the property owned by the debtor YSL as bare trustee for the limited partnership (the debtor YG LP) charged with developing it. Valuation is an area on which I must tread lightly in terms of what I can record in writing so as not to impact adversely any potential sale process that may be necessary in future.

[4] What follows is a general description of the capital structure of the debtors and the project sufficient to permit an understanding of the issues. For comparison purposes, it is relevant to consider the size of the project. There is no dispute that the “as if completed” value of the project is above \$1 billion. How much above and based on which assumptions is an issue, but I provide the round figure solely for comparison purposes relative to the debt and equity interests discussed.

[5] The project is fully zoned and permitted for construction of an 85 story retail and condominium complex planned for the corner of Yonge St. and Gerard in downtown Toronto. Substantial pre-sales have been made. Demolition of the old structures and shoring up of the excavation have been largely completed. Unfortunately, things ground to halt in March of 2020 and the project has been stuck in the “hole in the ground” stage ever since.

#### *The project ownership structure*

[6] YP GP has a General Partner with nominal capital and a nominal interest in the limited partnership. The “equity” in the partnership effectively resides in the “A” units with approximately \$14.8 million in capital but a capped right to return on that capital equivalent to interest (12.25% per year rate of return) and the “B” units who alone receive all of the residual profits from the project without limit.

[7] The owner of the “B” units and the General Partner are under common control within the Cresford group of companies as are the parties recorded as payees of the \$38.3 million related party debt to which I shall refer.

*The project debt structure*

[8] The secured debt – including registered mortgages and construction liens – stands at about \$160 million. The figure for secured debt is slightly misleading. There is just over \$100 million in deposits from condominium pre-sales made for the most part prior to 2019. These are insured by the second secured creditor whose claim would increase dollar for dollar if the relevant purchase agreements were repudiated and the deposits had to be returned. For this reason and to have an “apples to apples” idea of the debt structure, a figure of about \$260 million in secured debt is appropriate.

[9] The third-party unsecured debt that has been identified by the Trustee is in the range of approximately \$20 million plus or minus a few million dollars depending upon reserves allowed for claims yet to be filed or finalized. There are also various litigation claims outstanding the largest of which is from a former officer claiming that the limited partnership was a common employer and seeking, among other things, to enforce oral profit-sharing agreements. I have reviewed the Trustee’s report and in particular the Trustee’s reasoned conclusion that these claims are too contingent to be considered valid for voting purposes. I concur in that assessment. A conservative and prudent assessment of potential total unsecured claims is thus in the range of about \$25 million – a figure advanced with full knowledge that the total of all contingent claims identified could be in the same order of magnitude again. For the purposes of this motion, I find the figures estimated by me above are reasonable – those findings are, of course, without prejudice to the creditors holding such claims proving them in due course.

[10] There is also \$38.3 million in outstanding advances to YG LP recorded on its books from related parties. I have found those claims to be equity claims for all purposes relevant to this hearing for reasons I shall expand upon below.

[11] In round figures, one can thus consider there to be approximately \$260 million of secured debt and about \$20-\$25 million of unsecured debt outstanding. The Proposal assumes all of the former and would pay 58% of the latter when finalized. The “fulcrum” stakeholders in this case are thus the unsecured creditors to the extent of the 42% of their claims that are compromised (\$8.4 to \$10.5 million) plus the “A” limited partners in YG LP (\$14.8 million plus accrued “interest” entitlements) – such figures based upon the estimates and rulings that I have made and explained herein.

**Summary of nine findings made**

[12] The process of sifting through the mountains of evidence presented to me by the parties has been made exceptionally time-consuming and tedious by reason of the lack of usable electronic indexing in much of the materials filed. Tabs or electronic hyperlinks within compilations of electronically filed documents are non-existent in all but the most recently filed documents and there are many, many thousands of pages of documents presented. The profession is going to need to get on top of this problem as judges cannot

and will not in future undertake such gargantuan efforts to sift through a case when a few moments of care and attention at the front end could simplify it to such a great degree.

[13] Time does not permit me to set forth in writing a complete account of my review of the evidence and my conclusions – a written summary of which I was about 75% through before the impossibility of completing it in the form intended within the time available became obvious. I shall instead present below nine conclusions which encapsulate my reasons for finding that the Proposal as it currently stands has failed to satisfy me of the matters required by s. 59(2) of the BIA or the common law test of good faith.

(i) *The McCracken Affidavit is inadmissible*

[14] As is often the case in Commercial Court matters, this case proceeded on a “real time” schedule. In addition to the bankruptcy case that was commenced with an NOI filed on behalf of the debtors on April 30, 2021, there were two applications commenced the day before by two groups of YG LP limited partners seeking, among other things, the removal of the General Partner and various declarations challenging the authority of the General Partner to act on behalf of the partnership in any capacity and alleging breaches of fiduciary duty by the General Partner. The Proposal itself was filed on May 27, 2021 working towards a scheduled June 10, 2021 creditor meeting. On June 1, 2021 I issued directions for the conduct of all three proceedings with a view to having the sanction hearing ready to proceed on June 23, 2021.

[15] The Proposal Sponsor is Concord Properties. Concord is not a party to any of these proceedings although it is central to all three. Concord sponsored the Proposal and is bearing all the costs of it under a Proposal Sponsor Agreement dated April 30, 2021.

[16] The limited partner applicants issued subpoenas to Mr. McCracken – apparently the officer of Concord responsible for this Proposal. On the advice of counsel, Mr. McCracken declined to appear absent an order compelling him to do so. Counsel took the position that leave was required under the Bankruptcy Rules to compel him to appear in the bankruptcy proceeding and declined to produce him.

[17] The position taken was a curious one given my specific direction on June 1 that I was *not* applying the BIA stay to the two applications and that specific aspects of both applications would be heard and decided together on June 23, 2021 when the fairness hearing was conducted. The case timetable made specific allowances for responding records with respect to the limited partner applications and facts in relation to them. My ruling on June 1, 2021 was in both the civil and bankruptcy proceedings and bore the style of cause of both.

[18] Whether leave was or was not formally required to *compel* Mr. McCracken to appear, his failure has consequences in terms of the fairness of the process leading to

the approval motion in front of me. The opponents of the Proposal were deprived of the opportunity to explore aspects of the unfairness or unreasonableness of the Proposal that they had raised. There was insufficient time available in the tight timetable to drop everything and bring a leave application. The position taken ran utterly contrary to the spirit and intent of my ruling on June 1, 2021 at which Concord's counsel appeared *and made submissions*. This is the sort of issue that counsel applying the "three C's" of the Commercial List ought to have agreed to disagree upon and produced the witness without prejudice to objections that might be raised.

[19] It is against the foregoing backdrop that the affidavit of Mr. McCracken – delivered the day prior to the fairness hearing – must be considered.

[20] The affidavit was filed far too late to permit any interested party to respond to it effectively or to cross-examine upon it. None of the subject-matter of the affidavit was new information. The affidavit was entirely devoted to providing responses to various issues seen in written arguments or that arose on the cross-examination of other witnesses.

[21] Concord appeared to consider itself sufficiently at interest to appear through counsel on June 1, 2021 while declining to submit to examination because of its non-party status when preparations for this hearing were in full swing a few days later. Permitting the admission of this affidavit at this juncture would be to sanction unfairness of the highest order. A timetable was worked out for the hearing of this motion – worked out, I might add, at a motion that Concord was present at through counsel. Whether or not Concord had the *right* to insist upon a further motion to compel its attendance during the pre-hearing procedures, it certainly knew that taking that position when there was no time available to challenge it in court would have the practical effect that it did.

[22] Lying in the weeds is a strategy, but it does not confer the right to spring out of them at will. I find the McCracken affidavit to be inadmissible and attach no weight to it.

(ii) *No weight can be attached to the CBR April 2021 Appraisal*

[23] The parties have very hotly debated the valuation evidence that is on the record before me. A portion of that valuation evidence has been sealed. My reason for doing so is straightforward: the approval of the Proposal cannot be taken for granted and it is thus reasonably foreseeable that the project may have to be sold by a Trustee or Receiver in the near future and the ability of whichever court officer is charged with undertaking that sale to achieve the highest and best price available ought not to be impaired more than the circumstances already have by the disclosure of appraisals that may serve to skew market expectations. A significant portion of such evidence is part of the public record and between the public information and the use of carefully-framed circumlocutions I believe that I can convey my conclusions and reasons for them regarding the valuation evidence with reasonable clarity.

[24] Two of the appraisals before me, both from CBRE, are the most central to the questions I must determine. The first in time is dated August 8, 2019 providing CBRE's opinion of value as at July 30, 2019. This appraisal was prepared for the parent company of the debtors within the Cresford group and is based on the particular assumptions set out therein, including some supplied by Cresford. The second in time, also by CBRE, is dated April 30, 2021 as of March 16, 2021. This latter appraisal was prepared for Concord based on the assumptions set out therein, including some supplied by Concord. I shall not discuss in a public document the actual appraisal amounts in either, focusing instead on the differences between them.

[25] For present purposes, it is sufficient for me to observe that the 2021 CBRE appraisal is lower than the 2019 CBRE appraisal and lower by an amount that is significantly higher than the sum of the compromised amount of unsecured claims under the Proposal plus the total capital of the "B" unitholders in YG LP.

[26] I find that I can attach little weight to the 2021 CBRE appraisal in these circumstances because:

- a. The assumptions given to CBRE by Concord were materially different than those used in the 2019 CBRE appraisal including as to such things as leasable square footage of residential and retail space;
- b. When it formulated the instructions to CBRE, Concord was in the process of attempting to negotiate a Proposal to acquire the property through the bankruptcy process given lack of limited partner consents and its Proposal was being commissioned at a time when Concord had a clear and obvious interest in having appraisal evidence suggesting that the project was at least partly underwater;
- c. The downward alterations made by Concord to the square footage assumptions used by CBRE are unexplained, untested and appear to be admitted as having been quite preliminary at all events;
- d. Concord did not submit Mr. McCracken to cross-examination to examine in depth the reasons for the significant negative difference between the two instructions given to CBRE on the conflicting appraisals;
- e. The differences between the two have not been reasonably or adequately reconciled. There has been no general downward correction to residential real estate in Toronto that has been brought to the court's attention nor can the difference between the two appraisals reasonably be attributed solely to pandemic-induced alterations to the retail environment.

(iii) *ALL Construction Lien Claims are Unaffected Creditors under the Proposal*

[27] Under the Proposal, Construction Lien Claims are defined as “Unaffected Creditors”. The Trustee indicates that the total amount of such claims is \$11.865 million. Of this total, fifteen lien claimants with \$9.19 million in lien claims outstanding entered into assignment agreements with the Proposal Sponsor. As these are unvoting Unaffected Creditors under the Proposal, Concord required them to file claims as Affected Creditors in order to acquire the right to vote and to name a proxy designated by Concord.

[28] There was some controversy about what precisely the lien claimants received in return for agreeing to convert claims that were to be paid \$1.00 per valid \$1.00 of valid claims under the Proposal into claims receiving no more than \$0.58 per dollar of claim value. The Trustee reported second-hand information from Concord denying any “side” deals does little to address this concern. Assurances as to the lack of a side deal do not serve the purpose of permitting a reasonable understanding of the main deal. None of them have been disclosed beyond a skeletal summary and Concord declined to permit a representative to be examined prior to the hearing.

[29] It is of course open to the Proposal Sponsor to make any proposal that satisfies the formal requirements of the BIA if the debtor is prepared to adopt it and submit it to the creditors and the creditors are willing to accept it with their eyes open. In this case however the Proposal Sponsor has induced \$9.19 million of otherwise Unaffected Creditors to file claims as something they are not by definition (i.e. Affected Creditors) thereby effectively reducing the size of the cap from \$65 million to \$55.8 million and the maximum pool of funds available to the actual Affected Creditors described by the Proposal from \$37.7 million to \$32.4 million. These are material changes impacting all Affected Creditors that follow from arrangements made by the Proposal Sponsor outside the terms of the Proposal.

[30] The Proposal makes no provision for creditors “downshifting” their claims voluntarily. Lien claims are defined as “Unaffected Claims” and I see no basis for them to be accepted under the Proposal on any other basis particularly where doing so operates to the obvious detriment of the affected class members. This is not a case of a secured creditor valuing its security and filing an unsecured claim for the shortfall. There are consequences to such a valuation exercise that are absent here.

[31] The “electing” lien claimants have little in common with the actual Affected Creditors who had no election to make. Despite having made the election, assuming there was any basis in the Proposal to make such an election (and it appears to me that there was not), such creditors retained their security intact. Pursuant to art. 9.01 of the Proposal, the Proposal would have “no effect upon Unsecured Creditors” which definition does not cease to apply to them by virtue of a make-shift “election” for which the Proposal makes no provision. They did not agree to surrender their security nor even to value it in the bankruptcy process. They agreed to sell their claims on whatever terms they chose to accept from the Proposal Sponsor secure in the knowledge that if, for any reason, the Proposal does not move forward, their security remains intact and unaffected.



[32] This is an element of unfairness in this that I find particularly disturbing. It is all the more disturbing when I am not at all persuaded that the unsecured creditors face the spectre of near certain annihilation in the event of a bankruptcy or receivership but face the very real prospect of additional and illegitimate dilution of their claim value were I to approve the Proposal as presented with the presence of lien claimants in the Affected Creditor pool.

(iv) *The related party claims must be treated as equity*

[33] A fundamental principle of the BIA is that equity claims are subordinate to debt claims. This principle is voiced in s. 60(1.7) of the BIA that provides quite simply that "[n]o proposal that provides for the payment of an equity claim is to be approved by the court unless the proposal provides that all claims that are not equity claims are to be paid in full before the equity claim is to be paid". Section 140.1 expresses a similar requirement in respect of dividends more generally. While there is some similarity behind the concept of "equity claims" in Canadian insolvency law and that of "equitable subordination" the two are separate and one and must not be confused with the other: *U.S. Steel Canada Inc. (Re)*, 2016 ONCA 662 (CanLII) at para. 101.

[34] The limited partner applicants submit that the intercompany advances appearing in the general ledger of YG LP should be treated as equity claims within the meaning of the BIA. The debtors on the other hand urge me to pass over this issue entirely arguing that approval of the proposal does not entail approval of any payment of intercompany claims. Such claims will ultimately be determined by the Trustee and if disallowed for any reason will receive no distribution.

[35] I cannot accept the debtors' argument that I should sweep the equity claims under the carpet to be dealt with another day in another forum. This is so for the following reasons:

- a. The applicant limited partners have no standing to challenge the proof of the related party claims within the bankruptcy process even if their claims against related parties are not themselves released by the Proposal.
- b. On June 1, 2021 I directed that issues raised in the two applications would be dealt with on June 23. A theme in those applications was, among others, the allegation that the General Partner had been seeking to divert substantial payments to Cresford from various investor proposals negotiated by the Cresford group ahead of limited partners, the allegations that representations had been made in the Subscription Documents and elsewhere that Cresford entities would be paid out of distribution after the "A" unit limited partners, that counsel for Cresford had confirmed that the intercompany loans were subordinated to the limited partners, that the

- General Partner had acted in breach of its fiduciary duties and that the Proposal was not being advanced in good faith; and
- c. The timetable I approved on June 1 specifically contemplated the foregoing aspects of those applications being dealt with on June 1, 2021.

[36] If the related party claims are equity claims under the BIA, then it is also highly likely that the notional purchase price for the project being paid by the Proposal Sponsor under the Proposal must be viewed as being \$22 million less than it might otherwise appear, a fact that is also material to the matters I must consider on this motion.

[37] The allegations of the applicant limited partners in the two outstanding applications challenge the good faith with which the Proposal has been advanced by the General Partner in part on the theory that the Proposal has in fact been advanced to secure payment of the related party claims in priority to the “A” unitholders and without securing their consent.

[38] For the foregoing reasons, I cannot avoid a consideration of whether the related party claims are equity claims. My conclusion on that subject are an integral part of any conclusion I must make on the subject of good faith or the criteria to be considered under s. 59(2) of the BIA.

[39] Are the related party claims identified by the Trustee in this case “equity claims”?

[40] The BIA contains a definition of “equity claims” that is deliberately non-exhaustive. In *Sino-Forest Corporation (Re)*, 2012 ONCA 816 (CanLII) (at para. 44) the Court of Appeal found that the term should be given an expansive meaning to best secure the remedial intentions of Parliament.

[41] Subsequent cases have explored the concept of “equity claim” with a view to fleshing out its parameters. Some of the guidelines that can be distilled from that jurisprudence is the following:

- a. Neither the “intention of the parties” as between non-arm’s length parties nor the formal characterization they apply is conclusive as to the true nature of the transaction: *Tudor Sales Ltd. (Re)*, 2017 BCSC 119 (CanLII) at para. 35 and *Alberta Energy Regulator v Lexin Resources Ltd*, 2018 ABQB 590 (CanLII) at para. 37.
- b. The manner in which the transaction was implemented, and the economic reality of the surrounding circumstances must be examined to determine the true nature of the transaction with the form selected being merely the “point of departure” of the examination: *Lexin* at para. 37.
- c. It is helpful to consider whether the parties to the transaction had a subjective intent to repay principal or interest on the alleged loan from the

cash flows of the alleged borrower and, if so, was that expectation reasonable: *Lexin* at para. 41.

- d. It is also helpful to consider the a “list of factors” that courts have looked at in such cases – being careful not to apply them in a mechanical way or as a definitive checklist: *Lexin* at paras. 42-43.
- e. Among the factors to examine are:
  - i. the presence or absence of a fixed maturity date and schedule of payments.(absence of such terms being a potential indicator of equity);
  - ii. the presence or absence of a fixed rate of interest and interest payments. Again, it is suggested that the absence of a fixed rate of interest and interest payments is a strong indication that the advances were capital contributions rather than loans;
  - iii. the source of repayments. If the expectation of repayment depends solely on the success of the borrower’s business, the cases suggest that the transaction has the appearance of a capital contribution;
  - iv. the security, if any, for advances; and
  - v. the extent to which the advances were used to acquire capital assets. The use of the advance to meet the daily operating needs for the corporation, rather than to purchase capital assets, is arguably indicative of bona fide indebtedness: *Lexin* at paras. 42-43.

[42] The related party claims may be broken down into different buckets for the purposes of this analysis. The first one consists of payments that were made to retire loans taken out for the specific purpose of financing equity interests in YG LP. This involved loans used to buy out the \$15 million investment of a former limited partner, loans used to finance the Cresford group of companies’ \$15 million equity investment in Class B units as well as interest paid on both of these loans some or all of which has been recorded as obligations of YG LP on its books.

[43] Clearly advances made or charged to YG LP for the direct or indirect purpose of financing the purchase of an equity interest in YG LP are likely to the point of certainly to be characterized as equity claims of YG LP for the purposes of insolvency law. The evidence to this point supports the reasonable inference that a very substantial portion of the advances charged to YG LP by non-arm’s length parties can be so characterized.

[44] A second category of advances made can only be described as “miscellaneous” comprised of various sporadic payments made by members of the Cresford group of

companies that were recorded in the ledger of the limited partnership net of other payments made by the limited partnership to the Cresford group.

[45] The terms of the intercompany advances recorded on the general ledger of the limited partnership share the following characteristics:

- a. They were all non-interest bearing without any defined term or maturity date; and
- b. There are no loan documents evidencing any of them.

[46] Such payments as there were from YG LP on account of these advances were sporadic. The nature of the YG LP project is such that there is no cash flow nor any expectation of cash flow being available to repay the intercompany advances recorded until project completion when deposits and sales proceeds become available. The evidence does not suggest that intercompany advances were primarily short-term bridge advances pending the receipt of project financing that was used to repay them.

[47] There is substantial evidence that the related party advances were intended to be subordinated to holders of "A" units of YG LP and are thus equity claims. In the interest of time, I shall only summarize this evidence:

- a. Direct written representations were made to the investors in YG LP "A" units as part of the subscription process that after payment of "project expenses" only "external lenders" debt would be repaid ahead of them and that distributions to "Cresford" – unambiguously referencing the group of companies rather than one entity – would come after repayment of invested capital and the agreed return on investment to the limited partner investors;
- b. Cresford's communications to the limited partners never disclosed the existence of any "debt" owed to Cresford even when portraying "current debt" in various discussions with or disclosures made to them until very recently (and long after the advances in question were recorded on YG LP's books);
- c. Other Cresford group projects with similar capital structures also made representations that intercompany advances were treated as equity;
- d. There was a direct, written representations made by prior counsel to the General Partner in October 2020 that such intercompany advances were "subsequent in priority" to the YG LP "A" unit investors – that admission has since been retracted without an adequate explanation for why it was an alleged error; and

- e. Cresford's CFO also advised that the YG LP "A" unitholders would be paid in priority to "Cresford" a term used to describe the related group of Cresford companies under common control.

[48] A review of the foregoing factors in light of the jurisprudence leads me to the conclusion that the related party advances must be considered as equity claims for the purposes of this motion at least. Virtually all indicators reviewed point towards equity and there is little to no evidence leaning the other way.

(v) *The implied value of the Proposal is \$22 million less than assumed*

[49] The Proposal operates to reduce the payments made to unsecured creditors if claims are lower than the \$65 million cap. The converse is not the case. Absent the lien claims and the intercompany claims there is no mathematical prospect of the \$65 million cap being operative unless the contingent and late-filed claims are resolved at levels far in excess of any reasonable estimate. This means that the consideration paid by Concord under the Proposal must be considered to be worth \$22 million less than it might have been had the related party claims not been equity claims.

(vi) *The general partner had authority to file the NOI*

[50] The two groups of limited partners have raised three broad categories of objections to the capacity of the general partner to have filed the NOI and sought approval of the Revised Proposal: (i) as a matter of law, all partners including limited partners, must approve filing for bankruptcy; (ii) pursuant to the Limited Partnership Agreement, the general partner lacked the authority to file for bankruptcy; and (iii) the general partner ceased to be general partner prior to the filing. I shall consider each of these in turn.

#### *S. 85(1) of the BIA*

[51] Section 85(1) of the BIA provides that it "applies to limited partnerships in like manner as if limited partnerships were ordinary partnerships, and, on all the general partners of a limited partnership becoming bankrupt, the property of the limited partnership vests in the trustee."

[52] The limited partners position was that since all partners of a general partnership must authorize a bankruptcy filing and since s. 85(1) of the BIA applies the law in relation to general partnerships to limited partnerships in "like manner", it follows that the NOI must be authorized by all limited partners in addition to the general partner. In support of this interpretation they cite the case of *Aquaculture component Plant V Limited Partnership (Re)*, 1995 CanLII 9324 (NS SC) where two NOI's filed on behalf of limited partnerships were annulled on this basis.

[53] While the decision of Hamilton J. in the *Aquaculture* case is entitled to deference, it is not binding upon me. I find that I am unable to agree with its reasoning.

[54] The *Aquaculture* case stands quite alone in the jurisprudence on this topic – alone in the sense that none appear to have followed *or* disagreed with it as far as the research conducted by the parties has been able to determine. In the 26 years since it was decided, a significant number of limited partnerships have passed through our bankruptcy courts either for proposals or liquidations without apparent objection on this score. That practice of course does not have the effect of altering the law but it is at least a factor to consider given the number of times since then that Parliament has examined the BIA including with the addition of s. 59(4) that authorized changes to the constating documents of a debtor including a limited partnership.

[55] I reach a different conclusion than was reached in *Aquaculture* for the following reasons:

- a. The use of general “in like manner” language in s. 85(1) of the BIA is intended to ensure that the provision is interpreted consistent with the objects of the BIA and not in a manner as to defeat those objects or render the benefits of the BIA largely inaccessible to limited partnerships. The procedure for filing an NOI was intended to offer debtors a swift and relatively low cost means of seeking creditor protection after a secured creditor gives the required ten-day notice of its intention to enforce. Requiring unanimous consent for filing of an NOI would have the practical effect of making the benefits of bankruptcy law unavailable to limited partnerships in practice in a large number of cases. Limited partnerships often have large numbers of limited partners and the time required to convene a meeting and obtain unanimous consent would require more time than secured creditors are required by law to give in the way of notice.
- b. Provincial law generally provides that only general partners may bind a limited partnership (in Manitoba, s. 54(1) of the *The Partnership Act*, CCSM c P30) and the BIA treats partnerships and limited partnerships as a full “debtor”. The policy behind requiring all *general* partners to authorize a bankruptcy filing is obvious – all are liable without limit for the liabilities of the partnership. The same is not the case with a limited partnership.
- c. Section 59 of *The Partnership Act* also provides that actions or suits in relation to the limited partnership may be brought and conducted by and against the general partners as if there were no limited partners. This too supports the proposition that the consent of limited partners is not required for the filing of an NOI on behalf of the partnership.

[56] I find that s. 85(1) of the BIA did not require the asset of each limited partner to the filing of an NOI.

[57] The limited partners also pointed to provisions of the Limited Partnership Agreement to allege that the General Partner had automatically ceased to be general partner of the partnership by reason of certain actions or that that it lacked the authority to file on behalf of the partnership.

*Did the General Partner cease to be a general partner of YG LP at any time?*

[58] The Proposal Sponsor Agreement is dated April 30, 2021 and was entered into between Concord as Proposal Sponsor and YG LP acting through the General Partner. It was executed prior to filing the NOI but *after* the two limited partner groups had filed their separate applications seeking. To the extent it is relevant, there can be no question but that Concord was aware of the terms of the Limited Partnership Agreement at all relevant times when negotiating and entering into the Proposal Sponsor Agreement.

[59] Pursuant to s. 1.1 of the Proposal Sponsor Agreement, YG LP agreed to “use commercially reasonable efforts to effect a financial restructuring of [YG LP] that will result in the acquisition of the Property by the Proposal Sponsor together with [YG LP’s] rights, title and interests in and to such Project-related contracts as may be stipulated”. A draft of a proposal, substantially similar to the Proposal before this court for approval, was appended as a schedule to the Proposal Sponsor Agreement. The agreement was signed by Mr. Daniel Casey on behalf of each of the Cresford companies named as parties including YG LP.

[60] Section 10.14 of the YG LP Limited Partnership Agreement provides that “None of the following actions shall be taken unless it has *first* been approved by Special Resolution: (a) approving or disapproving the sale or exchange of all or substantially all of the business or assets of the Partnership”(emphasis added).

[61] The Proposal contemplated by the Proposal Sponsor Agreement clearly provides for the sale or exchange of all or substantially all of the business or assets of the Partnership. Section 1.1 of the Proposal Sponsor Agreement obliged YG LP to “use commercially reasonable efforts” to cause this to occur, including by filing the NOI and to requesting court approval of the Proposal. As obliged by the Proposal Sponsor Agreement, YG LP filed an NOI, filed the Proposal and subsequently sought court approval of the Proposal.

[62] Entering into the Proposal Sponsor Agreement constituted the “approval” of YG LP to the sale or exchange of all or substantially all of the business or assets of the Partnership” even if approvals of other parties were also required in order to *complete* the transaction. The prohibition in art. 10.14 attaches to the approval of the action and not its completion.

[63] Section 7.1(c) of the Limited Partnership Agreement creates an Event of Default if the General Partner “becomes insolvent ... consents to or acquiesces in the benefit of

[the BIA]”. By filing the NOI as a general partner of YG LP, the General Partner necessarily admitted to being insolvent at the time the NOI was filled out. There is no evidence that such state of insolvency arrived suddenly that day. The General Partner has accordingly admitted to the existence of an insolvency default under s. 7.1(c) of the Limited Partnership Agreement at some time prior to filing the NOI failing which no NOI would have been possible. By signing the Proposal Sponsor Agreement and agreeing to file the NOI to advance the Proposal, the General Partner also consented to the receiving the benefit of the BIA proposal provisions.

[64] For all of the foregoing reasons, the signing of the Proposal Sponsor Agreement amounts to an admission of further breaches of the Limited Partnership Agreement.

[65] Do such breaches entail the automatic removal of the authority of the General Partner to act as such at the time the NOI was actually filed? The answer in my view is that none of them have that effect.

[66] Section 11.2 of the Limited Partnership Agreement concerns the removal of the General Partner. Pursuant to s. 11.2(a), the General Partner “may be removed” by a court of competent jurisdiction on certain named grounds. That has not occurred. Section 11.2(b) provides that the General Partner “shall cease to be general partner” if any of the named events occurs. None of the named events apply to the agreement to file a NOI, the state of being insolvent or the signing of the Proposal Sponsor Agreement can be read to be included in the list of events listed in s. 11.2(b). The *aftermath* of the filing of the NOI may well be such a trigger but the answer to that question would require me to contend with the effects of the automatic stay which has not been raised before me.

[67] Accordingly, I find that the NOI filed by the General Partner was not void or subject to any similar infirmity. The foregoing conclusion refers only to the actual filing of the NOI and specifically does not apply to the breaches of the Limited Partnership Agreement consequent upon entering into the Proposal Sponsorship Agreement discussed above.

(vii) *The Proposal was the product of a flawed process and breaches of fiduciary duty by the General Partner*

[68] There are two aspects to this part of the objections raised by the objecting limited partners. First, it is alleged that during the year leading up to the Proposal Sponsor Agreement, the General Partner breached its fiduciary duty to act in the best interests of the partnership by seeking to advance the interests of non-arm’s length parties to the detriment of the limited partners while simultaneously frustrating every effort of the limited partners to access the information that the Limited Partnership Agreement and the Manitoba Partnership Act gave them the rights to see. Second, it is alleged that negotiating and entering into the Proposal Sponsor Agreement was a breach of fiduciary duties of the General Partner in that this was nothing less than deliberately negotiating and entering into an agreement to breach the Limited Partnership Agreement.



[69] As the sole general partner of YG LP, the General Partner was responsible for the management of the affairs of the limited partnership and was the only one able to bind the partnership. The General Partner owed a fiduciary duty to all of the partners of the firm in discharging that role and pursuant to s. 64 of *The Partnership Act*, is liable to account, both at law and in equity to the limited partners for its management of the firm.

[70] As I have outlined above, entering into the Proposal Sponsor Agreement was a clear violation of s. 10.14 of the Limited Partnership Agreement as it agreed to a process whereby substantially all of the property of the firm would be conveyed to a third party without the assent of the limited partners. The fact that the BIA stay of proceeding may impede or prevent the limited partners from seeking a direct remedy for that breach when the agreement was subsequently put into action by filing the NOI does not detract from the existence of a present breach the moment pen was put to paper. Further, whether the negotiations of the Proposal Sponsor Agreement consumed two weeks or two months, it is a breach of fiduciary duty to plan and then put into execution a deliberate breach of the Limited Partnership Agreement and doing so in the teeth of a pending application to stop the General Partner adds further weight to that conclusion.

[71] The debtors suggested that being in the proximity of insolvency dissolved or altered the fiduciary duties of the general partner owed to the limited partners. It is true that the law recognizes that the interests of creditors assume a greater weight the closer to insolvency the enterprise approaches. None of this dissolves the fiduciary obligations of the General Partner so much as it adds to it. It is at this point that the other aspect of the complaint of the limited partners enters the analysis.

[72] Nothing in what I have written suggests that a general partner cannot file an NOI where doing so appears on all of the facts and in the good faith exercise of the best business judgment of the general partner to be in the best interests of the enterprise as a whole to do so – a judgment that necessarily accounts for the obligations of the firm owed to its creditors.

[73] This filing was different because it came with strings attached: a binding Proposal Sponsor Agreement that granted exclusivity to a single party and obliged the General Partner to pursue one path and one path only to emerge from the process. Those strings did not get attached as a result of a process which itself discharged faithfully the fiduciary duties of the General Partner. Rather they were attached as the culmination of almost a year of battling to keep information away from limited partners that they had a right to access (in most cases at least) and the squandering of an expensively purchased window of restructuring breathing room looking not for the solution best able to discharge all of the obligations of the partnership but rather looking for the investor best able to secure the optimal outcome for the Cresford group of companies generally. In that process the limited partners were an obstacle to be circumvented and bankruptcy provided a possible key.

[74] Good faith in such circumstances is not assumed but must be shown. The evidence presented to me has rather persuasively convinced me that good faith took a back seat to self-interest.

[75] The parties have expended considerable effort in outlining the details of what occurred in that time frame. In the interests of time, I shall summarize the important take-aways from those events:

- a. Until the Proposal Sponsor Agreement and the April 2021 CBRE report prepared for Concord, *all* appraisal evidence showed a profitable project likely to result in full coverage for all of the outstanding third-party debt obligations plus all of the obligations owed to limited partners;
- b. The General Partner presented two potential transactions to the “A” unit limited partners in the second half of 2020 that provided for the full payment of all debt, the payment of approximately \$38 million to non-arm’s length parties related to the General Partner and payment of obligations owed to the limited partners at a discount – the latter of the two proposals emanated from Concord;
- c. The two proposals failed to proceed primarily because the General Partner was unable to provide a satisfactory explanation as to why Cresford related parties were to receive a substantial payment when limited partners were asked to accept a compromise the obligations due to them and limited partners had been assured that Cresford group obligations ranked behind them both when they made their investment and as late as October 2020 in a letter from counsel the debtors; and
- d. The limited partners were in a continual tug-of-war trying to pry information out of the General Partner having had to resort to a court order at the beginning of this year to obtain access to information that should have been available to them as of right.

[76] Few things are more precious in the restructuring business than time. YG LP was able to “purchase” more than a year of time with the forbearance arrangements that it worked out. That precious time appears to have been devoted solely to finding transactions that offered the greatest level of benefits for the Cresford group of companies. There is no evidence that any canvassing of the market – however constrained the market of developers capable of undertaking the completion of an 85-story mixed use tower in downtown Toronto may be – took place that was not indelibly tainted by the imperative of finding value for the Cresford group of companies rather than for the partnership itself.

(viii) *The Affected Creditor vote was unanimous*

[77] Despite the fact that I have found that fifteen of the forty-six votes cast in favour of the Proposal ought not to have been considered because they came from Unaffected Creditors, that determination does not impact the conclusion of the Trustee that the required statutory majorities voted in favour of the Proposal. There was but one negative vote cast and the Trustee disallowed that vote as being contingent. I have reviewed the Trustee's reasons for so ruling and find no fault with them. The removal of fifteen creditors and just over \$9 million in claims does not detract from the fact that thirty-one creditors holding approximately \$9 million in other claims cast votes in favour.

[78] While I am prepared to consider to some degree the impact of the assignment agreements negotiated by Concord (see below), I do not view such agreements as impacting the formal validity of the votes cast.

[79] I find that the Proposal received the required majority of two-thirds in value and over 50% in number of creditors voting in person or by proxy.

(ix) *The probative value of most of the Affected Creditor vote is attenuated*

[80] In the normal course, the agreement of a broad group of creditors to accept less than 100% of what they are owed is cogent evidence of the fairness and reasonable nature of a proposal. This is so as a matter of common sense and by a very long tradition in our law. It is not an indicator lightly to be ignored.

[81] I must also recognize that whatever doubts the evidence may raise as to the insolvency of the debtors in terms of the realizable value of their assets, there can be little doubt that the liquidity test for insolvency is met. The lien claimants have been unpaid for a year or more without any formal forbearance agreement. The first mortgagee has entered into a forbearance agreements but this expires on June 30, 2021.

[82] There was a window of time to find an out-of-court solution, but it would appear that the debtors have squandered it.

[83] The vote of the Affected Creditors *is* probative of fairness, but I find that its weight is attenuated in this case by the following circumstances:

- a. Only a relatively small minority voted who did not also enter into assignment agreements;
- b. The evidence is equivocal about precisely what consideration was received by those who entered into such assignment agreements – a relayed denial of “side-deals” without more adds little to the equation particularly when the deal itself is not disclosed;
- c. Clearly if assigning creditors received or stand to receive more than the value allocated to them under the Proposal their vote says little about the

business judgment of the creditors at large to accept the value offered to satisfy their claims but says more about the willingness of the Proposal Sponsor to pay more than has been reflected in the Proposal itself.


- d. This last-in-line class of creditors did not have available to it the range of information produced in connection with this approval motion.

### **Disposition**

[84] I will not approve the Proposal in its present form. I have concluded that, as presented, the Proposal is not reasonable, it is not calculated to benefit the general body of creditors and there are serious issues regarding the good faith with which it has been prepared and presented by the debtors. The debtors and the Proposal Sponsor have the authority under art. 3.06 of the Proposal to amend the Proposal to address the concerns I have raised. It is up to them – with the approval of the Trustee – to do so if they are so inclined.

[85] I am directing the parties to return on Wednesday June 30 at 2:15 pm either to propose amendments to the Proposal that address the concerns I have raised in a substantive way or to address next steps.

[86] These written reasons expand upon the summary reasons I presented orally in a hearing on June 29, 2021. I have released these reasons with relatively little opportunity to proof them and correct typographical errors or minor nits or stylistic glitches. I shall do so over the next week when I have more time available to me and the capacity to call upon my able assistant Ms. Daisy Ng to assist in that effort. Accordingly, I shall be releasing an amended version of these reasons over the course of the next week with such minor and non-substantive corrections.



S.F. Dunphy J.

**Date:** June 29, 2021