CITATION: **Randhawa v. Randhawa, 2021 ONSC 3643**

COURT FILE NO.: CV-18-593636-00CL
DATE: 20210519

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE – ONTARIO

(Commercial List)

RE: SWINDERPAL SINGH RANDHAWA

Applicant

AND:

RANA PARTAP SINGH RANDHAWA, PROEX LOGISTICS INC., GURU LOGISTICS INC., 1542300 ONTARIO INC. (OPERATED AS ASR TRANSPORTATION), 2221589 ONTARIO INC., 2435963 ONTARIO INC., NOOR RANDHAWA CORP., SUPERSTAR TRANSPORT LTD., R.S. INTERNATIONAL CARRIERS INC., SUBEET CARRIERS INC., SUPERSTAR LOGISTICS INC., CONTINENTAL TRUCK SERVICES INC., and ASR TRANSPORTATION INC.

Respondents

BEFORE: Koehnen J.

COUNSEL: *Aaron Kreaden, Sam Dukesz* for the Applicant

Brian Kolenda, Chris Kinnear Hunter for the Respondents

Christina Bowman for Motion Transport Ltd.

HEARD: March 12, 2021

ENDORSEMENT

[1] The applicant Swinderpal Singh Randhawa and the respondent Rana Partap Singh Randhawa are brothers. They have been involved in a long, acrimonious dispute about the separation of their interests in various businesses that they once ran together. The division of their businesses has been adjudicated on several occasions by Mr. Larry Banack acting as arbitrator. The applicant was referred to as Paul and the respondent as Rana in the factums of the parties and during oral argument. I will use the same names in these reasons.

[2] Between the two of them, Paul and Rana raised three issues for determination on this motion:

I. Did the Arbitrator have jurisdiction to appoint an inspector under the *Ontario Business Corporations Act*[1] (the "OBCA")?

II. Should the receiver appointed to sell the remaining business also be empowered to conduct an investigation that the Arbitrator envisaged that the inspector would conduct?

III. Who should be appointed as receiver?

[3] For the reasons set out below, I find that the Arbitrator had jurisdiction to appoint an inspector, the receiver should have investigatory powers and Paul's proposed receiver should be appointed.

I. Arbitrator's Jurisdiction to Appoint an inspector

[4] Rana submits that the Arbitrator had no jurisdiction to appoint an inspector under the OBCA because the statute reserves the power to do so to this court and because the inspector was to have the power to investigate Motion Transport Ltd., a non-party to the arbitration agreement.

[5] I will first address the Arbitrator's power to appoint an inspector under the OBCA and then address the implications of the inspector's power to look into the affairs of Motion.

[6] Paul commenced an oppression application in March 2018. The application was settled on October 1, 2018 by entering into Minutes of Settlement. The Minutes of Settlement called for the dissolution or sale of the businesses the brothers ran including the trucking business that is the subject of this motion.

[7] Rana submits that an arbitrator has no power to appoint an inspector because s. 162 (1) of the OBCA provides that "the court may appoint an inspector" and "court" is defined as the Ontario Superior Court of Justice. Rana relies on several authorities for the proposition that an arbitrator has no power to award a statutory remedy like the appointment of an inspector.

[8] Some confusion has arisen in this area because issues are often conflated and then reduced to a short form statement that an arbitrator has no power to grant a statutory remedy. Rather than resorting to the short form statement that an arbitrator has no power to grant a statutory remedy as Rana submits, I find it more helpful to untangle some of the issues that the cases address. Some of those separate issues include: (i) Whether an arbitrator in principle has

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[1] *Ontario Business Corporations Act*, R.S.O. 1990. c. B. 16

the power to grant a statutory remedy; (ii) Whether there are reasons in a particular case that might make it inappropriate for an arbitrator to grant a statutory remedy; (iii) The scope of the particular arbitration clause at issue; and (iv) A judicial concern that a party may be deprived of a remedy if they are limited to arbitration.

[9] As a starting point, more recent Ontario cases make it clear that statutory remedies, and in particular OBCA remedies, can be pursued through arbitration.[2]

[10] The only principled reason for preventing an arbitrator from awarding a statutory remedy that Rana advanced before me was the possibility that statutory remedies might affect persons who are not signatories to the arbitration agreement.

[11] In this regard Rana submits that an *OBCA* inspector is a court officer with specific rights and responsibilities set out in the statute. These include powers a private arbitrator could never grant including "requiring any person to produce documents or records to the inspector", "authorizing an inspector to conduct a hearing, administer oaths and examine any person upon oath, and prescribing rules for the conduct of the hearing" and "requiring any person to attend a hearing conducted by an inspector and to give evidence upon oath".[3]

[12] To the extent that the inspector is being asked to exercise its powers vis-à-vis persons who are not party to the arbitration agreement, I agree that an arbitrator has no jurisdiction to empower an inspector to do so. If, however, the powers of the inspector are limited to investigating the signatories to an arbitration agreement, I was given no conceptual reason for which an arbitrator should be precluded from appointing an inspector. Although the OBCA might refer to the court appointing an inspector, the whole principle underlying arbitration is that parties are free to contract out of the court system and submit their disputes to an arbitrator unless precluded by statute or public policy.

[13] In the case at hand, the Arbitrator recognized that his jurisdiction was limited to the signatories of the arbitration agreement and provided that if the inspector extended his activities beyond signatories to the arbitration agreement, the parties would have to obtain the assistance of the court. Paragraph 3 of his initial *ex parte* order provides:

> I HEREBY DECLARE THAT the scope of the investigation requested to be made by the inspector and the appointment and powers of the inspector are to be determined by return motion before me or the Superior Court of Justice (Commercial List) if the inspection could potentially impact the rights of entities who are not parties to the arbitration clause contained in the Minutes and are therefore outside my jurisdiction as Arbitrator.

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[2] *The Campaign for the Inclusion of People who are Deaf and Hard of Hearing v. Canadian Hearing Society*, 2018 ONSC 5445 at para. 58-59; *Blind Spot Holdings Ltd. v. Decast Holdings Inc.,* 2014 ONSC 1760 at para. 28.
[3] *Business Corporations Act*, RSO 1990, c B.16, s 162.

[14] Seeking the court's assistance in those circumstances is a solution that would naturally impose itself in any event. Enforcement of arbitral award depends initially on the agreement of the parties. An arbitral award has no independent compulsory force. To give it compulsory force, the successful party must in any event go to a court to have the award recognized and enforced.

[15] The arbitration agreement in question is found in paragraph 22 of the Minutes of Settlement between the parties. It provides:

> Paul and Rana each agree that any dispute arising in respect of the completion or implementation of these Minutes of Settlement, then Paul and Rana agree to appoint an arbitrator … and any such determinations shall be made on a summary basis and be final and binding on the Parties and shall not be subject to appeal.

[16] Apart from a minor grammatical error, the arbitration clause is clear. Paul and Rana have agreed to submit to an arbitrator "any dispute arising in respect of the completion or implementation of these Minutes of Settlement." The arbitration is not limited to the interpretation of the agreement. It is broader than that and encompasses "any dispute" that arises "in respect of the completion or implementation" of the Minutes of Settlement. The Minutes of Settlement specifically require Rana to provide Paul with information. The Arbitrator found that Rana had failed to do so.

[17] The Minutes of Settlement impose specific obligations with respect to provision of information. Paragraph three of the Minutes provide:

> Upon the execution of these Minutes of Settlement, the Parties agree to act in good faith to provide each other with financial, operational and any other information that is required to ensure that the events described in these Minutes of Settlement proceed in an open and transparent manner, including, but not limited to, information to allow the Parties to monitor the Trucking Business and Real Estate Business while the steps contemplated by these Minutes of Settlement are being implemented. ….

[18] Paragraphs 4-8 set out a process whereby the parties have time to assess the information they receive to determine whether one of them has directly or indirectly obtained an unequal benefit from the trucking business in the period following January 1, 2011. If one party asserts the other has received an unequal benefit and the parties cannot resolve that dispute, the Minutes call for the appointment of an independent accountant or arbitrator to determine the amount of the unequal benefit. The independent accountant or arbitrator is to work with the parties to determine a fair and efficient process for making that determination. If the parties cannot agree on that process, the independent accountant or arbitrator is empowered to determine the process.

[19] In my view, the Arbitrator's appointment of the inspector was squarely within the powers he was given under the Minutes of Settlement. He was empowered to establish a process to determine any alleged unequal benefit to one of the parties. Doing so was part and parcel of implementing the Minutes of Settlement. He determined that the most efficient way of doing so was to appoint an inspector. He was squarely within his jurisdiction under the Minutes of Settlement to do so.

[20] Rana relies on *Armstrong v. Northern Eyes Inc*.,[4] which he submits stands for the proposition that an arbitrator has no power to award a statutory remedy. *Armstrong*, arose in the context of a shareholders' agreement that provided a specific remedy for a departing shareholder. The arbitration clause was contained in the shareholders agreement. In that context, the case is not so much about a conceptual holding that arbitrators have no power to award statutory remedies but can be more closely read as standing for the proposition that in the circumstances of that case, where the parties had contemplated a specific remedy for a departing shareholder, the arbitration agreement did not give the arbitrator the power to go beyond the contractually agreed to remedy. That is far different from saying that an arbitrator has no power to award a remedy under the OBCA, regardless of the circumstances.

[21] The following extracts from the Divisional Court reasons make this clear:

> [34] It might also be noted that the remedies open to the arbitrator under Article 14 are comparatively close to the remedies available under OBCA s. 248(3)(f). The remedies are operationally identical in the sense that they require the majority to purchase the applicant's shares. What may differ, depending on the view that might be taken by the court in an oppression hearing, is the scope of the methodology used to achieve the valuation. If not completely identical, the remedies are comparatively close.
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> [35] Where the essential character of the dispute is subject to arbitration, there is no real deprivation of ultimate remedy so long as the applicant is able to pursue an appropriate remedy through the specialized vehicle of arbitration.
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> [36] Such is the case here. The applicant agreed in Article 14 that on leaving the company, he would tender his shares to be redeemed by the company at fair market value to be determined by the company's accountants. The applicant's problem is not that he lacks an appropriate remedy. His problem is that the method of valuation within the remedy to which he agreed may not be as

[4] *Armstrong v. Northern Eyes Inc*., 2000 CanLII 29047 (ON SCDC)

> potentially advantageous to him as that which might be imposed by a court under the OBCA. There is nothing unequal or unfair, within the meaning of s. 6(3) of the Arbitration Act, in holding the applicant to his agreement. Absent the extraordinary circumstances contemplated by cases such as *Deluce*, the *Weber* principle does not oust the arbitrator simply because the applicant now prefers the potential of a valuation method that might be more advantageous to him than the method to which he agreed.

[22] Put differently, when the arbitrator in *Armstrong* said he had no authority to grant a statutory remedy, he was really saying that the arbitration agreement prescribed the remedies that were available to the parties and, since arbitration is a matter of contract, the arbitrator had no power to go beyond the contractual remedy and provide a statutory remedy.

[23] Next, Rana relies on the decision of Justice Lax in *Pandora Select Partners, LP v. Strategy Real Estate Investments Ltd*..[5] Like *Armstrong, Pandora* is not so much about a general proposition to the effect that an arbitrator has no power to award remedies under the OBCA as it is about: (i) concerns that the applicant would be denied access to an OBCA remedy entirely; and (ii) the interpretation of the particular arbitration clause in that case.

[24] In *Pandora,* investors subscribed for shares in shares an OBCA company. The investors later complained that the OBCA company had not produced audited financial statements as they are required to do by the statute. The subscription agreement provided that it was to be construed with and governed by the laws of the State of New York and that:

> Any controversy, claim or dispute arising out of or relating to this Subscription Agreement between the parties hereto, their assignees, their affiliates, their attorneys, or agents, shall be litigated solely in state or Federal Court in New York City….

[25] On the plain wording of the OBCA, a state or federal court in New York is not a "court" for the purposes of the OBCA and may not be entitled to grant OBCA remedies.

[26] At the same time, the subscription agreement contained a conflicting clause which called for any dispute to be resolved "exclusively by arbitration to be conducted in New York, New York in accordance with the rules of the American Arbitration Association."

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[5] *Pandora Select Partners, LP v. Strategy Real Estate Investments Ltd*., 2007 CanLII 8026 (ON SC)

[27] In paragraph 15 of her reasons, Justice Lax drew a distinction between the arbitration clause which governed the subscription agreement and the core obligations of the OBCA corporation. On her interpretation of the arbitration agreement, Justice Lax found that the applicants had not contracted out of the right to apply to an Ontario court for relief about the manner in which the underlying corporation was to be governed. In doing so she explained:

> [15] The right of shareholders to financial reporting is solely a function of the legal relationship between a corporation and its shareholders under the OBCA. By contrast, the arbitration clause is contained in the Subscription Agreements, the purpose of which was to consummate a commercial transaction. The Subscription Agreements do not purport to apply to the core obligations which SREI has to the Applicants under the OBCA. Rather, they are primarily comprised of terms peculiar to the transaction, namely, representations and warranties between the parties that were intended "to induce" one another "to enter into" the Subscription Agreements, together with various covenants by SREI, including ones relating to compliance with U.S. securities legislation, compliance with laws, the keeping of records and books of account and the status of dividends. This would suggest that the arbitration clause is properly interpreted as applying to issues arising in the context of the transaction contemplated by the Subscription Agreements.

[28] Justice Lax continued in paragraph 16 of her reasons to express a concern that

> If the arbitration clause is interpreted as prohibiting the Applicants from seeking judicial enforcement of SREI's core obligations under the OBCA, this would mean that, merely by agreeing to include the arbitration clause in the Subscription Agreements, the Applicants have absolved SREI of its core financial disclosure obligations. In particular, if the arbitration clause prohibits the Applicants from seeking judicial enforcement of SREI's core obligations, it is likely the case that there is no forum to which the Applicants can turn to enforce those core obligations, thereby rendering the obligation nugatory. In turn, the arbitration clause would effectively circumvent the statutory requirement of explicit written consent provided by section 148(b) to exempt SREI from its obligations under Part XII of the OBCA. The deprivation of a statutory right is a matter to be considered in determining the scope of an arbitration clause.

[29] *Pandora* does not express a view that an arbitrator has no power to award OBCA remedies. Rather, it expresses a concern about what might happen in a foreign forum if the arbitral clause were interpreted that way and the concern that a foreign court may not have the power to award OBCA remedies.

[30] Finally, Rana relies on the decision of the Court of Appeal for British Columbia in *ABOP LLC v. Qtrade Canada Inc*.[6] The reasons of the motions court judge and of the Court of Appeal suggested that oppression relief was not available in the arbitration in that case. It is not entirely clear though whether this finding was grounded in a legal rule to the effect that statutory remedies are not available in arbitrations or whether it was grounded in the interpretation of the arbitration clause that applied in that case. The arbitration agreement at issue provided that a portion of the dispute was subject to arbitration but another portion of the dispute was not. The Court of Appeal disposed of the issue by holding that it would be for the arbitrator to make all necessary findings of fact. If those findings supported an oppression claim, then the applicant could continue the oppression claim in court based on the arbitrator's findings of fact.

[31] This is similar to what happened here. The Arbitrator made a finding that the appointment of an inspector was appropriate. He specifically found, however, that Paul would have to go to the courts if the inspector's powers were intended to affect persons that had not signed the arbitration agreement.

[32] In my view, the Arbitrator acted entirely appropriately and within his jurisdiction in authorizing the investigation and in directing the parties to the court if they wanted to expand the powers of the inspector to affect non-signatories to the arbitration agreement.

II. Should the Receiver Conduct an Investigation?

[33] The landscape has changed somewhat since this matter was last before the Arbitrator. Both parties now agree that a receiver should be appointed to sell the trucking business. The issue separating them is whether the receiver should have investigatory powers.

[34] The Arbitrator already determined that an investigation is needed in connection with the sale of the trucking business. Rana submits that I am not entitled to rely on any of the findings the Arbitrator made and must revisit the question of an investigatory receivership from scratch.

[35] I disagree. Rana's position might have more force if the question before me were whether a receiver should be appointed. That, however, is not in issue. Rana agrees that a receiver should be appointed. The only point of difference is whether there should be an

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[6] *ABOP LLC v. Qtrade Canada Inc*., 2007 BCCA 290.

investigation. It matters little whether the investigation is conducted by an inspector or by a receiver. The point is whether an investigation should occur. That issue has already been fully canvassed by the Arbitrator in a process that took many months.

[36] As noted above, even if I were to adopt Rana's view to the effect that the Arbitrator had no jurisdiction to appoint an inspector, the decision of the British Columbia Court of Appeal in *ABOP* holds that the appropriate course of action is for the Arbitrator to make relevant findings of fact and for the court to consider whether the statutory remedy is appropriate on those facts.

[37] The Arbitrator made ample findings of fact to justify the need for an investigation. The arbitrator has been involved with the parties since 2018. He has issued 12 endorsements or awards relating to the disputes between them. He has in his words "become very familiar with" their business dealings.

[38] The Arbitrator rendered two decisions in respect of the appointment of an inspector. The first was an *ex parte* order dated July 3, 2020. The matter then returned to the Arbitrator for submissions by Rana. That led to a further decision dated October 26, 2020 which runs to 359 paragraphs. It was based on extensive evidence including eight affidavits and *viva voce* cross-examinations before the Arbitrator, albeit conducted virtually.

[39] The Arbitrator provided detailed reasons for appointing an inspector which fall into two general categories.

[40] First, Rana "perpetuated a lack of transparency" in the operation of the trucking business. This included findings of a "lack of good faith in providing financial and operational information required to secure the sale of the Trucking Business." As noted earlier, the Minutes of Settlement required Rana to give Paul information to enable him to monitor the trucking business before the sale. The Arbitrator found that "Rana has failed to comply with his disclosure obligations" under the Minutes of Settlement. Among other things, the Arbitrator noted that it was Rana's obligation to prepare financial statements and that Rana did not do so.

[41] Second, the Arbitrator made several findings that Rana's own proposed receiver acknowledged would constitute red flags for potential fraud.

[42] Far from casting any doubt on the *ex parte* order, Rana's participation in the with notice hearing only strengthened the Arbitrator's view about the need for an inspector.

[43] The Arbitrator made a series of findings surrounding what appeared to be the transfer of at least 12 trucks from the brothers' business to Motion Transport Ltd. It appears that Motion acquired the trucks for the same price at which Rana had sold them, sometimes to third party, a day or two earlier. Motion was run by a good friend of Rana's, Mr. Dhinda. Mr. Dhinda says he was retired. Rana's son worked for Motion. Mr. Dhinda could not explain where Motion got the money to purchase the trucks that formerly belonged to the brothers' business. Moreover, Mr. Dhinda stated that he had no knowledge of Motion's accounting or operational issues because Rana's son "looked after that."

[44] The need for an investigation is well-founded. Whether it is conducted by an inspector or a receiver does not matter.

[45] In the hearing before me, Rana resisted the investigatory aspect of the receivership by: taking issue with some of the facts that the Arbitrator found; pointing to the cost of the investigation and by pointing to the delay an investigation will have on the sale. None of these provides a basis for refusing the investigation.

[46] Rana is entitled to dispute the facts on which the Arbitrator based his order for an investigation. The Arbitrator did not make definitive findings of fact in this regard nor is he entitled to. Indeed, the whole point of appointing an inspector is because facts need to be investigated. The test for the Arbitrator was whether there were sufficient grounds to have concerns about wrongdoing to warrant an investigation. There were more than ample grounds in this regard. Rana also suggested before me that his son was no longer working at Motion. That may or may not be the case but it has nothing to do with the allegations of past misconduct levelled against Rana and his relationship with Motion.

[47] With respect to the costs of the investigation, Paul has agreed to fund the investigation initially. If it finds wrongdoing, Paul will be compensated for the cost of the investigation out of the proceeds of sale. If it finds no wrongdoing, then the cost will remain for Paul's account.

[48] With respect to concerns about the delay that the investigation would have on the sale, Rana's own proposed receiver stated that: the investigation could be done expeditiously;[7] there are synergies to be gained by investigating while advancing the sales process;[8] and if there is a concern that Rana has not acted in good faith in providing information required to sell the business, it would be prudent "investigate those issues as part of any sale."[9] The Arbitrator expressly found that concerns about Rana's lack of good faith were valid.[10]

[49] There are also ample grounds for which the Receiver should be entitled to examine the affairs of Motion. I note here that the Receiver would not be making any findings of liability but would merely be conducting a factual investigation. The Receiver does not need to disrupt Motion's business to do so. It is simply a matter of having access to Motion's records which can be easily facilitated by allowing the Receiver to image Motion's computers or other electronic storage devices.

[50] In *Akagi v. Synergy Group (2000) Inc,*[11] the Ontario Court of Appeal confirmed that the mandate of a receiver appointed under section 101 of the *Courts of Justice Act*[12] can in appropriate cases include an investigation. As Blair J.A. stated:

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[7] Nackan Cross at q. 166.
[8] Nackan Cross at q. 172.
[9] Nackan Cross at q. 151.
[10] October Award at para. 293.
[11] *Akagi v. Synergy Group (2000) Inc*., 2015 ONCA 368
[12] *Courts of Justice Act,* RSO 1990, c C.43

> Indeed, whether it is labelled an "investigative" receivership or not, there is much to be said in favour of such a tool, in my view – when it is utilized in appropriate circumstances and with appropriate restraints. Clearly, there are situations where the appointment of a receiver to investigate the affairs of a debtor or to review certain transactions – including even, in proper circumstances, the affairs of and transactions concerning related non-parties – will be a proper exercise of the court's just and convenient authority under section 101 of the Courts of Justice Act.[13]

[51] In paragraph 98 of *Akagi*, Blair J.A. set out four themes or factors that emerged from the case law surrounding investigative receiverships.

[52] The first is whether the appointment is necessary to alleviate a risk to the plaintiff's right to recovery. I am satisfied that this factor has been met. Paul is entitled to 50% of the proceeds of sale. Rana is not entitled to any unequal benefit. The are a series of suspicious circumstances the Arbitrator identified that would, if substantiated, lead to an unequal benefit to Rana.

[53] The second factor is to determine whether the objective is to gather information and "ascertain the true state of affairs" of the debtor, or a related network of entities. This is the very purpose of an investigatory receiver. The appointment order can define the Receiver's powers to ensure that they are limited to this purpose. There is also a need to gather information because, as the Arbitrator noted, there is an informational imbalance between the parties. Correcting an informational imbalance is one key reason for appointing an investigative receiver.[14]

[54] The third factor is that the Receiver does not control the debtor's assets or operate its business, leaving the debtor to carry on its business in a manner consistent with the preservation of its business and property. This factor is of lesser importance here because the Receiver will also be empowered to sell the trucking business. As it relates to Motion, however, it is clear that the Receiver will not be operating Motion's business but will merely be investigating certain transactions between Motion and the brothers' trucking business or entities related to them.

[55] Finally, the receivership should be carefully tailored to what is required to assist in the recovery while protecting the defendant's interests, and go no further than necessary to achieve these ends. This too can be easily achieved by tailoring the order appropriately.

[56] There is ample authority to permit an inspector to extend its investigation to non-parties. In connection with the appointment of an inspector, s. 162(1) of the OBCA allows the

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[13] *Akagi* at para. 66
[14] *Akagi* at para 90.

court to make any order it thinks fit including, without limiting the generality of the foregoing:

> (d) an order authorizing an inspector to enter any premises in which the court is satisfied there might be relevant information, and to examine anything and make copies of any document or record found on the premises;
>
> (e) an order requiring any person to produce documents or records to the inspector;
>
> (f) an order authorizing an inspector to conduct a hearing, administer oaths and examine any person upon oath, and prescribing rules for the conduct of the hearing;
>
> (g) an order requiring any person to attend a hearing conducted by an inspector and to give evidence upon oath;
>
> (h) an order giving directions to an inspector or any interested person on any matter arising in the investigation;

[57] The wording of these provisions makes it clear that an inspector's powers are not restricted merely to the parties to the litigation but extend to all who have relevant information.

[58] Similarly, investigatory receivers have been given powers to include non-parties within the ambit of their investigation,[15] especially where the non-parties were involved in the movement of funds or assets at issue.[16]

[59] On the basis of the foregoing, I am satisfied that the receiver should have the investigatory powers Paul seeks.

[60] I am equally satisfied that the investigation should extend to Motion. Motion had the ability to make submissions before the Arbitrator and made submissions before me on this motion. Its submissions on the motion before me consisted of contesting some of the factual findings of the Arbitrator and of general allegations of inconvenience. As noted, however, the fact remained to be determined and all that would be required of Motion is to provide an image of its records to the investigatory receiver. If Motion does not cooperate in that regard, the steps required may be more intrusive. Whether more intrusive steps are required will initially be up to Motion to determine.

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[15] *Akagi* at para 90.
[16] *DeGroote v. DC Entertainment Corp*., 2013 ONSC 7101 at paras. 58 and 60.

III. Who should be appointed as receiver?

[61] Paul proposes that the court appoint KSV as Receiver. Rana proposes that A. Farber and Partners Inc. be appointed. I am concerned that Farber may be conflicted based on a prior retainer by Rana. Rana had retained Farber to assist him in the litigation between the parties. Farber's representative acknowledged that this created a potential conflict.

[62] Given past acrimony I think it is preferable to appoint KSV.

Disposition and Costs

[63] For the reasons set out above, Paul's motion is granted and KSV will be appointed Receiver over the trucking businesses of the parties.

[64] A draft order was included with the Caselines materials. If the respondents have any objections to that order they should notify the applicants and me by email within 48 hours. I will then set up a case conference to finalize the form of order.

[65] Any party seeking costs of the motion may make written submissions by June 1, 2021. Responding submissions should follow by June 8, 2021 with reply due by June 14.



Koehnen J.

Date: May 19, 2021