

**ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
COMMERCIAL LIST**

IN THE MATTER OF THE *COMPANIES' CREDITORS
ARRANGEMENT ACT*, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, AS AMENDED

AND IN THE MATTER OF A PLAN OF COMPROMISE OR
ARRANGEMENT OF FORME DEVELOPMENT GROUP INC.
AND THE OTHER COMPANIES LISTED ON SCHEDULE "A"
HERETO (the "Applicants")

APPLICATION UNDER THE *COMPANIES' CREDITORS
ARRANGEMENT ACT*, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, AS AMENDED

**BOOK OF AUTHORITIES OF THE MONITOR
(Returnable July 2, 2019)**

June 26, 2019

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TAB 1

2009 CarswellOnt 4467
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Nortel Networks Corp., Re

2009 CarswellOnt 4467, [2009] O.J. No. 3169,
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**IN THE MATTER OF THE COMPANIES' CREDITORS
ARRANGEMENT ACT, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, AS AMENDED**

AND IN THE MATTER OF A PLAN OF COMPROMISE OR ARRANGEMENT
OF NORTEL NETWORKS CORPORATION, NORTEL NETWORKS
LIMITED, NORTEL NETWORKS GLOBAL CORPORATION,
NORTEL NETWORKS INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION AND
NORTEL NETWORKS TECHNOLOGY CORPORATION (Applicants)

APPLICATION UNDER THE COMPANIES' CREDITORS
ARRANGEMENT ACT, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, AS AMENDED

Morawetz J.

Heard: June 29, 2009

Written reasons: July 23, 2009

Docket: 09-CL-7950

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Subject: Insolvency; Estates and Trusts

Related Abridgment Classifications

Bankruptcy and insolvency

XIV Administration of estate

XIV.6 Sale of assets

XIV.6.f Jurisdiction of court to approve sale

Bankruptcy and insolvency

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Headnote

Bankruptcy and insolvency --- Proposal — Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act — Miscellaneous issues

Telecommunication company entered protection under Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act ("Act") — Company decided to pursue "going concern" sales for various business units — Company entered into sale agreement with respect to assets in Code Division Multiple Access business and Long-Term Evolution Access assets — Company was pursuing sale of its other business units — Company brought motion for approval of bidding procedures and asset sale agreement — Motion granted — Court has jurisdiction to authorize sales process under Act in absence of formal plan of compromise or arrangement and creditor vote — Sale by company which preserved its business as going concern was consistent with objectives of Act — Unless sale was undertaken at this time, long-term viability of business would be in jeopardy.

Bankruptcy and insolvency --- Administration of estate — Sale of assets — Jurisdiction of court to approve sale

Telecommunication company entered protection under Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act ("Act") — Company decided to pursue "going concern" sales for various business units — Company entered into sale agreement with respect to assets in Code Division Multiple Access business and Long-Term Evolution Access assets — Company was pursuing sale of its other business units — Company brought motion for approval of bidding procedures and asset sale agreement — Motion granted — Court has jurisdiction to authorize sales process under Act in absence of formal plan of compromise or arrangement and creditor vote — Sale by company which preserved its business as going concern was consistent with objectives of Act — Unless sale was undertaken at this time, long-term viability of business would be in jeopardy.

Table of Authorities

Cases considered by *Morawetz J.*:

Asset Engineering LP v. Forest & Marine Financial Ltd. Partnership (2009), 2009 BCCA 319, 2009 CarswellBC 1738 (B.C. C.A.) — followed

ATB Financial v. Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments II Corp. (2008), 2008 ONCA 587, 2008 CarswellOnt 4811, (sub nom. *Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments II Corp., Re*) 240 O.A.C. 245, (sub nom. *Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments II Corp., Re*) 296 D.L.R. (4th) 135, (sub nom. *Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments II Corp., Re*) 92 O.R. (3d) 513, 45 C.B.R. (5th) 163, 47 B.L.R. (4th) 123 (Ont. C.A.) — considered

ATB Financial v. Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments II Corp. (2008), 2008 CarswellOnt 5432, 2008 CarswellOnt 5433 (S.C.C.) — referred to

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Calpine Canada Energy Ltd., Re (2007), 2007 CarswellAlta 1050, 2007 ABQB 504, 35 C.B.R. (5th) 1, 415 A.R. 196, 33 B.L.R. (4th) 68 (Alta. Q.B.) — referred to

Canadian Red Cross Society / Société Canadienne de la Croix-Rouge, Re (1998), 1998 CarswellOnt 3346, 5 C.B.R. (4th) 299, 72 O.T.C. 99 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]) — considered

Caterpillar Financial Services Ltd. v. Hard-Rock Paving Co. (2008), 2008 CarswellOnt 4046, 45 C.B.R. (5th) 87 (Ont. S.C.J.) — referred to

Cliffs Over Maple Bay Investments Ltd. v. Fisgard Capital Corp. (2008), 2008 BCCA 327, 2008 CarswellBC 1758, 83 B.C.L.R. (4th) 214, 296 D.L.R. (4th) 577, 434 W.A.C. 187, 258 B.C.A.C. 187, 46 C.B.R. (5th) 7, [2008] 10 W.W.R. 575 (B.C. C.A.) — distinguished

Consumers Packaging Inc., Re (2001), 150 O.A.C. 384, 27 C.B.R. (4th) 197, 2001 CarswellOnt 3482, 12 C.P.C. (5th) 208 (Ont. C.A.) — considered

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PSINET Ltd., Re (2001), 28 C.B.R. (4th) 95, 2001 CarswellOnt 3405 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) — considered

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Stelco Inc., Re (2004), 2004 CarswellOnt 4084, 6 C.B.R. (5th) 316 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) — referred to

Tiger Brand Knitting Co., Re (2005), 2005 CarswellOnt 1240, 9 C.B.R. (5th) 315 (Ont. S.C.J.) — referred to

Winnipeg Motor Express Inc., Re (2008), 2008 CarswellMan 560, 2008 MBQB 297, 49 C.B.R. (5th) 302 (Man. Q.B.) — referred to

Statutes considered:

Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C.

s. 363 — referred to

Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36

Generally — referred to

s. 11 — referred to

s. 11(4) — considered

MOTION by company for approval of bidding procedures for sale of business and asset sale agreement.

Morawetz J.:

Introduction

1 On June 29, 2009, I granted the motion of the Applicants and approved the bidding procedures (the "Bidding Procedures") described in the affidavit of Mr. Riedel sworn June 23, 2009 (the "Riedel Affidavit") and the Fourteenth Report of Ernst & Young, Inc., in its capacity as Monitor (the "Monitor") (the "Fourteenth Report"). The order was granted immediately after His Honour Judge Gross of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware (the "U.S. Court") approved the Bidding Procedures in the Chapter 11 proceedings.

2 I also approved the Asset Sale Agreement dated as of June 19, 2009 (the "Sale Agreement") among Nokia Siemens Networks B.V. ("Nokia Siemens Networks" or the "Purchaser"), as buyer, and Nortel Networks Corporation ("NNC"), Nortel Networks Limited ("NNL"), Nortel Networks, Inc. ("NNI") and certain of their affiliates, as vendors (collectively the "Sellers") in the form attached as Appendix "A" to the Fourteenth Report and I also approved and accepted the Sale Agreement for the purposes of conducting the "stalking horse" bidding process in accordance with the Bidding Procedures including, the Break-Up Fee and the Expense Reimbursement (as both terms are defined in the Sale Agreement).

3 An order was also granted sealing confidential Appendix "B" to the Fourteenth Report containing the schedules and exhibits to the Sale Agreement pending further order of this court.

4 The following are my reasons for granting these orders.

5 The hearing on June 29, 2009 (the "Joint Hearing") was conducted by way of video conference with a similar motion being heard by the U.S. Court. His Honor Judge Gross presided over the hearing in the U.S. Court. The Joint Hearing was conducted in accordance with the provisions of the Cross-Border Protocol, which had previously been approved by both the U.S. Court and this court.

6 The Sale Agreement relates to the Code Division Multiple Access ("CMDA") business Long-Term Evolution ("LTE") Access assets.

7 The Sale Agreement is not insignificant. The Monitor reports that revenues from CDMA comprised over 21% of Nortel's 2008 revenue. The CDMA business employs approximately 3,100 people (approximately 500 in Canada) and the LTE business employs approximately 1,000 people (approximately 500 in Canada). The purchase price under the Sale Agreement is \$650 million.

Background

8 The Applicants were granted CCAA protection on January 14, 2009. Insolvency proceedings have also been commenced in the United States, the United Kingdom, Israel and France.

9 At the time the proceedings were commenced, Nortel's business operated through 143 subsidiaries, with approximately 30,000 employees globally. As of January 2009, Nortel employed approximately 6,000 people in Canada alone.

10 The stated purpose of Nortel's filing under the CCAA was to stabilize the Nortel business to maximize the chances of preserving all or a portion of the enterprise. The Monitor reported that a thorough strategic review of the company's assets and operations would have to be undertaken in consultation with various stakeholder groups.

11 In April 2009, the Monitor updated the court and noted that various restructuring alternatives were being considered.

12 On June 19, 2009, Nortel announced that it had entered into the Sale Agreement with respect to its assets in its CMDA business and LTE Access assets (collectively, the "Business") and that it was pursuing the sale of its other business units. Mr. Riedel in his affidavit states that Nortel has spent many months considering various restructuring alternatives before determining in its business judgment to pursue "going concern" sales for Nortel's various business units.

13 In deciding to pursue specific sales processes, Mr. Riedel also stated that Nortel's management considered:

(a) the impact of the filings on Nortel's various businesses, including deterioration in sales; and

(b) the best way to maximize the value of its operations, to preserve jobs and to continue businesses in Canada and the U.S.

14 Mr. Riedel notes that while the Business possesses significant value, Nortel was faced with the reality that:

(a) the Business operates in a highly competitive environment;

(b) full value cannot be realized by continuing to operate the Business through a restructuring; and

(c) in the absence of continued investment, the long-term viability of the Business would be put into jeopardy.

15 Mr. Riedel concluded that the proposed process for the sale of the Business pursuant to an auction process provided the best way to preserve the Business as a going concern and to maximize value and preserve the jobs of Nortel employees.

16 In addition to the assets covered by the Sale Agreement, certain liabilities are to be assumed by the Purchaser. This issue is covered in a comprehensive manner at paragraph 34 of the Fourteenth Report. Certain liabilities to employees are included on this list. The assumption of these liabilities is consistent with the provisions of the Sale Agreement that requires the Purchaser to extend written offers of employment to at least 2,500 employees in the Business.

17 The Monitor also reports that given that certain of the U.S. Debtors are parties to the Sale Agreement and given the desire to maximize value for the benefit of stakeholders, Nortel determined and it has agreed with the Purchaser that the Sale Agreement is subject to higher or better offers being obtained pursuant to a sale process under s. 363 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code and that the Sale Agreement shall serve as a "stalking horse" bid pursuant to that process.

18 The Bidding Procedures provide that all bids must be received by the Seller by no later than July 21, 2009 and that the Sellers will conduct an auction of the purchased assets on July 24, 2009. It is anticipated that Nortel will ultimately seek a final sales order from the U.S. Court on or about July 28, 2009 and an approval and vesting order from this court in respect of the Sale Agreement and purchased assets on or about July 30, 2009.

19 The Monitor recognizes the expeditious nature of the sale process but the Monitor has been advised that given the nature of the Business and the consolidation occurring in the global market, there are likely to be a limited number of parties interested in acquiring the Business.

20 The Monitor also reports that Nortel has consulted with, among others, the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors (the "UCC") and the bondholder group regarding the Bidding Procedures and is of the view that both are supportive of the timing of this sale process. (It is noted that the UCC did file a limited objection to the motion relating to certain aspects of the Bidding Procedures.)

21 Given the sale efforts made to date by Nortel, the Monitor supports the sale process outlined in the Fourteenth Report and more particularly described in the Bidding Procedures.

22 Objections to the motion were filed in the U.S. Court and this court by MatlinPatterson Global Advisors LLC, MatlinPatterson Global Opportunities Partners III L.P. and Matlin Patterson Opportunities Partners (Cayman) III L.P. (collectively, "MatlinPatterson") as well the UCC.

23 The objections were considered in the hearing before Judge Gross and, with certain limited exceptions, the objections were overruled.

Issues and Discussion

24 The threshold issue being raised on this motion by the Applicants is whether the CCAA affords this court the jurisdiction to approve a sales process in the absence of a formal plan of compromise or arrangement and a creditor vote. If the question is answered in the affirmative, the secondary issue is whether this sale should authorize the Applicants to sell the Business.

25 The Applicants submit that it is well established in the jurisprudence that this court has the jurisdiction under the CCAA to approve the sales process and that the requested order should be granted in these circumstances.

26 Counsel to the Applicants submitted a detailed factum which covered both issues.

27 Counsel to the Applicants submits that one of the purposes of the CCAA is to preserve the going concern value of debtors companies and that the court's jurisdiction extends to authorizing sale of the debtor's business, even in the absence of a plan or creditor vote.

28 The CCAA is a flexible statute and it is particularly useful in complex insolvency cases in which the court is required to balance numerous constituents and a myriad of interests.

29 The CCAA has been described as "skeletal in nature". It has also been described as a "sketch, an outline, a supporting framework for the resolution of corporate insolvencies in the public interest". *ATB Financial v. Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments II Corp.* (2008), 45 C.B.R. (5th) 163 (Ont. C.A.) at paras. 44, 61, leave to appeal refused [2008] S.C.C.A. No. 337 (S.C.C.). ("ATB Financial").

30 The jurisprudence has identified as sources of the court's discretionary jurisdiction, *inter alia*:

(a) the power of the court to impose terms and conditions on the granting of a stay under s. 11(4) of the CCAA;

(b) the specific provision of s. 11(4) of the CCAA which provides that the court may make an order "on such terms as it may impose"; and

(c) the inherent jurisdiction of the court to "fill in the gaps" of the CCAA in order to give effect to its objects. *Canadian Red Cross Society / Société Canadienne de la Croix-Rouge, Re* (1998), 5 C.B.R. (4th) 299 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]) at para. 43; *PSINET Ltd., Re* (2001), 28 C.B.R. (4th) 95 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) at para. 5, *ATB Financial, supra*, at paras. 43-52.

31 However, counsel to the Applicants acknowledges that the discretionary authority of the court under s. 11 must be informed by the purpose of the CCAA.

Its exercise must be guided by the scheme and object of the Act and by the legal principles that govern corporate law issues. *Re Stelco Inc.* (2005), 9 C.B.R. (5th) 135 (Ont. C.A.) at para. 44.

32 In support of the court's jurisdiction to grant the order sought in this case, counsel to the Applicants submits that Nortel seeks to invoke the "overarching policy" of the CCAA, namely, to preserve the going concern. *Residential Warranty Co. of Canada Inc., Re* (2006), 21 C.B.R. (5th) 57 (Alta. Q.B.) at para. 78.

33 Counsel to the Applicants further submits that CCAA courts have repeatedly noted that the purpose of the CCAA is to preserve the benefit of a going concern business for all stakeholders, or "the whole economic community":

The purpose of the CCAA is to facilitate arrangements that might avoid liquidation of the company and allow it to continue in business to the benefit of the whole economic

community, including the shareholders, the creditors (both secured and unsecured) and the employees. *Citibank Canada v. Chase Manhattan Bank of Canada* (1991), 5 C.B.R. (3rd) 167 (Ont. Gen. Div.) at para. 29. *Re Consumers Packaging Inc.* (2001) 27 C.B.R. (4th) 197 (Ont. C.A.) at para. 5.

34 Counsel to the Applicants further submits that the CCAA should be given a broad and liberal interpretation to facilitate its underlying purpose, including the preservation of the going concern for the benefit of all stakeholders and further that it should not matter whether the business continues as a going concern under the debtor's stewardship or under new ownership, for as long as the business continues as a going concern, a primary goal of the CCAA will be met.

35 Counsel to the Applicants makes reference to a number of cases where courts in Ontario, in appropriate cases, have exercised their jurisdiction to approve a sale of assets, even in the absence of a plan of arrangement being tendered to stakeholders for a vote. In doing so, counsel to the Applicants submits that the courts have repeatedly recognized that they have jurisdiction under the CCAA to approve asset sales in the absence of a plan of arrangement, where such sale is in the best interests of stakeholders generally. *Canadian Red Cross Society / Société Canadienne de la Croix-Rouge, Re, supra, Re PSINet, supra, Consumers Packaging Inc., Re* [2001 CarswellOnt 3482 (Ont. C.A.)], *supra, Stelco Inc., Re* (2004), 6 C.B.R. (5th) 316 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) at para. 1, *Tiger Brand Knitting Co., Re* (2005), 9 C.B.R. (5th) 315 (Ont. S.C.J.), *Caterpillar Financial Services Ltd. v. Hard-Rock Paving Co.* (2008), 45 C.B.R. (5th) 87 (Ont. S.C.J.) and *Lehndorff General Partner Ltd., Re* (1993), 17 C.B.R. (3d) 24 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]).

36 In *Re Consumers Packaging, supra*, the Court of Appeal for Ontario specifically held that a sale of a business as a going concern during a CCAA proceeding is consistent with the purposes of the CCAA:

The sale of Consumers' Canadian glass operations as a going concern pursuant to the Owens-Illinois bid allows the preservation of Consumers' business (albeit under new ownership), and is therefore consistent with the purposes of the CCAA.

...we cannot refrain from commenting that Farley J.'s decision to approve the Owens-Illinois bid is consistent with previous decisions in Ontario and elsewhere that have emphasized the broad remedial purpose of flexibility of the CCAA and have approved the sale and disposition of assets during CCAA proceedings prior to a formal plan being tendered. *Re Consumers Packaging, supra, at paras. 5, 9.*

37 Similarly, in *Canadian Red Cross Society / Société Canadienne de la Croix-Rouge, Re, supra*, Blair J. (as he then was) expressly affirmed the court's jurisdiction to approve a sale of assets in the course of a CCAA proceeding before a plan of arrangement had been approved

by creditors. *Canadian Red Cross Society / Société Canadienne de la Croix-Rouge, Re, supra*, at paras. 43, 45.

38 Similarly, in *PSINet Limited, supra*, the court approved a going concern sale in a CCAA proceeding where no plan was presented to creditors and a substantial portion of the debtor's Canadian assets were to be sold. Farley J. noted as follows:

[If the sale was not approved,] there would be a liquidation scenario ensuing which would realize far less than this going concern sale (which appears to me to have involved a transparent process with appropriate exposure designed to maximize the proceeds), thus impacting upon the rest of the creditors, especially as to the unsecured, together with the material enlarging of the unsecured claims by the disruption claims of approximately 8,600 customers (who will be materially disadvantaged by an interrupted transition) plus the job losses for approximately 200 employees. *Re PSINet Limited, supra*, at para. 3.

39 In *Re Stelco Inc., supra*, in 2004, Farley J. again addressed the issue of the feasibility of selling the operations as a going concern:

I would observe that usually it is the creditor side which wishes to terminate CCAA proceedings and that when the creditors threaten to take action, there is a realization that a liquidation scenario will not only have a negative effect upon a CCAA applicant, but also upon its workforce. Hence, the CCAA may be employed to provide stability during a period of necessary financial and operational restructuring - and if a restructuring of the "old company" is not feasible, then there is the exploration of the feasibility of the sale of the operations/enterprise as a going concern (with continued employment) in whole or in part. *Re Stelco Inc, supra*, at para. 1.

40 I accept these submissions as being general statements of the law in Ontario. The value of equity in an insolvent debtor is dubious, at best, and, in my view, it follows that the determining factor should not be whether the business continues under the debtor's stewardship or under a structure that recognizes a new equity structure. An equally important factor to consider is whether the case can be made to continue the business as a going concern.

41 Counsel to the Applicants also referred to decisions from the courts in Quebec, Manitoba and Alberta which have similarly recognized the court's jurisdiction to approve a sale of assets during the course of a CCAA proceeding. *Boutiques San Francisco Inc., Re* (2004), 7 C.B.R. (5th) 189 (C.S. Que.), *Winnipeg Motor Express Inc., Re* (2008), 49 C.B.R. (5th) 302 (Man. Q.B.) at paras. 41, 44, and *Calpine Canada Energy Ltd., Re* (2007), 35 C.B.R. (5th) 1 (Alta. Q.B.) at para. 75.

42 Counsel to the Applicants also directed the court's attention to a recent decision of the British Columbia Court of Appeal which questioned whether the court should authorize

the sale of substantially all of the debtor's assets where the debtor's plan "will simply propose that the net proceeds from the sale...be distributed to its creditors". In *Cliffs Over Maple Bay Investments Ltd. v. Fisgard Capital Corp.* (2008), 46 C.B.R. (5th) 7 (B.C. C.A.) ("*Cliffs Over Maple Bay*"), the court was faced with a debtor who had no active business but who nonetheless sought to stave off its secured creditor indefinitely. The case did not involve any type of sale transaction but the Court of Appeal questioned whether a court should authorize the sale under the CCAA without requiring the matter to be voted upon by creditors.

43 In addressing this matter, it appears to me that the British Columbia Court of Appeal focussed on whether the court should grant the requested relief and not on the question of whether a CCAA court has the jurisdiction to grant the requested relief.

44 I do not disagree with the decision in *Cliffs Over Maple Bay*. However, it involved a situation where the debtor had no active business and did not have the support of its stakeholders. That is not the case with these Applicants.

45 The *Cliffs Over Maple Bay* decision has recently been the subject of further comment by the British Columbia Court of Appeal in *Asset Engineering LP v. Forest & Marine Financial Ltd. Partnership*, 2009 BCCA 319 (B.C. C.A.).

46 At paragraphs 24 - 26 of the *Forest and Marine* decision, Newbury J.A. stated:

24. In *Cliffs Over Maple Bay*, the debtor company was a real estate developer whose one project had failed. The company had been dormant for some time. It applied for CCAA protection but described its proposal for restructuring in vague terms that amounted essentially to a plan to "secure sufficient funds" to complete the stalled project (Para. 34). This court, per Tysoe J.A., ruled that although the Act can apply to single-project companies, its purposes are unlikely to be engaged in such instances, since mortgage priorities are fully straight forward and there will be little incentive for senior secured creditors to compromise their interests (Para. 36). Further, the Court stated, the granting of a stay under s. 11 is "not a free standing remedy that the court may grant whenever an insolvent company wishes to undertake a "restructuring"...Rather, s. 11 is ancillary to the fundamental purpose of the CCAA, and a stay of proceedings freezing the rights of creditors should only be granted in furtherance of the CCAA's fundamental purpose". That purpose has been described in *Meridian Developments Inc. v. Toronto Dominion Bank* (1984) 11 D.L.R. (4th) 576 (Alta. Q.B.):

The legislation is intended to have wide scope and allow a judge to make orders which will effectively maintain the status quo for a period while the insolvent company attempts to gain the approval of its creditors for a proposed

arrangement which will enable the company to remain in operation for what is, hopefully, the future benefit of both the company and its creditors. [at 580]

25. The Court was not satisfied in *Cliffs Over Maple Bay* that the "restructuring" contemplated by the debtor would do anything other than distribute the net proceeds from the sale, winding up or liquidation of its business. The debtor had no intention of proposing a plan of arrangement, and its business would not continue following the execution of its proposal - thus it could not be said the purposes of the statute would be engaged...

26. In my view, however, the case at bar is quite different from *Cliffs Over Maple Bay*. Here, the main debtor, the Partnership, is at the centre of a complicated corporate group and carries on an active financing business that it hopes to save notwithstanding the current economic cycle. (The business itself which fills a "niche" in the market, has been carried on in one form or another since 1983.) The CCAA is appropriate for situations such as this where it is unknown whether the "restructuring" will ultimately take the form of a refinancing or will involve a reorganization of the corporate entity or entities and a true compromise of the rights of one or more parties. The "fundamental purpose" of the Act - to preserve the *status quo* while the debtor prepares a plan that will enable it to remain in business to the benefit of all concerned - will be furthered by granting a stay so that the means contemplated by the Act - a compromise or arrangement - can be developed, negotiated and voted on if necessary...

47 It seems to me that the foregoing views expressed in *Forest and Marine* are not inconsistent with the views previously expressed by the courts in Ontario. The CCAA is intended to be flexible and must be given a broad and liberal interpretation to achieve its objectives and a sale by the debtor which preserves its business as a going concern is, in my view, consistent with those objectives.

48 I therefore conclude that the court does have the jurisdiction to authorize a sale under the CCAA in the absence of a plan.

49 I now turn to a consideration of whether it is appropriate, in this case, to approve this sales process. Counsel to the Applicants submits that the court should consider the following factors in determining whether to authorize a sale under the CCAA in the absence of a plan:

- (a) is a sale transaction warranted at this time?
- (b) will the sale benefit the whole "economic community"?
- (c) do any of the debtors' creditors have a *bona fide* reason to object to a sale of the business?

(d) is there a better viable alternative?

I accept this submission.

50 It is the position of the Applicants that Nortel's proposed sale of the Business should be approved as this decision is to the benefit of stakeholders and no creditor is prejudiced. Further, counsel submits that in the absence of a sale, the prospects for the Business are a loss of competitiveness, a loss of value and a loss of jobs.

51 Counsel to the Applicants summarized the facts in support of the argument that the Sale Transaction should be approved, namely:

(a) Nortel has been working diligently for many months on a plan to reorganize its business;

(b) in the exercise of its business judgment, Nortel has concluded that it cannot continue to operate the Business successfully within the CCAA framework;

(c) unless a sale is undertaken at this time, the long-term viability of the Business will be in jeopardy;

(d) the Sale Agreement continues the Business as a going concern, will save at least 2,500 jobs and constitutes the best and most valuable proposal for the Business;

(e) the auction process will serve to ensure Nortel receives the highest possible value for the Business;

(f) the sale of the Business at this time is in the best interests of Nortel and its stakeholders; and

(g) the value of the Business is likely to decline over time.

52 The objections of MatlinPatterson and the UCC have been considered. I am satisfied that the issues raised in these objections have been addressed in a satisfactory manner by the ruling of Judge Gross and no useful purpose would be served by adding additional comment.

53 Counsel to the Applicants also emphasize that Nortel will return to court to seek approval of the most favourable transaction to emerge from the auction process and will aim to satisfy the elements established by the court for approval as set out in *Royal Bank v. Soundair Corp.* (1991), 7 C.B.R. (3d) 1 (Ont. C.A.) at para. 16.

Disposition

54 The Applicants are part of a complicated corporate group. They carry on an active international business. I have accepted that an important factor to consider in a CCAA process is whether the case can be made to continue the business as a going concern. I am satisfied having considered the factors referenced at [49], as well as the facts summarized at [51], that the Applicants have met this test. I am therefore satisfied that this motion should be granted.

55 Accordingly, I approve the Bidding Procedures as described in the Riedel Affidavit and the Fourteenth Report of the Monitor, which procedures have been approved by the U.S. Court.

56 I am also satisfied that the Sale Agreement should be approved and further that the Sale Agreement be approved and accepted for the purposes of conducting the "stalking horse" bidding process in accordance with the Bidding Procedures including, without limitation the Break-Up Fee and the Expense Reimbursement (as both terms are defined in the Sale Agreement).

57 Further, I have also been satisfied that Appendix B to the Fourteenth Report contains information which is commercially sensitive, the dissemination of which could be detrimental to the stakeholders and, accordingly, I order that this document be sealed, pending further order of the court.

58 In approving the Bidding Procedures, I have also taken into account that the auction will be conducted prior to the sale approval motion. This process is consistent with the practice of this court.

59 Finally, it is the expectation of this court that the Monitor will continue to review ongoing issues in respect of the Bidding Procedures. The Bidding Procedures permit the Applicants to waive certain components of qualified bids without the consent of the UCC, the bondholder group and the Monitor. However, it is the expectation of this court that, if this situation arises, the Applicants will provide advance notice to the Monitor of its intention to do so.

Motion granted.

TAB 2

Most Negative Treatment: Distinguished

Most Recent Distinguished: [PCAS Patient Care Automation Services Inc., Re](#) | 2012 ONSC 3367, 2012 CarswellOnt 7248, 91 C.B.R. (5th) 285, 216 A.C.W.S. (3d) 551 | (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List], Jun 9, 2012)

1991 CarswellOnt 205
Ontario Court of Appeal

Royal Bank v. Soundair Corp.

1991 CarswellOnt 205, [1991] O.J. No. 1137, 27 A.C.W.S. (3d) 1178,
46 O.A.C. 321, 4 O.R. (3d) 1, 7 C.B.R. (3d) 1, 83 D.L.R. (4th) 76

**ROYAL BANK OF CANADA (plaintiff/respondent) v.
SOUNDAIR CORPORATION (respondent), CANADIAN
PENSION CAPITAL LIMITED (appellant) and CANADIAN
INSURERS' CAPITAL CORPORATION (appellant)**

Goodman, McKinlay and Galligan JJ.A.

Heard: June 11, 12, 13 and 14, 1991

Judgment: July 3, 1991

Docket: Doc. CA 318/91

Counsel: *J. B. Berkow* and *S. H. Goldman* , for appellants Canadian Pension Capital Limited and Canadian Insurers' Capital Corporation.

J. T. Morin, Q.C. , for Air Canada.

L.A.J. Barnes and *L.E. Ritchie* , for plaintiff/respondent Royal Bank of Canada.

S.F. Dunphy and *G.K. Ketcheson* , for Ernst & Young Inc., receiver of respondent Soundair Corporation.

W.G. Horton , for Ontario Express Limited.

N.J. Spies , for Frontier Air Limited.

Subject: Corporate and Commercial; Insolvency

Related Abridgment Classifications

Debtors and creditors

VII Receivers

VII.6 Conduct and liability of receiver

VII.6.a General conduct of receiver

Headnote

Receivers --- Conduct and liability of receiver — General conduct of receiver

Court considering its position when approving sale recommended by receiver.

S Corp., which engaged in the air transport business, had a division known as AT. When S Corp. experienced financial difficulties, one of the secured creditors, who had an interest in the assets of AT, brought a motion for the appointment of a receiver. The receiver was ordered to operate AT and to sell it as a going concern. The receiver had two offers. It accepted the offer made by OEL and rejected an offer by 922 which contained an unacceptable condition. Subsequently, 922 obtained an order allowing it to make a second offer removing the condition. The secured creditors supported acceptance of the 922 offer. The court approved the sale to OEL and dismissed the motion to approve the 922 offer. An appeal was brought from this order.

Held:

The appeal was dismissed.

Per Galligan J.A.: When a court appoints a receiver to use its commercial expertise to sell an airline, it is inescapable that it intends to rely upon the receiver's expertise and not upon its own. The court should be reluctant to second-guess, with the benefit of hindsight, the considered business decisions made by its receiver.

The conduct of the receiver should be reviewed in the light of the specific mandate given to him by the court. The order appointing the receiver did not say how the receiver was to negotiate the sale. The order obviously intended, because of the unusual nature of the asset being sold, to leave the method of sale substantially to the discretion of the receiver.

To determine whether a receiver has acted providently, the conduct of the receiver should be examined in light of the information the receiver had when it agreed to accept an offer. On the date the receiver accepted the OEL offer, it had only two offers: that of OEL, which was acceptable, and that of 922, which contained an unacceptable condition. The decision made was a sound one in the circumstances. The receiver made a sufficient effort to obtain the best price, and did not act improvidently.

The court must exercise extreme caution before it interferes with the process adopted by a receiver to sell an unusual asset. It is important that prospective purchasers know that, if they are acting in good faith, bargain seriously with a receiver and enter into an agreement with it, a court will not lightly interfere with the commercial judgment of the receiver to sell the assets to them.

Per McKinlay J.A. (concurring in the result): It is most important that the integrity of procedures followed by court-appointed receivers be protected in the interests of both commercial morality and the future confidence of business persons in their dealings with receivers. In all cases, the court should carefully scrutinize the procedure followed by the receiver. While the procedure carried out by the receiver in this case was appropriate, given the unfolding of events and the unique nature of the asset involved, it may not be a procedure that is likely to be appropriate in many receivership sales.

Per Goodman J.A. (dissenting): It was imprudent and unfair on the part of the receiver to ignore an offer from an interested party which offered approximately triple the cash down

payment without giving a chance to the offeror to remove the conditions or other terms which made the offer unacceptable to the receiver. The offer accepted by the receiver was improvident and unfair insofar as two creditors were concerned.

Table of Authorities

Cases considered:

Beauty Counsellors of Canada Ltd., Re (1986), 58 C.B.R. (N.S.) 237 (Ont. S.C.) — referred to

British Columbia Development Corp. v. Spun Cast Industries Ltd. (1977), 26 C.B.R. (N.S.) 28, 5 B.C.L.R. 94 (S.C.) — referred to

Cameron v. Bank of Nova Scotia (1981), 38 C.B.R. (N.S.) 1, 45 N.S.R. (2d) 303, 86 A.P.R. 303 (C.A.) — referred to

Crown Trust Co. v. Rosenberg (1986), 67 C.B.R. (N.S.) 320n, 60 O.R. (2d) 87, 22 C.P.C. (2d) 131, 39 D.L.R. (4th) 526 (H.C.) — applied

Salima Investments Ltd. v. Bank of Montreal (1985), 59 C.B.R. (N.S.) 242, 41 Alta. L.R. (2d) 58, 65 A.R. 372, 21 D.L.R. (4th) (C.A.) — referred to

Selkirk, Re (1986), 58 C.B.R. (N.S.) 245 (Ont. S.C.) — referred to

Selkirk, Re (1987), 64 C.B.R. (N.S.) 140 (Ont. S.C.) — referred to

Statutes considered:

Employment Standards Act, R.S.O. 1980, c. 137.

Environmental Protection Act, R.S.O. 1980, c. 141.

Appeal from order approving sale of assets by receiver.

Galligan J.A. :

1 This is an appeal from the order of Rosenberg J. made on May 1, 1991. By that order, he approved the sale of Air Toronto to Ontario Express Limited and Frontier Air Limited, and he dismissed a motion to approve an offer to purchase Air Toronto by 922246 Ontario Limited.

2 It is necessary at the outset to give some background to the dispute. Soundair Corporation ("Soundair") is a corporation engaged in the air transport business. It has three divisions. One of them is Air Toronto. Air Toronto operates a scheduled airline from Toronto to a number of mid-sized cities in the United States of America. Its routes serve as feeders to several of Air Canada's routes. Pursuant to a connector agreement, Air Canada provides some services to Air Toronto and benefits from the feeder traffic provided by it. The operational relationship between Air Canada and Air Toronto is a close one.

3 In the latter part of 1989 and the early part of 1990, Soundair was in financial difficulty. Soundair has two secured creditors who have an interest in the assets of Air Toronto. The Royal Bank of Canada (the "Royal Bank") is owed at least \$65 million dollars. The appellants

Canadian Pension Capital Limited and Canadian Insurers' Capital Corporation (collectively called "CCFL") are owed approximately \$9,500,000. Those creditors will have a deficiency expected to be in excess of \$50 million on the winding up of Soundair.

4 On April 26, 1990, upon the motion of the Royal Bank, O'Brien J. appointed Ernst & Young Inc. (the "receiver") as receiver of all of the assets, property and undertakings of Soundair. The order required the receiver to operate Air Toronto and sell it as a going concern. Because of the close relationship between Air Toronto and Air Canada, it was contemplated that the receiver would obtain the assistance of Air Canada to operate Air Toronto. The order authorized the receiver:

(b) to enter into contractual arrangements with Air Canada to retain a manager or operator, including Air Canada, to manage and operate Air Toronto under the supervision of Ernst & Young Inc. until the completion of the sale of Air Toronto to Air Canada or other person.

Also because of the close relationship, it was expected that Air Canada would purchase Air Toronto. To that end, the order of O'Brien J. authorized the Receiver:

(c) to negotiate and do all things necessary or desirable to complete a sale of Air Toronto to Air Canada and, if a sale to Air Canada cannot be completed, to negotiate and sell Air Toronto to another person, subject to terms and conditions approved by this Court.

5 Over a period of several weeks following that order, negotiations directed towards the sale of Air Toronto took place between the receiver and Air Canada. Air Canada had an agreement with the receiver that it would have exclusive negotiating rights during that period. I do not think it is necessary to review those negotiations, but I note that Air Canada had complete access to all of the operations of Air Toronto and conducted due diligence examinations. It became thoroughly acquainted with every aspect of Air Toronto's operations.

6 Those negotiations came to an end when an offer made by Air Canada on June 19, 1990, was considered unsatisfactory by the receiver. The offer was not accepted and lapsed. Having regard to the tenor of Air Canada's negotiating stance and a letter sent by its solicitors on July 20, 1990, I think that the receiver was eminently reasonable when it decided that there was no realistic possibility of selling Air Toronto to Air Canada.

7 The receiver then looked elsewhere. Air Toronto's feeder business is very attractive, but it only has value to a national airline. The receiver concluded reasonably, therefore, that it was commercially necessary for one of Canada's two national airlines to be involved in any sale of Air Toronto. Realistically, there were only two possible purchasers, whether direct or indirect. They were Air Canada and Canadian Airlines International.

8 It was well known in the air transport industry that Air Toronto was for sale. During the months following the collapse of the negotiations with Air Canada, the receiver tried unsuccessfully to find viable purchasers. In late 1990, the receiver turned to Canadian Airlines International, the only realistic alternative. Negotiations began between them. Those negotiations led to a letter of intent dated February 11, 1990. On March 6, 1991, the receiver received an offer from Ontario Express Limited and Frontier Airlines Limited, who are subsidiaries of Canadian Airlines International. This offer is called the OEL offer.

9 In the meantime, Air Canada and CCFL were having discussions about making an offer for the purchase of Air Toronto. They formed 922246 Ontario Limited ("922") for the purpose of purchasing Air Toronto. On March 1, 1991, CCFL wrote to the receiver saying that it proposed to make an offer. On March 7, 1991, Air Canada and CCFL presented an offer to the receiver in the name of 922. For convenience, its offers are called the "922 offers."

10 The first 922 offer contained a condition which was unacceptable to the receiver. I will refer to that condition in more detail later. The receiver declined the 922 offer and on March 8, 1991, accepted the OEL offer. Subsequently, 922 obtained an order allowing it to make a second offer. It then submitted an offer which was virtually identical to that of March 7, 1991, except that the unacceptable condition had been removed.

11 The proceedings before Rosenberg J. then followed. He approved the sale to OEL and dismissed a motion for the acceptance of the 922 offer. Before Rosenberg J., and in this court, both CCFL and the Royal Bank supported the acceptance of the second 922 offer.

12 There are only two issues which must be resolved in this appeal. They are:

- (1) Did the receiver act properly when it entered into an agreement to sell Air Toronto to OEL?
- (2) What effect does the support of the 922 offer by the secured creditors have on the result?

13 I will deal with the two issues separately.

1. Did the Receiver Act Properly in Agreeing to Sell to OEL?

14 Before dealing with that issue, there are three general observations which I think I should make. The first is that the sale of an airline as a going concern is a very complex process. The best method of selling an airline at the best price is something far removed from the expertise of a court. When a court appoints a receiver to use its commercial expertise to sell an airline, it is inescapable that it intends to rely upon the receiver's expertise and not upon its own. Therefore, the court must place a great deal of confidence in the actions taken

and in the opinions formed by the receiver. It should also assume that the receiver is acting properly unless the contrary is clearly shown. The second observation is that the court should be reluctant to second-guess, with the benefit of hindsight, the considered business decisions made by its receiver. The third observation which I wish to make is that the conduct of the receiver should be reviewed in the light of the specific mandate given to him by the court.

15 The order of O'Brien J. provided that if the receiver could not complete the sale to Air Canada that it was "to negotiate and sell Air Toronto to another person." The court did not say how the receiver was to negotiate the sale. It did not say it was to call for bids or conduct an auction. It told the receiver to negotiate and sell. It obviously intended, because of the unusual nature of the asset being sold, to leave the method of sale substantially in the discretion of the receiver. I think, therefore, that the court should not review minutely the process of the sale when, broadly speaking, it appears to the court to be a just process.

16 As did Rosenberg J., I adopt as correct the statement made by Anderson J. in *Crown Trust Co. v. Rosenberg* (1986), 60 O.R. (2d) 87, 67 C.B.R. (N.S.) 320n, 22 C.P.C. (2d) 131, 39 D.L.R. (4th) 526 (H.C.), at pp. 92-94 [O.R.], of the duties which a court must perform when deciding whether a receiver who has sold a property acted properly. When he set out the court's duties, he did not put them in any order of priority, nor do I. I summarize those duties as follows:

1. It should consider whether the receiver has made a sufficient effort to get the best price and has not acted improvidently.
2. It should consider the interests of all parties.
3. It should consider the efficacy and integrity of the process by which offers are obtained.
4. It should consider whether there has been unfairness in the working out of the process.

17 I intend to discuss the performance of those duties separately.

1. Did the Receiver make a sufficient effort to get the best price and did it act providently?

18 Having regard to the fact that it was highly unlikely that a commercially viable sale could be made to anyone but the two national airlines, or to someone supported by either of them, it is my view that the receiver acted wisely and reasonably when it negotiated only with Air Canada and Canadian Airlines International. Furthermore, when Air Canada said that it would submit no further offers and gave the impression that it would not participate further in the receiver's efforts to sell, the only course reasonably open to the receiver was to negotiate with Canadian Airlines International. Realistically, there was nowhere else to go

but to Canadian Airlines International. In doing so, it is my opinion that the receiver made sufficient efforts to sell the airline.

19 When the receiver got the OEL offer on March 6, 1991, it was over 10 months since it had been charged with the responsibility of selling Air Toronto. Until then, the receiver had not received one offer which it thought was acceptable. After substantial efforts to sell the airline over that period, I find it difficult to think that the receiver acted improvidently in accepting the only acceptable offer which it had.

20 On March 8, 1991, the date when the receiver accepted the OEL offer, it had only two offers, the OEL offer, which was acceptable, and the 922 offer, which contained an unacceptable condition. I cannot see how the receiver, assuming for the moment that the price was reasonable, could have done anything but accept the OEL offer.

21 When deciding whether a receiver had acted providently, the court should examine the conduct of the receiver in light of the information the receiver had when it agreed to accept an offer. In this case, the court should look at the receiver's conduct in the light of the information it had when it made its decision on March 8, 1991. The court should be very cautious before deciding that the receiver's conduct was improvident based upon information which has come to light after it made its decision. To do so, in my view, would derogate from the mandate to sell given to the receiver by the order of O'Brien J. I agree with and adopt what was said by Anderson J. in *Crown Trust Co. v. Rosenberg*, supra, at p. 112 [O.R.]:

Its decision was made as a matter of business judgment *on the elements then available to it*. It is of the very essence of a receiver's function to make such judgments and in the making of them to act seriously and responsibly so as to be prepared to stand behind them.

If the court were to reject the recommendation of the Receiver in any but the most exceptional circumstances, it would materially diminish and weaken the role and function of the Receiver both in the perception of receivers and in the perception of any others who might have occasion to deal with them. It would lead to the conclusion that the decision of the Receiver was of little weight and that the real decision was always made upon the motion for approval. That would be a consequence susceptible of immensely damaging results to the disposition of assets by court-appointed receivers.

[Emphasis added.]

22 I also agree with and adopt what was said by Macdonald J.A. in *Cameron v. Bank of Nova Scotia* (1981), 38 C.B.R. (N.S.) 1, 45 N.S.R. (2d) 303, 86 A.P.R. 303 (C.A.), at p. 11 [C.B.R.]:

In my opinion if the decision of the receiver to enter into an agreement of sale, subject to court approval, with respect to certain assets is reasonable and sound under the circumstances *at the time existing* it should not be set aside simply because a later and higher bid is made. To do so would literally create chaos in the commercial world and receivers and purchasers would never be sure they had a binding agreement.

[Emphasis added.]

23 On March 8, 1991, the receiver had two offers. One was the OEL offer, which it considered satisfactory but which could be withdrawn by OEL at any time before it was accepted. The receiver also had the 922 offer, which contained a condition that was totally unacceptable. It had no other offers. It was faced with the dilemma of whether it should decline to accept the OEL offer and run the risk of it being withdrawn, in the hope that an acceptable offer would be forthcoming from 922. An affidavit filed by the president of the receiver describes the dilemma which the receiver faced, and the judgment made in the light of that dilemma:

24. An asset purchase agreement was received by Ernst & Young on March 7, 1991 which was dated March 6, 1991. This agreement was received from CCFL in respect of their offer to purchase the assets and undertaking of Air Toronto. Apart from financial considerations, which will be considered in a subsequent affidavit, the *Receiver determined that it would not be prudent to delay acceptance of the OEL agreement to negotiate a highly uncertain arrangement with Air Canada and CCFL*. Air Canada had the benefit of an 'exclusive' in negotiations for Air Toronto and had clearly indicated its intention take itself out of the running while ensuring that no other party could seek to purchase Air Toronto and maintain the Air Canada connector arrangement vital to its survival. The CCFL offer represented a radical reversal of this position by Air Canada at the eleventh hour. However, it contained a significant number of conditions to closing which were entirely beyond the control of the Receiver. As well, the CCFL offer came less than 24 hours before signing of the agreement with OEL which had been negotiated over a period of months, at great time and expense.

[Emphasis added.] I am convinced that the decision made was a sound one in the circumstances faced by the receiver on March 8, 1991.

24 I now turn to consider whether the price contained in the OEL offer was one which it was provident to accept. At the outset, I think that the fact that the OEL offer was the only acceptable one available to the receiver on March 8, 1991, after 10 months of trying to sell the airline, is strong evidence that the price in it was reasonable. In a deteriorating economy, I doubt that it would have been wise to wait any longer.

25 I mentioned earlier that, pursuant to an order, 922 was permitted to present a second offer. During the hearing of the appeal, counsel compared at great length the price contained in the second 922 offer with the price contained in the OEL offer. Counsel put forth various hypotheses supporting their contentions that one offer was better than the other.

26 It is my opinion that the price contained in the 922 offer is relevant only if it shows that the price obtained by the receiver in the OEL offer was not a reasonable one. In *Crown Trust Co. v. Rosenberg*, supra, Anderson J., at p. 113 [O.R.], discussed the comparison of offers in the following way:

No doubt, as the cases have indicated, situations might arise where the disparity was so great as to call in question the adequacy of the mechanism which had produced the offers. It is not so here, and in my view that is substantially an end of the matter.

27 In two judgments, Saunders J. considered the circumstances in which an offer submitted after the receiver had agreed to a sale should be considered by the court. The first is *Re Selkirk* (1986), 58 C.B.R. (N.S.) 245 (Ont. S.C.), at p. 247:

If, for example, in this case there had been a second offer of a substantially higher amount, then the court would have to take that offer into consideration in assessing whether the receiver had properly carried out his function of endeavouring to obtain the best price for the property.

28 The second is *Re Beauty Counsellors of Canada Ltd.* (1986), 58 C.B.R. (N.S.) 237 (Ont. S.C.), at p. 243:

If a substantially higher bid turns up at the approval stage, the court should consider it. Such a bid may indicate, for example, that the trustee has not properly carried out its duty to endeavour to obtain the best price for the estate.

29 In *Re Selkirk* (1987), 64 C.B.R. (N.S.) 140 (Ont. S.C.), at p. 142, McRae J. expressed a similar view:

The court will not lightly withhold approval of a sale by the receiver, particularly in a case such as this where the receiver is given rather wide discretionary authority as per the order of Mr. Justice Trainor and, of course, where the receiver is an officer of this court. Only in a case where there seems to be some unfairness in the process of the sale or *where there are substantially higher offers which would tend to show that the sale was improvident* will the court withhold approval. It is important that the court recognize the commercial exigencies that would flow if prospective purchasers are allowed to wait

until the sale is in court for approval before submitting their final offer. This is something that must be discouraged.

[Emphasis added.]

30 What those cases show is that the prices in other offers have relevance only if they show that the price contained in the offer accepted by the receiver was so unreasonably low as to demonstrate that the receiver was improvident in accepting it. I am of the opinion, therefore, that if they do not tend to show that the receiver was improvident, they should not be considered upon a motion to confirm a sale recommended by a court-appointed receiver. If they were, the process would be changed from a sale by a receiver, subject to court approval, into an auction conducted by the court at the time approval is sought. In my opinion, the latter course is unfair to the person who has entered bona fide into an agreement with the receiver, can only lead to chaos, and must be discouraged.

31 If, however, the subsequent offer is so substantially higher than the sale recommended by the receiver, then it may be that the receiver has not conducted the sale properly. In such circumstances, the court would be justified itself in entering into the sale process by considering competitive bids. However, I think that that process should be entered into only if the court is satisfied that the receiver has not properly conducted the sale which it has recommended to the court.

32 It is necessary to consider the two offers. Rosenberg J. held that the 922 offer was slightly better or marginally better than the OEL offer. He concluded that the difference in the two offers did not show that the sale process adopted by the receiver was inadequate or improvident.

33 Counsel for the appellants complained about the manner in which Rosenberg J. conducted the hearing of the motion to confirm the OEL sale. The complaint was that when they began to discuss a comparison of the two offers, Rosenberg J. said that he considered the 922 offer to be better than the OEL offer. Counsel said that when that comment was made, they did not think it necessary to argue further the question of the difference in value between the two offers. They complain that the finding that the 922 offer was only marginally better or slightly better than the OEL offer was made without them having had the opportunity to argue that the 922 offer was substantially better or significantly better than the OEL offer. I cannot understand how counsel could have thought that by expressing the opinion that the 922 offer was better, Rosenberg J. was saying that it was a significantly or substantially better one. Nor can I comprehend how counsel took the comment to mean that they were foreclosed from arguing that the offer was significantly or substantially better. If there was some misunderstanding on the part of counsel, it should have been raised before Rosenberg J. at the time. I am sure that if it had been, the misunderstanding would have been cleared up

quickly. Nevertheless, this court permitted extensive argument dealing with the comparison of the two offers.

34 The 922 offer provided for \$6 million cash to be paid on closing with a royalty based upon a percentage of Air Toronto profits over a period of 5 years up to a maximum of \$3 million. The OEL offer provided for a payment of \$2 million on closing with a royalty paid on gross revenues over a 5-year period. In the short term, the 922 offer is obviously better because there is substantially more cash up front. The chances of future returns are substantially greater in the OEL offer because royalties are paid on gross revenues, while the royalties under the 922 offer are paid only on profits. There is an element of risk involved in each offer.

35 The receiver studied the two offers. It compared them and took into account the risks, the advantages and the disadvantages of each. It considered the appropriate contingencies. It is not necessary to outline the factors which were taken into account by the receiver because the manager of its insolvency practice filed an affidavit outlining the considerations which were weighed in its evaluation of the two offers. They seem to me to be reasonable ones. That affidavit concluded with the following paragraph:

24. On the basis of these considerations the Receiver has approved the OEL offer and has concluded that it represents the achievement of the highest possible value at this time for the Air Toronto division of SoundAir.

36 The court appointed the receiver to conduct the sale of Air Toronto, and entrusted it with the responsibility of deciding what is the best offer. I put great weight upon the opinion of the receiver. It swore to the court which appointed it that the OEL offer represents the achievement of the highest possible value at this time for Air Toronto. I have not been convinced that the receiver was wrong when he made that assessment. I am, therefore, of the opinion that the 922 offer does not demonstrate any failure upon the part of the receiver to act properly and providently.

37 It follows that if Rosenberg J. was correct when he found that the 922 offer was in fact better, I agree with him that it could only have been slightly or marginally better. The 922 offer does not lead to an inference that the disposition strategy of the receiver was inadequate, unsuccessful or improvident, nor that the price was unreasonable.

38 I am, therefore, of the opinion the the receiver made a sufficient effort to get the best price, and has not acted improvidently.

2. Consideration of the Interests of all Parties

39 It is well established that the primary interest is that of the creditors of the debtor: see *Crown Trust Co. v. Rosenberg* , supra, and *Re Selkirk* , supra (Saunders J.). However,

as Saunders J. pointed out in *Re Beauty Counsellors*, supra at p. 244 [C.B.R.], "it is not the only or overriding consideration."

40 In my opinion, there are other persons whose interests require consideration. In an appropriate case, the interests of the debtor must be taken into account. I think also, in a case such as this, where a purchaser has bargained at some length and doubtless at considerable expense with the receiver, the interests of the purchaser ought to be taken into account. While it is not explicitly stated in such cases as *Crown Trust Co. v. Rosenberg*, supra, *Re Selkirk* (1986), supra, *Re Beauty Counsellors*, supra, *Re Selkirk* (1987), supra, and (*Cameron*), supra, I think they clearly imply that the interests of a person who has negotiated an agreement with a court-appointed receiver are very important.

41 In this case, the interests of all parties who would have an interest in the process were considered by the receiver and by Rosenberg J.

3. Consideration of the Efficacy and Integrity of the Process by which the Offer was Obtained

42 While it is accepted that the primary concern of a receiver is the protecting of the interests of the creditors, there is a secondary but very important consideration, and that is the integrity of the process by which the sale is effected. This is particularly so in the case of a sale of such a unique asset as an airline as a going concern.

43 The importance of a court protecting the integrity of the process has been stated in a number of cases. First, I refer to *Re Selkirk*, supra, where Saunders J. said at p. 246 [C.B.R.]:

In dealing with the request for approval, the court has to be concerned primarily with protecting the interest of the creditors of the former bankrupt. A secondary but important consideration is that the process under which the sale agreement is arrived at should be consistent with commercial efficacy and integrity.

In that connection I adopt the principles stated by Macdonald J.A. of the Nova Scotia Supreme Court (Appeal Division) in *Cameron v. Bank of N.S.* (1981), 38 C.B.R. (N.S.) 1, 45 N.S.R. (2d) 303, 86 A.P.R. 303 (C.A.), where he said at p. 11:

In my opinion if the decision of the receiver to enter into an agreement of sale, subject to court approval, with respect to certain assets is reasonable and sound under the circumstances at the time existing it should not be set aside simply because a later and higher bid is made. To do so would literally create chaos in the commercial world and receivers and purchasers would never be sure they had a binding agreement. On the contrary, they would know that other bids could be received and considered up until the application for court approval is heard — this would be an intolerable situation.

While those remarks may have been made in the context of a bidding situation rather than a private sale, I consider them to be equally applicable to a negotiation process leading to a private sale. Where the court is concerned with the disposition of property, the purpose of appointing a receiver is to have the receiver do the work that the court would otherwise have to do.

44 In *Salima Investments Ltd. v. Bank of Montreal* (1985), 59 C.B.R. (N.S.) 242, 41 Alta. L.R. (2d) 58, 65 A.R. 372, 21 D.L.R. (4th) 473 at p. 476 [D.L.R.], the Alberta Court of Appeal said that sale by tender is not necessarily the best way to sell a business as an ongoing concern. It went on to say that when some other method is used which is provident, the court should not undermine the process by refusing to confirm the sale.

45 Finally, I refer to the reasoning of Anderson J. in *Crown Trust Co. v. Rosenberg*, supra, at p. 124 [O.R.]:

While every proper effort must always be made to assure maximum recovery consistent with the limitations inherent in the process, no method has yet been devised to entirely eliminate those limitations or to avoid their consequences. *Certainly it is not to be found in loosening the entire foundation of the system. Thus to compare the results of the process in this case with what might have been recovered in some other set of circumstances is neither logical nor practical.*

[Emphasis added.]

46 It is my opinion that the court must exercise extreme caution before it interferes with the process adopted by a receiver to sell an unusual asset. It is important that prospective purchasers know that, if they are acting in good faith, bargain seriously with a receiver and enter into an agreement with it, a court will not lightly interfere with the commercial judgment of the receiver to sell the asset to them.

47 Before this court, counsel for those opposing the confirmation of the sale to OEL suggested many different ways in which the receiver could have conducted the process other than the way which he did. However, the evidence does not convince me that the receiver used an improper method of attempting to sell the airline. The answer to those submissions is found in the comment of Anderson J. in *Crown Trust Co. v. Rosenberg*, supra, at p. 109 [O.R.]:

The court ought not to sit as on appeal from the decision of the Receiver, reviewing in minute detail every element of the process by which the decision is reached. To do so would be a futile and duplicitous exercise.

48 It would be a futile and duplicitous exercise for this court to examine in minute detail all of circumstances leading up to the acceptance of the OEL offer. Having considered the process adopted by the receiver, it is my opinion that the process adopted was a reasonable and prudent one.

4. Was there unfairness in the process?

49 As a general rule, I do not think it appropriate for the court to go into the minutia of the process or of the selling strategy adopted by the receiver. However, the court has a responsibility to decide whether the process was fair. The only part of this process which I could find that might give even a superficial impression of unfairness is the failure of the receiver to give an offering memorandum to those who expressed an interest in the purchase of Air Toronto.

50 I will outline the circumstances which relate to the allegation that the receiver was unfair in failing to provide an offering memorandum. In the latter part of 1990, as part of its selling strategy, the receiver was in the process of preparing an offering memorandum to give to persons who expressed an interest in the purchase of Air Toronto. The offering memorandum got as far as draft form, but was never released to anyone, although a copy of the draft eventually got into the hands of CCFL before it submitted the first 922 offer on March 7, 1991. A copy of the offering memorandum forms part of the record, and it seems to me to be little more than puffery, without any hard information which a sophisticated purchaser would require in order to make a serious bid.

51 The offering memorandum had not been completed by February 11, 1991. On that date, the receiver entered into the letter of intent to negotiate with OEL. The letter of intent contained a provision that during its currency the receiver would not negotiate with any other party. The letter of intent was renewed from time to time until the OEL offer was received on March 6, 1991.

52 The receiver did not proceed with the offering memorandum because to do so would violate the spirit, if not the letter, of its letter of intent with OEL.

53 I do not think that the conduct of the receiver shows any unfairness towards 922. When I speak of 922, I do so in the context that Air Canada and CCFL are identified with it. I start by saying that the receiver acted reasonably when it entered into exclusive negotiations with OEL. I find it strange that a company, with which Air Canada is closely and intimately involved, would say that it was unfair for the receiver to enter into a time-limited agreement to negotiate exclusively with OEL. That is precisely the arrangement which Air Canada insisted upon when it negotiated with the receiver in the spring and summer of 1990. If it was not unfair for Air Canada to have such an agreement, I do not understand

why it was unfair for OEL to have a similar one. In fact, both Air Canada and OEL in its turn were acting reasonably when they required exclusive negotiating rights to prevent their negotiations from being used as a bargaining lever with other potential purchasers. The fact that Air Canada insisted upon an exclusive negotiating right while it was negotiating with the receiver demonstrates the commercial efficacy of OEL being given the same right during its negotiations with the receiver. I see no unfairness on the part of the receiver when it honoured its letter of intent with OEL by not releasing the offering memorandum during the negotiations with OEL.

54 Moreover, I am not prepared to find that 922 was in any way prejudiced by the fact that it did not have an offering memorandum. It made an offer on March 7, 1991, which it contends to this day was a better offer than that of OEL. 922 has not convinced me that if it had an offering memorandum, its offer would have been any different or any better than it actually was. The fatal problem with the first 922 offer was that it contained a condition which was completely unacceptable to the receiver. The receiver, properly, in my opinion, rejected the offer out of hand because of that condition. That condition did not relate to any information which could have conceivably been in an offering memorandum prepared by the receiver. It was about the resolution of a dispute between CCFL and the Royal Bank, something the receiver knew nothing about.

55 Further evidence of the lack of prejudice which the absence of an offering memorandum has caused 922 is found in CCFL's stance before this court. During argument, its counsel suggested as a possible resolution of this appeal that this court should call for new bids, evaluate them and then order a sale to the party who put in the better bid. In such a case, counsel for CCFL said that 922 would be prepared to bid within 7 days of the court's decision. I would have thought that, if there were anything to CCFL's suggestion that the failure to provide an offering memorandum was unfair to 922, that it would have told the court that it needed more information before it would be able to make a bid.

56 I am satisfied that Air Canada and CCFL have, and at all times had, all of the information which they would have needed to make what to them would be a commercially viable offer to the receiver. I think that an offering memorandum was of no commercial consequence to them, but the absence of one has since become a valuable tactical weapon.

57 It is my opinion that there is no convincing proof that if an offering memorandum had been widely distributed among persons qualified to have purchased Air Toronto, a viable offer would have come forth from a party other than 922 or OEL. Therefore, the failure to provide an offering memorandum was neither unfair, nor did it prejudice the obtaining of a better price on March 8, 1991, than that contained in the OEL offer. I would not give effect to the contention that the process adopted by the receiver was an unfair one.

58 There are two statements by Anderson J. contained in *Crown Trust Co. v. Rosenberg*, supra, which I adopt as my own. The first is at p. 109 [O.R.]:

The court should not proceed against the recommendations of its Receiver except in special circumstances and where the necessity and propriety of doing so are plain. Any other rule or approach would emasculate the role of the Receiver and make it almost inevitable that the final negotiation of every sale would take place on the motion for approval.

The second is at p. 111 [O.R.]:

It is equally clear, in my view, though perhaps not so clearly enunciated, that it is only in an exceptional case that the court will intervene and proceed contrary to the Receiver's recommendations if satisfied, as I am, that the Receiver has acted reasonably, prudently and fairly and not arbitrarily.

In this case the receiver acted reasonably, prudently, fairly and not arbitrarily. I am of the opinion, therefore, that the process adopted by the receiver in reaching an agreement was a just one.

59 In his reasons for judgment, after discussing the circumstances leading to the 922 offer, Rosenberg J. said this:

They created a situation as of March 8th, where the Receiver was faced with two offers, one of which was in acceptable form and one of which could not possibly be accepted in its present form. The Receiver acted appropriately in accepting the OEL offer.

I agree.

60 The receiver made proper and sufficient efforts to get the best price that it could for the assets of Air Toronto. It adopted a reasonable and effective process to sell the airline which was fair to all persons who might be interested in purchasing it. It is my opinion, therefore, that the receiver properly carried out the mandate which was given to it by the order of O'Brien J. It follows that Rosenberg J. was correct when he confirmed the sale to OEL.

II. The effect of the support of the 922 offer by the two secured creditors.

61 As I noted earlier, the 922 offer was supported before Rosenberg J., and in this court, by CCFL and by the Royal Bank, the two secured creditors. It was argued that, because the interests of the creditors are primary, the court ought to give effect to their wish that the 922 offer be accepted. I would not accede to that suggestion for two reasons.

62 The first reason is related to the fact that the creditors chose to have a receiver appointed by the court. It was open to them to appoint a private receiver pursuant to the authority of their security documents. Had they done so, then they would have had control of the process and could have sold Air Toronto to whom they wished. However, acting privately and controlling the process involves some risks. The appointment of a receiver by the court insulates the creditors from those risks. But, insulation from those risks carries with it the loss of control over the process of disposition of the assets. As I have attempted to explain in these reasons, when a receiver's sale is before the court for confirmation, the only issues are the propriety of the conduct of the receiver and whether it acted providently. The function of the court at that stage is not to step in and do the receiver's work, or change the sale strategy adopted by the receiver. Creditors who asked the court to appoint a receiver to dispose of assets should not be allowed to take over control of the process by the simple expedient of supporting another purchaser if they do not agree with the sale made by the receiver. That would take away all respect for the process of sale by a court-appointed receiver.

63 There can be no doubt that the interests of the creditor are an important consideration in determining whether the receiver has properly conducted a sale. The opinion of the creditors as to which offer ought to be accepted is something to be taken into account. But if the court decides that the receiver has acted properly and providently, those views are not necessarily determinative. Because, in this case, the receiver acted properly and providently, I do not think that the views of the creditors should override the considered judgment of the receiver.

64 The second reason is that, in the particular circumstances of this case, I do not think the support of CCFL and the Royal Bank of the 922 offer is entitled to any weight. The support given by CCFL can be dealt with summarily. It is a co-owner of 922. It is hardly surprising and not very impressive to hear that it supports the offer which it is making for the debtor's assets.

65 The support by the Royal Bank requires more consideration and involves some reference to the circumstances. On March 6, 1991, when the first 922 offer was made, there was in existence an inter-lender agreement between the Royal Bank and CCFL. That agreement dealt with the share of the proceeds of the sale of Air Toronto which each creditor would receive. At the time, a dispute between the Royal Bank and CCFL about the interpretation of that agreement was pending in the courts. The unacceptable condition in the first 922 offer related to the settlement of the inter-lender dispute. The condition required that the dispute be resolved in a way which would substantially favour CCFL. It required that CCFL receive \$3,375,000 of the \$6 million cash payment and the balance, including the royalties, if any, be paid to the Royal Bank. The Royal Bank did not agree with that split of the sale proceeds.

66 On April 5, 1991, the Royal Bank and CCFL agreed to settle the inter-lender dispute. The settlement was that if the 922 offer was accepted by the court, CCFL would receive only \$1 million, and the Royal Bank would receive \$5 million plus any royalties which might be paid. It was only in consideration of that settlement that the Royal Bank agreed to support the 922 offer.

67 The Royal Bank's support of the 922 offer is so affected by the very substantial benefit which it wanted to obtain from the settlement of the inter-lender dispute that, in my opinion, its support is devoid of any objectivity. I think it has no weight.

68 While there may be circumstances where the unanimous support by the creditors of a particular offer could conceivably override the proper and provident conduct of a sale by a receiver, I do not think that this is such a case. This is a case where the receiver has acted properly and in a provident way. It would make a mockery out of the judicial process, under which a mandate was given to this receiver to sell this airline if the support by these creditors of the 922 offer were permitted to carry the day. I give no weight to the support which they give to the 922 offer.

69 In its factum, the receiver pointed out that, because of greater liabilities imposed upon private receivers by various statutes such as the *Employment Standards Act*, R.S.O. 1980, c. 137, and the *Environmental Protection Act*, R.S.O. 1980, c. 141, it is likely that more and more the courts will be asked to appoint receivers in insolvencies. In those circumstances, I think that creditors who ask for court-appointed receivers and business people who choose to deal with those receivers should know that if those receivers act properly and providently, their decisions and judgments will be given great weight by the courts who appoint them. I have decided this appeal in the way I have in order to assure business people who deal with court-appointed receivers that they can have confidence that an agreement which they make with a court-appointed receiver will be far more than a platform upon which others may bargain at the court approval stage. I think that persons who enter into agreements with court-appointed receivers, following a disposition procedure that is appropriate given the nature of the assets involved, should expect that their bargain will be confirmed by the court.

70 The process is very important. It should be carefully protected so that the ability of court-appointed receivers to negotiate the best price possible is strengthened and supported. Because this receiver acted properly and providently in entering into the OEL agreement, I am of the opinion that Rosenberg J. was right when he approved the sale to OEL and dismissed the motion to approve the 922 offer.

71 I would, accordingly, dismiss the appeal. I would award the receiver, OEL and Frontier Airlines Limited their costs out of the Soundair estate, those of the receiver on a solicitor-client scale. I would make no order as to the costs of any of the other parties or intervenors.

McKinlay J.A. :

72 I agree with Galligan J.A. in result, but wish to emphasize that I do so on the basis that the undertaking being sold in this case was of a very special and unusual nature. It is most important that the integrity of procedures followed by court-appointed receivers be protected in the interests of both commercial morality and the future confidence of business persons in their dealings with receivers. Consequently, in all cases, the court should carefully scrutinize the procedure followed by the receiver to determine whether it satisfies the tests set out by Anderson J. in *Crown Trust Co. v. Rosenberg* (1986), 67 C.B.R. (N.S.) 320n, 60 O.R. (2d) 87, 22 C.P.C. (2d) 131, 39 D.L.R. (4th) 526 (H.C.) . While the procedure carried out by the receiver in this case, as described by Galligan J.A., was appropriate, given the unfolding of events and the unique nature of the assets involved, it is not a procedure that is likely to be appropriate in many receivership sales.

73 I should like to add that where there is a small number of creditors who are the only parties with a real interest in the proceeds of the sale (i.e., where it is clear that the highest price attainable would result in recovery so low that no other creditors, shareholders, guarantors, etc., could possibly benefit therefore), the wishes of the interested creditors should be very seriously considered by the receiver. It is true, as Galligan J.A. points out, that in seeking the court appointment of a receiver, the moving parties also seek the protection of the court in carrying out the receiver's functions. However, it is also true that in utilizing the court process, the moving parties have opened the whole process to detailed scrutiny by all involved, and have probably added significantly to their costs and consequent shortfall as a result of so doing. The adoption of the court process should in no way diminish the rights of any party, and most certainly not the rights of the only parties with a real interest. Where a receiver asks for court approval of a sale which is opposed by the only parties in interest, the court should scrutinize with great care the procedure followed by the receiver. I agree with Galligan J.A. that in this case that was done. I am satisfied that the rights of all parties were properly considered by the receiver, by the learned motions court judge, and by Galligan J.A.

Goodman J.A. (dissenting):

74 I have had the opportunity of reading the reasons for judgment herein of Galligan and McKinlay JJ.A. Respectfully, I am unable to agree with their conclusion.

75 The case at bar is an exceptional one in the sense that upon the application made for approval of the sale of the assets of Air Toronto, two competing offers were placed before Rosenberg J. Those two offers were that of OEL and that of 922, a company incorporated for the purpose of acquiring Air Toronto. Its shares were owned equally by CCFL and Air Canada. It was conceded by all parties to these proceedings that the only persons who had any interest in the proceeds of the sale were two secured creditors, viz., CCFL and the Royal

Bank of Canada. Those two creditors were unanimous in their position that they desired the court to approve the sale to 922. We were not referred to, nor am I aware of, any case where a court has refused to abide by the unanimous wishes of the only interested creditors for the approval of a specific offer made in receivership proceedings.

76 In *British Columbia Developments Corp. v. Spun Cast Industries Ltd.* (1977), 26 C.B.R. (N.S.) 28, 5 B.C.L.R. 94 (S.C.) , Berger J. said at p. 30 [C.B.R.]:

Here all of those with a financial stake in the plant have joined in seeking the court's approval of the sale to Fincas. This court does not have a roving commission to decide what is best for investors and businessmen when they have agreed among themselves what course of action they should follow. It is their money.

77 I agree with that statement. It is particularly apt to this case. The two secured creditors will suffer a shortfall of approximately \$50 million. They have a tremendous interest in the sale of assets which form part of their security. I agree with the finding of Rosenberg J. that the offer of 922 is superior to that of OEL. He concluded that the 922 offer is marginally superior. If by that he meant that mathematically it was likely to provide slightly more in the way of proceeds, it is difficult to take issue with that finding. If, on the other hand, he meant that having regard to all considerations it was only marginally superior, I cannot agree. He said in his reasons:

I have come to the conclusion that knowledgeable creditors such as the Royal Bank would prefer the 922 offer even if the other factors influencing their decision were not present. No matter what adjustments had to be made, the 922 offer results in more cash immediately. Creditors facing the type of loss the Royal Bank is taking in this case would not be anxious to rely on contingencies especially in the present circumstances surrounding the airline industry.

78 I agree with that statement completely. It is apparent that the difference between the two offers insofar as cash on closing is concerned amounts to approximately \$3 million to \$4 million. The bank submitted that it did not wish to gamble any further with respect to its investment, and that the acceptance and court approval of the OEL offer in effect supplanted its position as a secured creditor with respect to the amount owing over and above the down payment and placed it in the position of a joint entrepreneur, but one with no control. This results from the fact that the OEL offer did not provide for any security for any funds which might be forthcoming over and above the initial down payment on closing.

79 In *Cameron v. Bank of Nova Scotia* (1981), 38 C.B.R. (N.S.) 1, 45 N.S.R. (2d) 303, 86 A.P.R. 303 (C.A.) , Hart J.A., speaking for the majority of the court, said at p. 10 [C.B.R.]:

Here we are dealing with a receiver appointed at the instance of one major creditor, who chose to insert in the contract of sale a provision making it subject to the approval of the court. This, in my opinion, shows an intention on behalf of the parties to invoke the normal equitable doctrines which place the court in the position of looking to the interests of all persons concerned before giving its blessing to a particular transaction submitted for approval. In these circumstances the court would not consider itself bound by the contract entered into in good faith by the receiver but would have to look to the broader picture to see that that contract was for the benefit of the creditors as a whole. When there was evidence that a higher price was readily available for the property the chambers judge was, in my opinion, justified in exercising his discretion as he did. Otherwise he could have deprived the creditors of a substantial sum of money.

80 This statement is apposite to the circumstances of the case at bar. I hasten to add that in my opinion it is not only price which is to be considered in the exercise of the judge's discretion. It may very well be, as I believe to be so in this case, that the amount of cash is the most important element in determining which of the two offers is for the benefit and in the best interest of the creditors.

81 It is my view, and the statement of Hart J.A. is consistent therewith, that the fact that a creditor has requested an order of the court appointing a receiver does not in any way diminish or derogate from his right to obtain the maximum benefit to be derived from any disposition of the debtor's assets. I agree completely with the views expressed by McKinlay J.A. in that regard in her reasons.

82 It is my further view that any negotiations which took place between the only two interested creditors in deciding to support the approval of the 922 offer were not relevant to the determination by the presiding judge of the issues involved in the motion for approval of either one of the two offers, nor are they relevant in determining the outcome of this appeal. It is sufficient that the two creditors have decided unanimously what is in their best interest, and the appeal must be considered in the light of that decision. It so happens, however, that there is ample evidence to support their conclusion that the approval of the 922 offer is in their best interests.

83 I am satisfied that the interests of the creditors are the prime consideration for both the receiver and the court. In *Re Beauty Counsellors of Canada Ltd.* (1986), 58 C.B.R. (N.S.) 237 (Ont. S.C.) , Saunders J. said at p. 243:

This does not mean that a court should ignore a new and higher bid made after acceptance where there has been no unfairness in the process. The interests of the creditors, while not the only consideration, are the prime consideration.

84 I agree with that statement of the law. In *Re Selkirk* (1986), 58 C.B.R. (N.S.) 245 (Ont. S.C.), Saunders J. heard an application for court approval of the sale by the sheriff of real property in bankruptcy proceedings. The sheriff had been previously ordered to list the property for sale subject to approval of the court. Saunders J. said at p. 246:

In dealing with the request for approval, the court has to be concerned primarily with protecting the interests of the creditors of the former bankrupt. A secondary but important consideration is that the process under which the sale agreement is arrived at should be consistent with commercial efficacy and integrity.

85 I am in agreement with that statement as a matter of general principle. Saunders J. further stated that he adopted the principles stated by Macdonald J.A. in *Cameron*, supra, quoted by Galligan J.A. in his reasons. In *Cameron*, the remarks of Macdonald J.A. related to situations involving the calling of bids and fixing a time limit for the making of such bids. In those circumstances the process is so clear as a matter of commercial practice that an interference by the court in such process might have a deleterious effect on the efficacy of receivership proceedings in other cases. But Macdonald J.A. recognized that even in bid or tender cases where the offeror for whose bid approval is sought has complied with all requirements, a court might not approve the agreement of purchase and sale entered into by the receiver. He said at pp. 11-12 [C.B.R.]:

There are, of course, many reasons why a court might not approve an agreement of purchase and sale, viz., where the offer accepted is so low in relation to the appraised value as to be unrealistic; or, where the circumstances indicate that insufficient time was allowed for the making of bids or that inadequate notice of sale by bid was given (where the receiver sells property by the bid method); or, where it can be said that the proposed sale is not in the best interest of either the creditors or the owner. Court approval must involve the delicate balancing of competing interests and not simply a consideration of the interests of the creditors.

86 The deficiency in the present case is so large that there has been no suggestion of a competing interest between the owner and the creditors.

87 I agree that the same reasoning may apply to a negotiation process leading to a private sale, but the procedure and process applicable to private sales of a wide variety of businesses and undertakings with the multiplicity of individual considerations applicable and perhaps peculiar to the particular business is not so clearly established that a departure by the court from the process adopted by the receiver in a particular case will result in commercial chaos to the detriment of future receivership proceedings. Each case must be decided on its own merits, and it is necessary to consider the process used by the receiver in the present proceedings and to determine whether it was unfair, improvident or inadequate.

88 It is important to note at the outset that Rosenberg J. made the following statement in his reasons:

On March 8, 1991 the trustee accepted the OEL offer subject to court approval. The Receiver at that time had no other offer before it that was in final form or could possibly be accepted. The Receiver had at the time the knowledge that Air Canada with CCFL had not bargained in good faith and had not fulfilled the promise of its letter of March 1st. The Receiver was justified in assuming that Air Canada and CCFL's offer was a long way from being in an acceptable form and that Air Canada and CCFL's objective was to interrupt the finalizing of the OEL agreement and to retain as long as possible the Air Toronto connector traffic flowing into Terminal 2 for the benefit of Air Canada.

89 In my opinion there was no evidence before him or before this court to indicate that Air Canada, with CCFL, had not bargained in good faith, and that the receiver had knowledge of such lack of good faith. Indeed, on his appeal, counsel for the receiver stated that he was not alleging Air Canada and CCFL had not bargained in good faith. Air Canada had frankly stated at the time that it had made its offer to purchase, which was eventually refused by the receiver, that it would not become involved in an "auction" to purchase the undertaking of Air Canada and that, although it would fulfil its contractual obligations to provide connecting services to Air Toronto, it would do no more than it was legally required to do insofar as facilitating the purchase of Air Toronto by any other person. In so doing, Air Canada may have been playing "hardball," as its behaviour was characterized by some of the counsel for opposing parties. It was nevertheless merely openly asserting its legal position, as it was entitled to do.

90 Furthermore, there was no evidence before Rosenberg J. or this court that the receiver had assumed that Air Canada and CCFL's objective in making an offer was to interrupt the finalizing of the OEL agreement and to retain as long as possible the Air Toronto connector traffic flowing into Terminal 2 for the benefit of Air Canada. Indeed, there was no evidence to support such an assumption in any event, although it is clear that 922, and through it CCFL and Air Canada, were endeavouring to present an offer to purchase which would be accepted and/or approved by the court in preference to the offer made by OEL.

91 To the extent that approval of the OEL agreement by Rosenberg J. was based on the alleged lack of good faith in bargaining and improper motivation with respect to connector traffic on the part of Air Canada and CCFL, it cannot be supported.

92 I would also point out that rather than saying there was no other offer before it that was final in form, it would have been more accurate to have said that there was *no unconditional* offer before it.

93 In considering the material and evidence placed before the court, I am satisfied that the receiver was at all times acting in good faith. I have reached the conclusion, however, that the process which he used was unfair insofar as 922 is concerned, and improvident insofar as the two secured creditors are concerned.

94 Air Canada had been negotiating with Soundair Corporation for the purchase from it of Air Toronto for a considerable period of time prior to the appointment of a receiver by the court. It had given a letter of intent indicating a prospective sale price of \$18 million. After the appointment of the receiver, by agreement dated April 30, 1990, Air Canada continued its negotiations for the purchase of Air Toronto with the receiver. Although this agreement contained a clause which provided that the receiver "shall not negotiate for the sale ... of Air Toronto with any person except Air Canada," it further provided that the receiver would not be in breach of that provision merely by receiving unsolicited offers for all or any of the assets of Air Toronto. In addition, the agreement, which had a term commencing on April 30, 1990, could be terminated on the fifth business day following the delivery of a written notice of termination by one party to the other. I point out this provision merely to indicate that the exclusivity privilege extended by the receiver to Air Canada was of short duration at the receiver's option.

95 As a result of due diligence investigations carried out by Air Canada during the months of April, May and June of 1990, Air Canada reduced its offer to \$8.1 million conditional upon there being \$4 million in tangible assets. The offer was made on June 14, 1990, and was open for acceptance until June 29, 1990.

96 By amending agreement dated June 19, 1990, the receiver was released from its covenant to refrain from negotiating for the sale of the Air Toronto business and assets to any person other than Air Canada. By virtue of this amending agreement, the receiver had put itself in the position of having a firm offer in hand, with the right to negotiate and accept offers from other persons. Air Canada, in these circumstances, was in the subservient position. The receiver, in the exercise of its judgment and discretion, allowed the Air Canada offer to lapse. On July 20, 1990, Air Canada served a notice of termination of the April 30, 1990 agreement.

97 Apparently as a result of advice received from the receiver to the effect that the receiver intended to conduct an auction for the sale of the assets and business of the Air Toronto division of Soundair Corporation, the solicitors for Air Canada advised the receiver by letter dated July 20, 1990, in part as follows:

Air Canada has instructed us to advise you that it does not intend to submit a further offer in the auction process.

98 This statement, together with other statements set forth in the letter, was sufficient to indicate that Air Canada was not interested in purchasing Air Toronto in the process apparently contemplated by the receiver at that time. It did not form a proper foundation for the receiver to conclude that there was no realistic possibility of selling Air Toronto [to] Air Canada, either alone or in conjunction with some other person, in different circumstances. In June 1990, the receiver was of the opinion that the fair value of Air Toronto was between \$10 million and \$12 million.

99 In August 1990, the receiver contacted a number of interested parties. A number of offers were received which were not deemed to be satisfactory. One such offer, received on August 20, 1990, came as a joint offer from OEL and Air Ontario (an Air Canada connector). It was for the sum of \$3 million for the good will relating to certain Air Toronto routes, but did not include the purchase of any tangible assets or leasehold interests.

100 In December 1990, the receiver was approached by the management of Canadian Partner (operated by OEL) for the purpose of evaluating the benefits of an amalgamated Air Toronto/Air Partner operation. The negotiations continued from December of 1990 to February of 1991, culminating in the OEL agreement dated March 8, 1991.

101 On or before December 1990, CCFL advised the receiver that it intended to make a bid for the Air Toronto assets. The receiver, in August of 1990, for the purpose of facilitating the sale of Air Toronto assets, commenced the preparation of an operating memorandum. He prepared no less than six draft operating memoranda with dates from October 1990 through March 1, 1991. None of these were distributed to any prospective bidder despite requests having been received therefor, with the exception of an early draft provided to CCFL without the receiver's knowledge.

102 During the period December 1990 to the end of January 1991, the receiver advised CCFL that the offering memorandum was in the process of being prepared and would be ready soon for distribution. He further advised CCFL that it should await the receipt of the memorandum before submitting a formal offer to purchase the Air Toronto assets.

103 By late January, CCFL had become aware that the receiver was negotiating with OEL for the sale of Air Toronto. In fact, on February 11, 1991, the receiver signed a letter of intent with OEL wherein it had specifically agreed not to negotiate with any other potential bidders or solicit any offers from others.

104 By letter dated February 25, 1991, the solicitors for CCFL made a written request to the receiver for the offering memorandum. The receiver did not reply to the letter because he felt he was precluded from so doing by the provisions of the letter of intent dated February 11, 1991. Other prospective purchasers were also unsuccessful in obtaining the

promised memorandum to assist them in preparing their bids. It should be noted that, exclusivity provision of the letter of intent expired on February 20, 1991. This provision was extended on three occasions, viz., February 19, 22 and March 5, 1991. It is clear that from a legal standpoint the receiver, by refusing to extend the time, could have dealt with other prospective purchasers, and specifically with 922.

105 It was not until March 1, 1991, that CCFL had obtained sufficient information to enable it to make a bid through 922. It succeeded in so doing through its own efforts through sources other than the receiver. By that time the receiver had already entered into the letter of intent with OEL. Notwithstanding the fact that the receiver knew since December of 1990 that CCFL wished to make a bid for the assets of Air Toronto (and there is no evidence to suggest that at that time such a bid would be in conjunction with Air Canada or that Air Canada was in any way connected with CCFL), it took no steps to provide CCFL with information necessary to enable it to make an intelligent bid, and indeed suggested delaying the making of the bid until an offering memorandum had been prepared and provided. In the meantime, by entering into the letter of intent with OEL, it put itself in a position where it could not negotiate with CCFL or provide the information requested.

106 On February 28, 1991, the solicitors for CCFL telephoned the receiver and were advised for the first time that the receiver had made a business decision to negotiate solely with OEL and would not negotiate with anyone else in the interim.

107 By letter dated March 1, 1991, CCFL advised the receiver that it intended to submit a bid. It set forth the essential terms of the bid and stated that it would be subject to customary commercial provisions. On March 7, 1991 CCFL and Air Canada, jointly through 922, submitted an offer to purchase Air Toronto upon the terms set forth in the letter dated March 1, 1991. It included a provision that the offer was conditional upon the interpretation of an inter-lender agreement which set out the relative distribution of proceeds as between CCFL and the Royal Bank. It is common ground that it was a condition over which the receiver had no control, and accordingly would not have been acceptable on that ground alone. The receiver did not, however, contact CCFL in order to negotiate or request the removal of the condition, although it appears that its agreement with OEL not to negotiate with any person other than OEL expired on March 6, 1991.

108 The fact of the matter is that by March 7, 1991, the receiver had received the offer from OEL which was subsequently approved by Rosenberg J. That offer was accepted by the receiver on March 8, 1991. Notwithstanding the fact that OEL had been negotiating the purchase for a period of approximately 3 months, the offer contained a provision for the sole benefit of the purchaser that it was subject to the purchaser obtaining "a financing commitment within 45 days of the date hereof in an amount not less than the Purchase Price from the Royal Bank of Canada or other financial institution upon terms and conditions

acceptable to them. In the event that such a financing commitment is not obtained within such 45 day period, the purchaser or OEL shall have the right to terminate this agreement upon giving written notice of termination to the vendor on the first Business Day following the expiry of the said period." The purchaser was also given the right to waive the condition.

109 In effect, the agreement was tantamount to a 45-day option to purchase, excluding the right of any other person to purchase Air Toronto during that period of time and thereafter if the condition was fulfilled or waived. The agreement was, of course, stated to be subject to court approval.

110 In my opinion, the process and procedure adopted by the receiver was unfair to CCFL. Although it was aware from December 1990 that CCFL was interested in making an offer, it effectively delayed the making of such offer by continually referring to the preparation of the offering memorandum. It did not endeavour during the period December 1990 to March 7, 1991, to negotiate with CCFL in any way the possible terms of purchase and sale agreement. In the result, no offer was sought from CCFL by the receiver prior to February 11, 1991, and thereafter it put itself in the position of being unable to negotiate with anyone other than OEL. The receiver then, on March 8, 1991, chose to accept an offer which was conditional in nature without prior consultation with CCFL (922) to see whether it was prepared to remove the condition in its offer.

111 I do not doubt that the receiver felt that it was more likely that the condition in the OEL offer would be fulfilled than the condition in the 922 offer. It may be that the receiver, having negotiated for a period of 3 months with OEL, was fearful that it might lose the offer if OEL discovered that it was negotiating with another person. Nevertheless, it seems to me that it was imprudent and unfair on the part of the receiver to ignore an offer from an interested party which offered approximately triple the cash down payment without giving a chance to the offeror to remove the conditions or other terms which made the offer unacceptable to it. The potential loss was that of an agreement which amounted to little more than an option in favour of the offeror.

112 In my opinion the procedure adopted by the receiver was unfair to CCFL in that, in effect, it gave OEL the opportunity of engaging in exclusive negotiations for a period of 3 months, notwithstanding the fact that it knew CCFL was interested in making an offer. The receiver did not indicate a deadline by which offers were to be submitted, and it did not at any time indicate the structure or nature of an offer which might be acceptable to it.

113 In his reasons, Rosenberg J. stated that as of March 1, CCFL and Air Canada had all the information that they needed, and any allegations of unfairness in the negotiating process by the receiver had disappeared. He said:

They created a situation as of March 8, where the receiver was faced with two offers, one of which was acceptable in form and one of which could not possibly be accepted in its present form. The Receiver acted appropriately in accepting the OEL offer.

If he meant by "acceptable in form" that it was acceptable to the receiver, then obviously OEL had the unfair advantage of its lengthy negotiations with the receiver to ascertain what kind of an offer would be acceptable to the receiver. If, on the other hand, he meant that the 922 offer was unacceptable in its form because it was conditional, it can hardly be said that the OEL offer was more acceptable in this regard, as it contained a condition with respect to financing terms and conditions "*acceptable to them*."

114 It should be noted that on March 13, 1991, the representatives of 922 first met with the receiver to review its offer of March 7, 1991, and at the request of the receiver, withdrew the inter-lender condition from its offer. On March 14, 1991, OEL removed the financing condition from its offer. By order of Rosenberg J. dated March 26, 1991, CCFL was given until April 5, 1991, to submit a bid, and on April 5, 1991, 922 submitted its offer with the inter-lender condition removed.

115 In my opinion, the offer accepted by the receiver is improvident and unfair insofar as the two creditors are concerned. It is not improvident in the sense that the price offered by 922 greatly exceeded that offered by OEL. In the final analysis it may not be greater at all. The salient fact is that the cash down payment in the 922 offer constitutes proximately two thirds of the contemplated sale price, whereas the cash down payment in the OEL transaction constitutes approximately 20 to 25 per cent of the contemplated sale price. In terms of absolute dollars, the down payment in the 922 offer would likely exceed that provided for in the OEL agreement by approximately \$3 million to \$4 million.

116 In *Re Beauty Counsellors of Canada Ltd.*, supra, Saunders J. said at p. 243 [C.B.R.]:

If a substantially higher bid turns up at the approval stage, the court should consider it. Such a bid may indicate, for example, that the trustee has not properly carried out its duty to endeavour to obtain the best price for the estate. In such a case the proper course might be to refuse approval and to ask the trustee to recommence the process.

117 I accept that statement as being an accurate statement of the law. I would add, however, as previously indicated, that in determining what is the best price for the estate, the receiver or court should not limit its consideration to which offer provides for the greater sale price. The amount of down payment and the provision or lack thereof to secure payment of the balance of the purchase price over and above the down payment may be the most important factor to be considered, and I am of the view that is so in the present case. It is clear that that was the view of the only creditors who can benefit from the sale of Air Toronto.

118 I note that in the case at bar the 922 offer in conditional form was presented to the receiver before it accepted the OEL offer. The receiver, in good faith, although I believe mistakenly, decided that the OEL offer was the better offer. At that time the receiver did not have the benefit of the views of the two secured creditors in that regard. At the time of the application for approval before Rosenberg J., the stated preference of the two interested creditors was made quite clear. He found as fact that knowledgeable creditors would not be anxious to rely on contingencies in the present circumstances surrounding the airline industry. It is reasonable to expect that a receiver would be no less knowledgeable in that regard, and it is his primary duty to protect the interests of the creditors. In my view, it was an improvident act on the part of the receiver to have accepted the conditional offer made by OEL, and Rosenberg J. erred in failing to dismiss the application of the receiver for approval of the OEL offer. It would be most inequitable to foist upon the two creditors, who have already been seriously hurt, more unnecessary contingencies.

119 Although in other circumstances it might be appropriate to ask the receiver to recommence the process, in my opinion, it would not be appropriate to do so in this case. The only two interested creditors support the acceptance of the 922 offer, and the court should so order.

120 Although I would be prepared to dispose of the case on the grounds stated above, some comment should be addressed to the question of interference by the court with the process and procedure adopted by the receiver.

121 I am in agreement with the view expressed by McKinlay J.A. in her reasons that the undertaking being sold in this case was of a very special and unusual nature. As a result, the procedure adopted by the receiver was somewhat unusual. At the outset, in accordance with the terms of the receiving order, it dealt solely with Air Canada. It then appears that the receiver contemplated a sale of the assets by way of auction, and still later contemplated the preparation and distribution of an offering memorandum inviting bids. At some point, without advice to CCFL, it abandoned that idea and reverted to exclusive negotiations with one interested party. This entire process is not one which is customary or widely accepted as a general practice in the commercial world. It was somewhat unique, having regard to the circumstances of this case. In my opinion, the refusal of the court to approve the offer accepted by the receiver would not reflect on the integrity of procedures followed by court-appointed receivers, and is not the type of refusal which will have a tendency to undermine the future confidence of business persons in dealing with receivers.

122 Rosenberg J. stated that the Royal Bank was aware of the process used and tacitly approved it. He said it knew the terms of the letter of intent in February 1991, and made no comment. The Royal Bank did, however, indicate to the receiver that it was not satisfied

with the contemplated price, nor the amount of the down payment. It did not, however, tell the receiver to adopt a different process in endeavouring to sell the Air Toronto assets. It is not clear from the material filed that at the time it became aware of the letter of intent that it knew that CCFL was interested in purchasing Air Toronto.

123 I am further of the opinion that a prospective purchaser who has been given an opportunity to engage in exclusive negotiations with a receiver for relatively short periods of time which are extended from time to time by the receiver, and who then makes a conditional offer, the condition of which is for his sole benefit and must be fulfilled to his satisfaction unless waived by him, and which he knows is to be subject to court approval, cannot legitimately claim to have been unfairly dealt with if the court refuses to approve the offer and approves a substantially better one.

124 In conclusion, I feel that I must comment on the statement made by Galligan J.A. in his reasons to the effect that the suggestion made by counsel for 922 constitutes evidence of lack of prejudice resulting from the absence of an offering memorandum. It should be pointed out that the court invited counsel to indicate the manner in which the problem should be resolved in the event that the court concluded that the order approving the OEL offer should be set aside. There was no evidence before the court with respect to what additional information may have been acquired by CCFL since March 8, 1991, and no inquiry was made in that regard. Accordingly, I am of the view that no adverse inference should be drawn from the proposal made as a result of the court's invitation.

125 For the above reasons I would allow the appeal one set of costs to CCFL-922, set aside the order of Rosenberg J., dismiss the receiver's motion with one set of costs to CCFL-922 and order that the assets of Air Toronto be sold to numbered corporation 922246 on the terms set forth in its offer with appropriate adjustments to provide for the delay in its execution. Costs awarded shall be payable out of the estate of Soundair Corporation. The costs incurred by the receiver in making the application and responding to the appeal shall be paid to him out of the assets of the estate of Soundair Corporation on a solicitor-client basis. I would make no order as to costs of any of the other parties or intervenors.

Appeal dismissed.

TAB 3

2015 QCCS 1920
Cour supérieure du Québec

Bloom Lake, g.p.l., Re

2015 CarswellQue 4072, 2015 QCCS 1920, 27
C.B.R. (6th) 1, J.E. 2015-830, EYB 2015-251727

In the matter of the companies' creditors arrangement act, r.s.c. 1985, c. C-36, as amended: Bloom lake General Partner Limited, Quinto Mining Corporation, 8568391 Canada Limited and Cliffs Québec Iron mining ULC, Petitioners, and The bloom lake iron ore mine limited partnership and Bloom lake railway company limited, Mises en cause, and FTI Consulting Canada Inc., Monitor, and 9201955 Canada inc., Mise en cause, and Eabametoong first nation, Ginoogaming first nation, Constance Lake first nation and Long Lake # 58 first nation, Aroland first nation and Marten Falls first nation, Objectors, and 8901341 Canada inc. and Canadian Development And Marketing Corporation, Interveners

Hamilton J.C.S.

Heard: 24 april 2015

Judgment: 27 april 2015

Docket: C.S. Qué. Montréal 500-11-048114-157

Counsel: Me Bernard Boucher, Me Sébastien Guy, Me Steven J. Weisz for Bloom Lake General Partner Limited, Quinto Mining Corporation, 8568391 Canada Limited, Cliffs Quebec Iron Mining ULC, The Bloom Lake Iron Ore Mine Limited Partnership, Bloom Lake Railway Company Limited

Me Sylvain Rigaud, Me Chrystal Ashby for FTI Consulting Canada Inc.

Me Jean-Yves Simard, Me Sean Zweig for 9201955 Canada Inc.

Me Stéphane Hébert, Me Maurice Fleming for Eabametoong First Nation Ginoogaming First Nation, Constance Lake First Nation and Long Lake # 58 First Nation, Aroland First Nation, Marten Falls First Nation

Me Sandra Abitan, Me Éric Préfontaine, Me Julien Morissette for 8901341 Canada inc. Canadian Development and Marketing Corporation

Subject: Civil Practice and Procedure; Insolvency; Public

Related Abridgment Classifications

Aboriginal and Indigenous law

XII Miscellaneous

Bankruptcy and insolvency

XIX Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act

XIX.3 Arrangements

XIX.3.e Miscellaneous

Civil practice and procedure

III Parties

III.4 Standing

Headnote

Bankruptcy and insolvency --- Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act — Arrangements — Miscellaneous

Sellers, who were parent company and affiliates of petitioners, sought to sell interests in chromite mining projects in Ring of Fire mining district — Sellers executed initial Share Purchase Agreement (SPA) with N, which made provision for "superior proposal" mechanism allowing sellers to accept unsolicited, superior offer from third party — Petitioners commenced motion for issuance of approval and vesting order with respect to initial SPA — C made unsolicited, superior offer — Sellers developed supplemental bid process giving C and N chance to submit their best and final offers — Sellers ultimately accepted N's higher bidding offer and entered into revised SPA with N — Petitioners amended their motion to seek issuance of approval and vesting order with respect to revised SPA — Ruling was made on petitioners' amended motion — Motion was granted — Sale process was fair, reasonable and efficient within s. 36(3)(a) of Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act — There was no legal requirement that sale process be approved in advance — Sellers had no obligation to accept C's unsolicited and superior offer and to terminate initial SPA — Initial SPA permitted sellers to terminate it, but did not require them to do so — Sellers' supplemental bid process was very reasonable and fair, and in best interests of creditors — N submitted its offer in compliance with rules, and there was no fundamental flaw in process such as parties having unequal access to information or one party seeking to amend its offer after it had knowledge of other offers.

Aboriginal and indigenous law --- Miscellaneous

Sellers, who were parent company and affiliates of petitioners, sought to sell interests in chromite mining projects in Ring of Fire mining district — Sellers executed initial Share Purchase Agreement (SPA) with N, which made provision for "superior proposal" mechanism allowing sellers to accept unsolicited, superior offer from third party — Petitioners commenced motion for issuance of approval and vesting order with respect to initial SPA — First Nations bands filed objection to motion — Following C's unsolicited superior offer and supplemental bidding process, sellers accepted N's highest bidding offer and entered into revised SPA with N — Petitioners amended their motion to seek issuance of

approval and vesting order with respect to revised SPA, but First Nations bands maintained their objection — Ruling was made on petitioners' amended motion — Motion was granted — It was not clear to what extent First Nations bands had knowledge of sale process and could have participated — There was no evidence to suggest that bands on their own could have made serious offer, or that they would have partnered with party that was not already identified and included in process — It was pure speculation whether First Nations would have presented offer in excess of N's offer — Sale of shares from one private party to another did not trigger duty to consult First Nations — It was difficult to see how granting of two or three percent royalty impacted rights of First Nations bands.

Civil practice and procedure --- Parties — Standing

Parties had standing and their objections were not dismissed due to lack of interest or standing.

Faillite et insolvabilité --- Loi sur les arrangements avec les créanciers des compagnies — Arrangements — Divers

Vendeurs, qui représentaient la société mère et les filiales des pétitionnaires, voulaient vendre leurs intérêts dans les projets miniers de chromite dans le district minier du Cercle de Feu — Vendeurs ont signé avec N une convention d'achat d'actions prévoyant un mécanisme de [TRADUCTION] « propositions supérieures » qui permettait aux vendeurs d'accepter des offres supérieures non-sollicitées — Pétitionnaires ont déposé une requête en vue d'obtenir une ordonnance d'approbation et d'acquisition portant sur la convention — C a fait une offre supérieure non-sollicitée — Vendeurs ont élaboré un processus de soumissions supplémentaire permettant à C et N de présenter leurs meilleures offres finales — Vendeurs ont accepté l'offre supérieure de N et ont signé une convention d'achat d'actions révisée avec N — Pétitionnaires ont déposé une requête modifiée en vue de l'émission d'une ordonnance d'approbation et d'acquisition portant sur la convention révisée — Décision a été rendue à la suite du dépôt de la requête modifiée par les pétitionnaires — Requête a été accordée — Processus de vente a été équitable, raisonnable et efficace au regard de l'art. 36(3)a) de la Loi sur les arrangements avec les créanciers des compagnies — Il n'existait aucune obligation juridique de faire approuver la vente à l'avance — Vendeurs n'avaient pas l'obligation d'accepter l'offre supérieure non-sollicitée de C et de mettre fin à la convention initiale — Convention initiale autorisait les vendeurs à y mettre fin, mais ne l'exigeait pas — Processus de soumissions supplémentaire des vendeurs était très raisonnable et équitable, et dans le meilleur intérêt des créanciers — N a présenté son offre en conformité avec les règles, donc il n'y avait pas d'erreur fondamentale dans le processus qui aurait eu pour effet de rendre inégal l'accès des parties à l'information ou qui aurait fait en sorte qu'une partie modifie son offre après avoir eu connaissance d'autres offres.

Droit autochtone --- Divers

Vendeurs, qui représentaient la société mère et les filiales des pétitionnaires, voulaient vendre leurs intérêts dans les projets miniers de chromite dans le district minier du Cercle de Feu — Vendeurs ont signé avec N une convention d'achat d'actions prévoyant un mécanisme de

[TRADUCTION] « propositions supérieures » qui permettait aux vendeurs d'accepter des offres supérieures non-sollicitées — Pétitionnaires ont déposé une requête en vue d'obtenir une ordonnance d'approbation et d'acquisition portant sur la convention — Bandes de Premières Nations ont soulevé une objection à l'encontre de la requête — Suite à l'offre supérieure et non-sollicitée de C et au processus de soumissions supplémentaire, vendeurs ont accepté l'offre supérieure de N et ont signé une convention d'achat d'actions révisée avec N — Vendeurs ont accepté l'offre supérieure de N et ont signé une convention d'achat d'actions révisée avec N — Pétitionnaires ont déposé une requête modifiée en vue de l'émission d'une ordonnance d'approbation et d'acquisition portant sur la convention révisée, mais les bandes de Premières Nations ont maintenu leur objection — Décision a été rendue à la suite du dépôt de la requête modifiée par les pétitionnaires — Requête a été accordée — On ignorait ce que les bandes de Premières Nations savaient du processus de vente et dans quelle mesure elles auraient pu y participer — Il n'existait aucun élément de preuve laissant croire que les bandes auraient pu, d'elles-mêmes, faire une offre sérieuse ou qu'elles auraient pu s'entendre avec une partie au processus qui n'était pas déjà identifiée — Hypothèse selon laquelle les Premières Nations auraient pu présenter une offre supérieure à l'offre de N relevait de la pure spéculation — Vente d'actions d'une partie privée à une autre partie privée n'a pas déclenché l'obligation de consulter les Premières Nations — Il était difficile d'imaginer comment l'octroi de deux ou trois points de pourcentage en termes de redevances pouvait avoir un impact sur les droits des bandes de Premières Nations.

Procédure civile --- Parties — Intérêt pour agir

Objections des parties n'ont pas été rejetées en raison de leur manque d'intérêt ou d'intérêt pour agir.

Table of Authorities

Cases considered by *Hamilton J.C.S.*:

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AbitibiBowater Inc., Re (2010), 2010 QCCS 1742, 2010 CarswellQue 4082, 71 C.B.R. (5th) 220 (C.S. Que.) — considered

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BDC Venture Capital Inc. v. Natural Convergence Inc. (2009), 2009 ONCA 665, 2009 CarswellOnt 5535, 57 C.B.R. (5th) 186 (Ont. C.A.) — referred to

Boutiques San Francisco Inc., Re (2004), 2004 CarswellQue 753, [2004] R.J.Q. 965, 5 C.B.R. (5th) 197 (C.S. Que.) — referred to

Canadian Airlines Corp., Re (2000), 2000 ABQB 442, 2000 CarswellAlta 662, [2000] 10 W.W.R. 269, 20 C.B.R. (4th) 1, 84 Alta. L.R. (3d) 9, 9 B.L.R. (3d) 41, 265 A.R. 201 (Alta. Q.B.) — considered

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Carrier Sekani Tribal Council v. British Columbia (Utilities Commission) (2010), 2010 SCC 43, 2010 CarswellBC 2867, 2010 CarswellBC 2868, 96 R.P.R. (4th) 1, [2010] 11 W.W.R. 577, 54 C.E.L.R. (3d) 1, 9 B.C.L.R. (5th) 205, (sub nom. *Rio Tinto Alcon Inc. v. Carrier Sekani Tribal Council*) [2010] 4 C.N.L.R. 250, 406 N.R. 333, 325 D.L.R. (4th) 1, 11 Admin. L.R. (5th) 246, 293 B.C.A.C. 175, 496 W.A.C. 175, (sub nom. *Rio Tinto Alcon Inc. v. Carrier Sekani Tribal Council*) [2010] 2 S.C.R. 650, (sub nom. *Rio Tinto Alcon Inc. v. Carrier Sekani Tribal Council*) 225 C.R.R. (2d) 75 (S.C.C.) — followed
Consumers Packaging Inc., Re (2001), 2001 CarswellOnt 3482, 27 C.B.R. (4th) 197, 150 O.A.C. 384, 12 C.P.C. (5th) 208, [2001] O.T.C. 459 (Ont. C.A.) — referred to
Crown Trust Co. v. Rosenberg (1986), 60 O.R. (2d) 87, 22 C.P.C. (2d) 131, 39 D.L.R. (4th) 526, 67 C.B.R. (N.S.) 320 (note), 1986 CarswellOnt 235 (Ont. H.C.) — considered
Haida Nation v. British Columbia (Minister of Forests) (2004), 2004 SCC 73, 2004 CarswellBC 2656, 2004 CarswellBC 2657, 245 D.L.R. (4th) 33, 19 Admin. L.R. (4th) 195, 11 C.E.L.R. (3d) 1, [2005] 1 C.N.L.R. 72, 26 R.P.R. (4th) 1, [2005] 3 W.W.R. 419, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 511, 36 B.C.L.R. (4th) 282, 327 N.R. 53, 206 B.C.A.C. 52, 338 W.A.C. 52, 2004 CSC 73 (S.C.C.) — followed

Skeena Cellulose Inc., Re (2002), 2002 BCSC 597, 2002 CarswellBC 1021, 34 C.B.R. (4th) 298 (B.C. S.C. [In Chambers]) — considered

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Statutes considered:

Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3

Generally — referred to

Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C.

Chapter 15 — referred to

Code civil du Québec, L.Q. 1991, c. 64

en général — referred to

Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36

Generally — referred to

s. 36 — considered

s. 36(1) — considered

s. 36(3) — considered

s. 36(3)(a) — considered

s. 36(6) — considered

Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11, reprinted R.S.C. 1985, App. II, No. 44

s. 35 — considered

Personal Property Security Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 359

Generally — referred to

Personal Property Security Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. P.10

Generally — referred to

RULING on petitioners' amended motion for issuance of approval and vesting order with respect to revised share purchase agreement.

Hamilton J.C.S.:

1 The Petitioners have made an Amended Motion for the Issuance of an Approval and Vesting Order with respect to the Sale of the Chromite Shares (#82 on the plunitif; the original motion was #65). Objections were filed by (1) six First Nation bands (#85, as amended at the hearing) and (2) 8901341 Canada Inc. and Canadian Development and Marketing Corporation (together, CDM) (#87).

CONTEXT

2 On January 27, 2015, Mr. Justice Castonguay issued an Initial Order placing the Petitioners and the Mises-en-cause under the protection of the *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*.¹ The ultimate parent of the Petitioners and the Mises-en-cause is Cliffs Natural Resources Inc. (Cliffs), which is neither a Petitioner nor a Mise-en-cause.

3 The Petitioner Cliffs Québec Iron Mining ULC (CQIM) owns, through two subsidiaries, a 100% interest in the Black Thor and Black Label chromite mining projects and a 70% interest in the Big Daddy chromite mining project. All three projects form part of the Ring of Fire, a mining district in northern Ontario.

4 Other entities related to Cliffs but which are not parties to the CCAA proceedings own other mining interests in the Ring of Fire.

5 The proposed transaction with respect to which the Petitioners are seeking an approval and vesting order involves the sale of those various interests, including in particular the sale of CQIM's shares in the subsidiaries described above.

6 Cliffs and its affiliates paid approximately US\$350 million to acquire their interests in the Ring of Fire projects, and invested a further US\$200 million in developing these projects.

7 By 2013, Cliffs had suspended all activities related to the Ring of Fire and began making general inquiries with potential interested parties with a view to selling its interests in the Ring of Fire. No material interest resulted from these efforts.

8 By September 2014, Cliffs's desire to sell its interests in the Ring of Fire was publicly known.² It hired Moelis & Company LLC to assist with the sale process for various assets including the Ring of Fire in October 2014.³

9 The sale process will be described in greater detail below. It resulted in the execution of a letter of intent with Noront on February 13, 2015.⁴

10 While the sellers were negotiating the Share Purchase Agreement with Noront, CDM sent an unsolicited letter of intent to acquire the Ring of Fire interests on March 14, 2015.⁵ That letter of intent was analyzed by the sellers, Moelis and the Monitor and was rejected.⁶ Two revised letters of intent followed and were also rejected.⁷

11 The sellers executed the initial Share Purchase Agreement with Noront on March 22, 2015, which provided for a price of US \$20 million.⁸ Noront issued a press release describing the transaction on March 23, 2015.⁹

12 The initial SPA provided in Section 7.1 a "Superior Proposal" mechanism that allowed the sellers to accept an unsolicited and superior offer from a third party.

13 On April 2, 2015, the Petitioners made a motion for the issuance of an approval and vesting order with respect to the initial SPA. Four First Nations bands who live and exercise their Aboriginal and treaty rights in and on the land and territories surrounding the Ring of Fire filed an objection to the motion. CDM did not. Instead, on April 13, 2015, CDM made an unsolicited offer for the interests in the Ring of Fire which included a purchase price of US \$23 million.¹⁰

14 CDM's offer was considered by the sellers, Moelis and the Monitor to be a "Superior Proposal" as defined in Section 7.1 of the initial SPA. As a result, they advised Noront,¹¹ which expressed an interest in making a new offer.

15 The sellers, after consulting Moelis and the Monitor, developed the Supplemental Bid Process to give each party the chance to submit its best and final offer.¹²

16 Both Noront and CDM participated in the Supplemental Bid Process and submitted new offers, with Noront's offer at US \$27.5 million and CDM's at US \$25.275 million.¹³

17 The sellers accepted the Noront offer and entered into a revised SPA with Noront on April 17, 2015.¹⁴ The Petitioners then amended their motion to allege the additional facts since April 2, 2015 and to seek the issuance of an approval and vesting order with respect to the revised SPA.

18 The First Nation bands maintained their objection (#85)¹⁵ and CDM filed a Declaration of Intervention and Contestation with respect to the amended motion (#87).

POSITION OF THE PARTIES

19 The Petitioners argue that the revised SPA should be approved because:

1. the marketing and sales process was fair, reasonable, transparent and efficient;
2. the price offered by Noront was the highest binding offer received in the process;
3. CQIM exercised its commercial and business judgment with assistance from Moelis;
4. the Monitor assisted and advised CQIM throughout the process and recommends the approval of the motion.

20 Moreover, they argue that no creditor has opposed the motion, and that the First Nations bands and CDM do not have legal standing to oppose the motion.

21 The Monitor and Noront supported the position put forward by the Petitioners.

22 The First Nations bands argued the following points:

1. they have a legitimate interest and standing to contest the motion as an "other interested party" under Section 36 of the CCAA, because they have Aboriginal and treaty rights that are affected by the change in control of the Ring of Fire interests;

2. there was a duty on the part of the sellers and their advisers to consult with and advise the First Nations bands about the sale process. Instead, the First Nations bands were ignored and did not even learn of the existence of the sale process until March 23, 2015;
3. the sale process was not open, fair or transparent and did not recognize the rights of the First Nations bands;
4. there was no sales process order; and
5. there is no urgency and they should be given the opportunity to present an offer.

23 Finally, CDM argued as follows:

1. the sellers were required to accept the "Superior Proposal" made by CDM on April 13, 2015;
2. the Supplemental Bid Process did not treat the two parties fairly;
3. the Monitor's support of the process is not determinative;
4. it had the necessary interest to intervene in the CCAA proceedings and contest the motion.

ISSUES

24 The Court will analyze the following issues:

1. Was the sale process "fair, reasonable, transparent and efficient"?

In the context of the analysis of this issue, the Court will consider various sub-issues, including the business judgement rule, the importance of the Monitor's recommendation, and the interpretation of Section 7.1 of the initial SPA.

2. Do the First Nations bands have other grounds on which to object to the proposed transaction?
3. Do the First Nations bands and CDM have legal standing to raise there issues?

ANALYSIS

Was the sale process "fair, reasonable, transparent and efficient"?

25 Section 36 of the CCAA provides in part as follows:

36. (1) A debtor company in respect of which an order has been made under this Act may not sell or otherwise dispose of assets outside the ordinary course of business unless authorized to do so by a court. Despite any requirement for shareholder approval, including one under federal or provincial law, the court may authorize the sale or disposition even if shareholder approval was not obtained.

...

(3) In deciding whether to grant the authorization, the court is to consider, among other things,

(a) whether the process leading to the proposed sale or disposition was reasonable in the circumstances;

(b) whether the monitor approved the process leading to the proposed sale or disposition;

(c) whether the monitor filed with the court a report stating that in their opinion the sale or disposition would be more beneficial to the creditors than a sale or disposition under a bankruptcy;

(d) the extent to which the creditors were consulted;

(e) the effects of the proposed sale or disposition on the creditors and other interested parties; and

(f) whether the consideration to be received for the assets is reasonable and fair, taking into account their market value.

(6) The court may authorize a sale or disposition free and clear of any security, charge or other restriction and, if it does, it shall also order that other assets of the company or the proceeds of the sale or disposition be subject to a security, charge or other restriction in favour of the creditor whose security, charge or other restriction is to be affected by the order.

...

26 The criteria in Section 36(3) of the CCAA have been held not to be cumulative or exhaustive. The Court must look at the proposed transaction as a whole and decide whether it is appropriate, fair and reasonable:

[48] The elements which can be found in Section 36 CCAA are, first of all, not limitative and secondly they need not to be all fulfilled in order to grant or not grant an order under this section.

[49] The Court has to look at the transaction as a whole and essentially decide whether or not the sale is appropriate, fair and reasonable. In other words, the Court could grant the process for reasons others than those mentioned in Section 36 CCAA or refuse to grant it for reasons which are not mentioned in Section 36 CCAA.¹⁶

27 Further, in the context of one of the asset sales in *AbitibiBowater*, Mr. Justice Gascon, then of this Court, adopted the following list of relevant factors:

[36] The Court has jurisdiction to approve a sale of assets in the course of CCAA proceedings, notably when such a sale of assets is in the best interest of the stakeholders generally.

[37] In determining whether to authorize a sale of assets under the CCAA, the Court should consider, amongst others, the following key factors:

- have sufficient efforts to get the best price been made and have the parties acted providently;
- the efficacy and integrity of the process followed;
- the interests of the parties; and
- whether any unfairness resulted from the working out process.

[38] These principles were enunciated in *Royal Bank v. Soundair Corp.* They are equally applicable in a CCAA sale situation.¹⁷

28 The Court must give due consideration to two further elements in assessing whether the sale should be approved under Section 36 CCAA:

1. the business judgment rule:

[70] That being so, it is not for this Court to second-guess the commercial and business judgment properly exercised by the Petitioners and the Monitor.

[71] A court will not lightly interfere with the exercise of this commercial and business judgment in the context of an asset sale where the marketing and sale process was fair, reasonable, transparent and efficient. This is certainly not a case where it should.¹⁸

2. the weight to be given to the recommendation of the Monitor:

The recommendation of the Monitor, a court-appointed officer experienced in the insolvency field, carries great weight with the Court in any approval process. Absent

some compelling, exceptional factor to the contrary, a Court should accept an applicant's proposed sale process where it is recommended by the Monitor and supported by the stakeholders.¹⁹

29 Debtors often ask the Court to authorize the sale process in advance. This has the advantage of ensuring that the process is clear and of reducing the likelihood of a subsequent challenge. In the present matter, the Petitioners did seek the Court's authorization with respect to a sale process for their other assets, but they did not seek the Court's authorization with respect to the sale process for the Ring of Fire interests because that sale process was already well under way before the CCAA filing. There is no legal requirement that the sale process be approved in advance, but it creates the potential for the process being challenged after the fact, as in this case.

30 The Court will therefore review the sale process in light of these factors.

(1) From October 2014 to the execution of the Noront letter of intent on February 13, 2015

31 The sale process began in earnest in October 2014 when Cliffs engaged Moelis.

32 Moelis identified a group of eighteen potential buyers and strategic partners, with the assistance of CQIM and Cliffs. The group included traders, resource buyers, financial sector participants, local strategic partners, and market participants, as well as parties who had previously expressed an interest in the Ring of Fire.

33 Moelis began contacting the potential interested parties to solicit interest in purchasing the Ring of Fire project. It sent a form of non-disclosure agreement to fifteen parties. Fourteen executed the agreement and were given access to certain confidential information.

34 Negotiations ensued with seven of the interested parties, and six were given access to the data room that was established in November 2014.

35 By January 21, 2015, non-binding letters of intent were received from Noront and from a third party. There were also two verbal expressions of interest, but neither resulted in a letter of intent.

36 The Noront letter of intent was determined by the sellers in consultation with Moelis and the Monitor to be the better offer. Moelis then contacted all parties who had indicated a preliminary level of interest to give them the opportunity to submit a letter of intent in a price range superior to the Noront letter of intent, but no such letter was received.

37 Negotiations continued with Noront and a letter of intent was executed with Noront on February 13, 2015.²⁰

38 With respect to this portion of the process, CDM does not raise any issue but the First Nations bands complain that they were not included in the list of potential interested parties and were not otherwise consulted.

39 The Court will discuss the special status of the First Nations bands in the next section of this judgment. At this stage, it is sufficient to note that the sale process must be reasonable, but is not required to be perfect. Even if the initial list of eighteen potential buyers and strategic partners omitted some potential buyers, this is not a basis for the Court to intervene, provided that the sellers, with Moelis and the Monitor, took reasonable steps.²¹ The Court is satisfied that this test was met.

(2) From letter of intent to initial SPA

40 Between February 13, 2015 and March 22, 2015, the sellers negotiated the SPA with Noront and signed the initial SPA. In that same period, CDM expressed an interest in the Ring of Fire interests and sent three separate offers, all of which were refused by the sellers.

41 CDM does not contest the reasonability of the sellers' actions in this period. In fact, CDM did not contest the original motion to approve the initial SPA, but chose instead to make a new offer.

(3) The initial SPA and the "Superior Proposal"

42 The initial SPA with Noront dated March 22, 2015 provided for a purchase price of US \$20 million.

43 Section 7.1 of the initial SPA allowed the sellers to pursue a "Superior Proposal", defined as an unsolicited offer from a third party which appeared to be more favourable to the sellers. In that eventuality, the sellers had the right to terminate the initial SPA upon reimbursing Noront's expenses up to \$250,000.

44 CDM made a new offer on April 13, 2015.²² The sellers, in consultation with their advisers and the Monitor, concluded that it was a Superior Proposal.

45 CDM argues that in those circumstances, the sellers had the obligation to terminate the initial SPA and to accept the CDM offer.

46 The Court does not agree.

47 On its face, the language in Section 7.1 is permissive and not mandatory. It says that the sellers "may" terminate the initial SPA and enter into an agreement with the new offeror. It does not require them to do so.

48 CDM argued that Section 7.1 does not provide for a right to match, which is found in other agreements of this nature. That may be true, but a right to match is different. Specific language would be necessary to contractually require the sellers to accept an offer from Noront that matched the new offer. No language was required to give Noront the right to make a new offer. Further, specific language would be required to remove the possibility of Noront making a new offer. There is no such language. It would be surprising to find such language: why would Noront give up the right to make another offer, and why would the sellers prevent Noront from making another offer? Any such language would be to the detriment of the two contracting parties and for the exclusive benefit of an unknown third party. As the Monitor pointed out, Section 12.2 of the initial SPA specifies that the SPA is for the sole benefit of the parties and is not intended to give any rights, benefits or remedies to a third party.

49 As a result, the sellers had no obligation to accept the April 13 offer from CDM.

(4) The Supplemental Bid Process

50 Once the sellers, their advisers and the Monitor determined that the April 13 offer from CDM was a Superior Proposal, they had to decide how to manage the process. They had two interested parties and they decided to give them both the chance to make their best and final offer through a process that they created for the purpose, which is referred to as the Supplemental Bid Process. This was a very reasonable decision, in the best interests of the creditors, although probably not one that either offeror was very happy with.

51 The sellers, their advisers and the Monitor established a series of rules, and they sent the rules to the two offerors at the same time:

1. Each of the Bidders' best and final offer is to be delivered in the form of an executed Share Purchase Agreement (the "Final Bid"), together with a blackline mark-up against the March 22 SPA to show proposed changes.
2. Final Bids can remove section 7.1(d) and the related provisions of the March 22 SPA.
3. Final bids are to be received by Moelis by no later than 5:00 p.m. (Toronto time) on Wednesday, April 15, 2015 in accordance with paragraph 7 below.
4. Final Bids may be accompanied by a cover letter setting any additional considerations that the Bidder wishes to be considered in connection with its Final Bid but such cover letter should not amend or modify any of the terms and conditions contained in the executed SPA.

5. Final Bids will be reviewed by the Sellers in consultation with moelis and the Monitor. A determination of the Superior Proposal will be made as soon as practicable and communicated to the Bidders.

6. Any clarifications or other communications with respect to this process should be made in writing to the Sale Advisor, with a copy to the Monitor.

7. Final Bids are to be submitted to the Sale Advisor c/o Carlo De Giroloamo by email at carlo.degirolamo@moelis.com.

8. All initially capitalized terms used herein unless otherwise defined shall have the meanings given to them in the March 22 SPA.²³

52 They declined a request from Noront to modify the rules.²⁴

53 Both Noront and CDM decided to participate in the Supplemental Bid Process and both submitted offers.

54 All parties agree that the CDM offer was in compliance with the rules of the Supplemental Bid Process.

55 Noront's offer was received at 5:00 p.m. on April 15.²⁵ CDM argues that the offer was not in compliance with the rules:

- The cover email states that final approvals are still required (presumably from Franco-Nevada which was advancing the funds for the transaction and Resource Capital Fund (RCF) which was the principal lender to Noront) and that Noront expected to receive them within the next hour;
- The cover letter was not signed;
- The cover letter stated that the revised offer was effective only if the sellers received another offer; and
- The email did not include an executed SPA, but only a blackline mark-up of the SPA.

56 Subsequent to 5:00 p.m., Noront completed the requirements:

- At 5:34 p.m., Noront sent a signed cover letter. A paragraph was added to explain that "certain representations and warranties and conditions to the advance of the loan with Franco-Nevada have been reduced in order to provide certainty on

Noront's financing" and that the signature pages for the SPA and the fully executed loan agreement would be sent separately;²⁶

- At 8:50 p.m., Noront's counsel sent the executed SPA and the amended and restated loan agreement. The executed SPA included some changes described as "cleanup" and "not substantive" since 5:00 p.m. Among those changes, Noront deleted RCF from Exhibit C (Required Consents), suggesting that it had obtained that consent;²⁷
- At 10:00 p.m., Moelis asked Noront for confirmation of the RCF consent and an executed copy of it, an explanation for the source of the additional funds, and clarification of the deadline for the vesting order;²⁸
- At 10:35 p.m., Noront provided the executed RCF consent and an explanation of the funding;²⁹ and
- At 1:25 p.m. on April 16, Noront agreed to extend the date for the vesting order from April 20 to April 27.³⁰

57 The Noront offer was the higher of the two offers in terms of the purchase price. The issue is whether these issues are such as to invalidate the process such that the Court should require the sellers to start over.

58 The Court considers that these issues are relatively minor and that they do not invalidate the process:

- Noront submitted its offer on time;
- The offer was not amended in any substantive way after 5:00 p.m. In particular, the purchase price was not amended;
- The lack of a signature on the cover letter was irrelevant;
- The condition that the revised offer was effective only if the sellers received another offer had already been fulfilled before Noront submitted its offer. Noront did not know this, but the sellers, Moelis and the Monitor did;
- The missing third party consents were not within Noront's control. Noront said at 5:00 p.m. that it expected to receive them within the next hour. In fact, it provided the consents to Moelis at 8:50 p.m.;

- The executed SPA was provided at 8:50 p.m. The delay appears to be related to the missing consents. There is no evidence that Noront was using this as a means to preserve an out from the offer; and
- The questions with respect to the source of the funding and the date were clarifications requested by Moelis for its evaluation of the offer and were not elements missing from the offer.

59 This is not a case where there is a fundamental flaw in the process, such as the parties having unequal access to information or one party seeking to amend its offer after it had knowledge of the other offers. The process was fair. It was not perfect, but the Courts do not require perfection.

(5) Conclusion

60 As a result, the Court concludes that the sale process was reasonable within Section 36(3)(a) of the CCAA. Moreover, the other factors in Section 36(3) favour the approval of the sale:

- The monitor approved the process and was involved throughout;
- The monitor filed a report with the Court in which he recommends the approval of the sale;
- The creditors were not consulted, but the motion and amended motion were served on the service list and no creditor has objected to the sale;
- The consideration appears to be fair, given that it is the result of a reasonable process. The Court gives weight to the business judgment of the sellers and their advisers.

61 For all of these reasons, the Court dismisses CDM's contestation of the motion.

62 There remain the issues raised by the First Nations bands.

2. Do the First Nations bands have other grounds on which to object to the transaction?

63 The First Nations bands raise issues of two natures.

64 First, they argue that they were denied the opportunity to participate in the sale process and they ask for time to examine the possibility of presenting an offer for the Ring of Fire interests.

65 Second, they argue that the transaction has an impact on their Aboriginal and treaty rights protected under Section 35 of the *Constitution Act, 1982*.

66 The Court has already concluded that the process of identifying potential buyers and strategic partners was reasonable.

67 Further, it is not clear to what extent the First Nations bands had knowledge of the sale process and could have participated. The September 17, 2014 newspaper article says that Cliffs is exploring alternatives including the possibility of selling its Ring of Fire interests.³¹ That article refers to a letter which was sent to the First Nations bands in the area which again would have referred to a possible sale.

68 At the very latest, they knew about the potential sale when a press release was published on March 23, 2015.

69 Moreover, in its materials, CDM alleged that its final offer on April 15 "had the support of two of the most impacted First Nations communities",³² which suggests that the First Nations bands had at least some involvement in the sale process.

70 Nevertheless, the interest of the First Nations bands remains at a very preliminary level. Although the First Nations bands say that they have hired a financial adviser and that they want a delay to analyze the possibility of making an offer for the Ring of Fire interests, whether on their own or with a partner, there is no evidence to suggest that the bands on their own would make a serious offer, or that they would partner with a party that was not already identified by Moelis and included in the process. It is pure speculation as to whether they will ever present an offer in excess of the Noront offer. The Courts have rejected firm offers for greater amounts received after the sale process has concluded.³³ The Courts should also refuse to stop the sale process because a party arriving late might be interested in presenting an offer which might be better than the offer on the table.

71 The First Nations bands also plead that they have a special interest in this transaction because they live and exercise their Aboriginal and treaty rights guaranteed by the Constitution on the land and territories surrounding the Ring of Fire.

72 For the purposes of this motion, the Court will assume that to be true. It is nevertheless unclear to what extent a change of control of the corporations which own the interests in the Ring of Fire project impacts on those rights. The identity of the shareholders of the corporations does not change the rights of the First Nations bands or the obligations of the corporations in relation to the development of the project.

73 The First Nations bands pointed to two specific issues.

74 First, they argued that there was a duty to consult which was not respected. It is clear that as a matter of constitutional law, there is a duty to consult. It is equally clear that this duty lies on the Crown, not on private parties.³⁴ As a result, the Crown has a duty to consult when it acts, including when it sells shares in a corporation with interests that impact on the rights of the First Nations.³⁵ However, a sale of shares from one private party to another does not trigger the duty to consult. The First Nations bands also produced the Regional Framework Agreement between nine First Nation bands in the Ring of Fire area, including the six objectors, and the Ontario Crown.³⁶ Cliffs was not a party to this agreement, and the sale of the sellers' interests in the Ring of Fire project does not affect any party's rights and obligations under the agreement. It is indeed unfortunate that the First Nations bands were not included in the sale process, because they will have an important role to play in the development of the Ring of Fire. But the failure to include them was not a breach of the duty to consult or of the Regional Framework Agreement.

75 Second, the First Nations bands gave as an example of how the proposed transaction might prejudice their rights a royalty arrangement which Noront appears to have entered into with Franco-Nevada as part of the financing for the proposed transaction. The press release announcing the initial transaction on March 23, 2015 provided:

Franco-Nevada will receive a 3% royalty over the Black Thor chromite deposit and a 2% royalty over all of Noront's property in the region with the exception of Eagle's Nest, which is excluded.³⁷

76 Assuming that the financing arrangements for the final transaction include a similar provision, which seems likely, the Court is unconvinced that it should refuse the approval of the transaction for this reason.

77 It is difficult to see how granting a 2 or 3% royalty impacts the rights of the First Nations bands, unless it is their position that they are entitled to a royalty of more than 97%. They did not advance such an argument during the hearing.

78 Further, the Court is not being asked to approve the financing arrangements between Noront and Franco-Nevada. If there is something in those financing arrangements that infringes on the rights of the First Nations bands, their rights and their remedies are not affected by the order that the Court is being asked to issue today.

79 For all of these reasons, the Court dismisses the objection made by the First Nations bands.

3. Interest or Standing

80 For the reasons set out above, the Court will dismiss CDM's contestation and the objection made by the First Nations bands. In principle, it is not necessary to deal with the issue of interest or standing. Also, given that the Court was given only a short delay to draft this judgment, it might not be wise to get too far into the issue.

81 However, all parties pleaded the question at length and the Court will therefore deal with it.

82 The Ontario authorities supporting the position that the "bitter bidder" has no interest or standing to challenge the approval motion are clear³⁸ and they have been followed in Québec.³⁹

83 However, the issues which the Court must consider before approving a sale include the reasonableness of the sale process, which involves questions of the fairness and the integrity of the process.

84 A losing bidder is not seeking to promote the best interests of the creditors, but is looking to promote its own interest. It will seek to raise these issues, not because it has any particular interest in fairness or integrity, but because it lost and it wants a second kick at the proverbial can. The narrow technical ground on which the losing bidder is found to have no interest is that it has no legal or proprietary right in the property being sold.⁴⁰ The underlying policy reason is that the losing bidder is a distraction, with the potential for delay and additional expense.

85 However, if the losing bidder is excluded from the process, who will raise the issues of fairness and integrity? The creditors will not do so, because their interest is limited to getting the best price. Where there is a subsequent higher bid, their interest will be in direct conflict with the integrity of the sale process.

86 Perhaps the way to reconcile all of this is to exclude the losing bidder from the Court approval process and instead require the losing bidder to make its complaints and objections to the monitor. The monitor would then be required to report to the Court on any such complaints and objections. In this case, the Monitor's Fourth Report deals with the objection of the First Nations bands in fair and objective manner. However, because CDM filed its intervention after the Monitor filed his report, the Monitor's Fourth Report does not deal with the issues raised by CDM. In that sense, the CDM intervention was useful to the Court in exercising its jurisdiction under Section 36 of the CCAA.

87 The objection of the First Nations bands went beyond their status as losing bidders or excluded bidders, and included issues related to their Aboriginal and treaty rights guaranteed by the Constitution.

88 The case law on the interest or standing of the "bitter bidder" and the policy considerations underlying that case law have no application to these issues. The interest of the First Nations bands is closer to the interest of "social stakeholders" that have been recognized in a number of cases.⁴¹

89 Although the Court will dismiss the objections raised by the First Nations bands and CDM, it will not do so on grounds of a lack of interest or standing.

FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT HEREBY:

90 *GRANTS* the Petitioners' Amended Motion for the Issuance of an Approval and Vesting Order (#82).

91 *ORDERS* that all capitalized terms in this Order shall have the meaning given to them in the Share Purchase Agreement dated as of March 22, 2015, as amended and restated as of April 17, 2015 (the "*Share Purchase Agreement*") by and among Petitioner Cliffs Québec Iron Mining ULC ("*CQIM*"), Cliffs Greene B.V., Cliffs Netherlands B.V. and the Additional Sellers, as vendors, Noront Resources Ltd., as parent, and 9201955 Canada Inc., as purchaser (the "*Purchaser*"), a redacted copy of which was filed as Exhibit R-11 to the Motion, unless otherwise indicated herein.

SERVICE

92 *ORDERS* that any prior delay for the presentation of this Motion is hereby abridged and validated so that this Motion is properly returnable today and hereby dispenses with further service thereof.

93 *PERMITS* service of this Order at any time and place and by any means whatsoever.

SALE APPROVAL

94 *ORDERS and DECLARES* that the transaction (the "*Transaction*") contemplated by the Share Purchase Agreement is hereby approved, and the execution of the Share Purchase Agreement by CQIM is hereby authorized and approved, *nunc pro tunc*, with such non-material alterations, changes, amendments, deletions or additions thereto as may be agreed to but only with the consent of the Monitor.

95 *AUTHORIZES and DIRECTS* the Monitor to hold the Deposit, *nunc pro tunc*, and to apply, disburse and/or deliver the Deposit or the applicable portions thereof in accordance with the provisions of the Share Purchase Agreement.

EXECUTION OF DOCUMENTATION

96 *AUTHORIZES and DIRECTS* CQIM and the Monitor to perform all acts, sign all documents and take any necessary action to execute any agreement, contract, deed, provision, transaction or undertaking stipulated in or contemplated by the Share Purchase Agreement (Exhibit R-12) and any other ancillary document which could be required or useful to give full and complete effect thereto.

AUTHORIZATION

97 *ORDERS and DECLARES* that this Order shall constitute the only authorization required by CQIM to proceed with the Transaction and that no shareholder approval, if applicable, shall be required in connection therewith.

VESTING OF THE AMALCO SHARES

98 *ORDERS and DECLARES* that upon the issuance of a Monitor's certificate substantially in the form appended as *Schedule "A"* hereto (the "*Certificate*"), all of CQIM's right, title and interest in and to the Amalco Shares shall vest absolutely and exclusively in and with the Purchaser, free and clear of and from any and all right, title, benefits, priorities, claims (including claims provable in bankruptcy in the event that CQIM should be adjudged bankrupt), liabilities (direct, indirect, absolute or contingent), obligations, interests, prior claims, security interests (whether contractual, statutory or otherwise), liens, charges, hypothecs, mortgages, pledges, trusts, deemed trusts (whether contractual, statutory, or otherwise), assignments, judgments, executions, writs of seizure or execution, notices of sale, options, agreements, rights of distress, legal, equitable or contractual setoff, adverse claims, levies, taxes, disputes, debts, charges, rights of first refusal or other preemptive rights in favour of third parties, restrictions on transfer of title, or other claims or encumbrances, whether or not they have attached or been perfected, registered, published or filed and whether secured, unsecured or otherwise (collectively, the "*Encumbrances*") by or of any and all persons or entities of any kind whatsoever, including without limiting the generality of the foregoing (i) any Encumbrances created by the Initial Order of this Court dated January 27, 2015 (as amended on February 20, 2015 and as may be further amended from time to time), and (ii) all charges, security interests or charges evidenced by registration, publication or filing pursuant to the Civil Code of Québec, the Ontario Personal Property Security Act, the British Columbia Personal Property Security Act or any other applicable legislation providing for a security interest in personal or movable property, and, for greater

certainty, *ORDERS* that all of the Encumbrances affecting or relating to the Amalco Shares be expunged and discharged as against the Amalco Shares, in each case effective as of the applicable time and date of the Certificate.

99 *ORDERS and DIRECTS* the Monitor to file with the Court a copy of the Certificate, forthwith after issuance thereof.

100 *DECLARES* that the Monitor shall be at liberty to rely exclusively on the Conditions Certificates in issuing the Certificate, without any obligation to independently confirm or verify the waiver or satisfaction of the applicable conditions.

101 *AUTHORIZES and DIRECTS* the Monitor to receive and hold the Purchase Price and to remit the Purchase Price in accordance with the provisions of this Order.

102 *AUTHORIZES and DIRECTS* the Monitor to remit, following closing of the Transaction, that portion of the Purchase Price payable to the Non-Filing Sellers, to the Non-Filing Sellers in accordance with the Purchase Price Allocation described under Exhibit D of the Share Purchase Agreement (Exhibit R-12), as it may be amended by the Non-Filing Sellers, or as the Non-Filing Sellers may otherwise direct.

CANCELLATION OF SECURITY REGISTRATIONS

103 *ORDERS* the Québec Personal and Movable Real Rights Registrar, upon presentation of the required form with a true copy of this Order and the Certificate, to reduce the scope of or strike the registrations in connection with the Amalco Shares, listed in *Schedule "B"* hereto, in order to allow the transfer to the Purchaser of the Amalco Shares free and clear of such registrations.

104 *ORDERS* that upon the issuance of the Certificate, CQIM shall be authorized and directed to take all such steps as may be necessary to effect the discharge of all Encumbrances registered against the Amalco Shares, including filing such financing change statements in the Ontario Personal Property Registry ("*OPPR*") as may be necessary, from any registration filed against CQIM in the *OPPR*, provided that CQIM shall not be authorized or directed to effect any discharge that would have the effect of releasing any collateral other than the Amalco Shares, and CQIM shall be authorized to take any further steps by way of further application to this Court.

105 *ORDERS* that upon the issuance of the Certificate, CQIM shall be authorized and directed to take all such steps as may be necessary to effect the discharge of all Encumbrances registered against the Amalco Shares, including filing such financing change statements in the British Columbia Personal Property Security Registry (the "*BCPPR*") as may be necessary, from any registration filed against CQIM in the *BCPPR*, provided that CQIM shall not be

authorized or directed to effect any discharge that would have the effect of releasing any collateral other than the Amalco Shares, and CQIM shall be authorized to take any further steps by way of further application to this Court.

CQIM NET PROCEEDS

106 *ORDERS* that the proportion of the Purchase Price payable to CQIM in accordance with the Share Purchase Agreement (the "*CQIM Net Proceeds*") shall be remitted to the Monitor and shall be held by the Monitor pending further order of the Court.

107 *ORDERS* that for the purposes of determining the nature and priority of the Encumbrances, the CQIM Net Proceeds shall stand in the place and stead of the Amalco Shares, and that upon payment of the Purchase Price by the Purchaser, all Encumbrances shall attach to the CQIM Net Proceeds with the same priority as they had with respect to the Amalco Shares immediately prior to the sale, as if the Amalco Shares had not been sold and remained in the possession or control of the person having that possession or control immediately prior to the sale.

VALIDITY OF THE TRANSACTION

108 *ORDERS* that notwithstanding:

- a) the pendency of these proceedings;
- b) any petition for a receiving order now or hereafter issued pursuant to the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act* ("**BIA**") and any order issued pursuant to any such petition; or
- c) the provisions of any federal or provincial legislation;

the vesting of the Amalco Shares contemplated in this Order, as well as the execution of the Share Purchase Agreement pursuant to this Order, are to be binding on any trustee in bankruptcy that may be appointed, and shall not be void or voidable nor deemed to be a preference, assignment, fraudulent conveyance, transfer at undervalue or other reviewable transaction under the BIA or any other applicable federal or provincial legislation, as against CQIM, the Purchaser or the Monitor, and shall not constitute oppressive or unfairly prejudicial conduct pursuant to any applicable federal or provincial legislation.

LIMITATION OF LIABILITY

109 *DECLARES* that, subject to other orders of this Court, nothing herein contained shall require the Monitor to take control, or to otherwise manage all or any part of the Purchased

Shares. The Monitor shall not, as a result of this Order, be deemed to be in possession of any of the Purchased Shares within the meaning of environmental legislation, the whole pursuant to the terms of the CCAA.

110 *DECLARES* that no action lies against the Monitor by reason of this Order or the performance of any act authorized by this Order, except by leave of the Court. The entities related to the Monitor or belonging to the same group as the Monitor shall benefit from the protection arising under the present paragraph.

CONFIDENTIALITY

111 *ORDERS* that the unredacted Initial Purchase Agreement filed with the Court as Exhibit R-3, the summary of the two LOIs filed with the Court as Exhibit R-8, the unredacted Share Purchase Agreement filed with the Court as Exhibit R-12 and the unredacted blackline of the Share Purchase Agreement showing changes from the Initial Purchase Agreement filed with the Court as Exhibit R-16 shall be sealed, kept confidential and not form part of the public record, but rather shall be placed, separate and apart from all other contents of the Court file, in a sealed envelope attached to a notice that sets out the title of these proceedings and a statement that the contents are subject to a sealing order and shall only be opened upon further Order of the Court.

GENERAL

112 *DECLARES* that this Order shall have full force and effect in all provinces and territories in Canada.

113 *DECLARES* that the Monitor shall be authorized to apply as it may consider necessary or desirable, with or without notice, to any other court or administrative body, whether in Canada, the United States of America or elsewhere, for orders which aid and complement this Order and, without limitation to the foregoing, an order under Chapter 15 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code, for which the Monitor shall be the foreign representative of the Petitioners and Mises-en-cause. All courts and administrative bodies of all such jurisdictions are hereby respectfully requested to make such orders and to provide such assistance to the Monitor as may be deemed necessary or appropriate for that purpose.

114 *REQUESTS* the aid and recognition of any court or administrative body in any Province of Canada and any Canadian federal court or administrative body and any federal or state court or administrative body in the United States of America and any court or administrative body elsewhere, to act in aid of and to be complementary to this Court in carrying out the terms of this Order.

115 *ORDERS* the provisional execution of the present Order notwithstanding any appeal and without the requirement to provide any security or provision for costs whatsoever.

116 *THE WHOLE WITHOUT COSTS.*

Order accordingly.

APPENDIX

SCHEDULE "A"

FORM OF CERTIFICATE OF THE MONITOR

SUPERIOR COURT (Commercial Division)

C A N A D A

PROVINCE OF QUÉBEC

DISTRICT OF MONTRÉAL

File: No:

500-11-048114-157

IN THE MATTER OF THE COMPANIES' CREDITORS ARRANGEMENT ACT,
R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, AS AMENDED:

BLOOM LAKE GENERAL PARTNER LIMITED

QUINTO MINING CORPORATION

8568391 CANADA LIMITED

CLIFFS QUEBEC IRON MINING ULC

Petitioners

-and-

THE BLOOM LAKE IRON ORE MINE LIMITED PARTNERSHIP

BLOOM LAKE RAILWAY COMPANY LIMITED

Mises-en-cause

-and-

9201955 CANADA INC.

Mise-en-cause

-and-

THE REGISTRAR OF THE REGISTER OF PERSONAL AND MOVABLE REAL RIGHTS

Mise-en-cause

-and-

FTI CONSULTING CANADA INC.

Monitor

CERTIFICATE OF THE MONITOR

RECITALS

A. Pursuant to an initial order rendered by the Honourable Mr. Justice Martin Catonguay, J.S.C., of the Superior Court of Québec, [Commercial Division] (the "*Court*") on January 27, 2015 (as amended on February 20, 2015 and as may be further amended from time to time, the "*Initial Order*"), FTI Consulting Canada Inc. (the "*Monitor*") was appointed to monitor the business and financial affairs of the Petitioners and the Mises-en-cause (together with the Petitioners, the "*CCAA Parties*").

B. Pursuant to an order (the "*Approval and Vesting Order*") rendered by the Court on <*>, 2015, the transaction contemplated by the Share Purchase Agreement dated as of March 22, 2015, as amended and restated as of April 17, 2015 (the "*Share Purchase Agreement*") by and among Petitioner Cliffs Québec Iron Mining ULC ("*CQIM*"), Cliffs Greene B.V., Cliffs Netherlands B.V. and the Additional Sellers (as defined therein), as vendors, Noront Resources Ltd., as parent, and 9201955 Canada Inc., as purchaser (the "*Purchaser*") was authorized and approved, with a view, *inter alia*, to vest in and to the Purchaser, all of CQIM's right, title and interest in and to the Amalco Shares.

C. Each capitalized term used and not defined herein has the meaning given to such term in the Share Purchase Agreement.

D. The Approval and Vesting Order provides for the vesting of all of CQIM's right, title and interest in and to the Amalco Shares in the Purchaser, in accordance with the terms of the Approval and Vesting Order and upon the delivery of a certificate (the "*Certificate*") issued by the Monitor confirming that the Sellers and the Purchaser have each delivered Conditions Certificates to the Monitor.

E. In accordance with the Approval and Vesting Order, the Monitor has the power to authorize, execute and deliver this Certificate.

F. The Approval and Vesting Order also directed the Monitor to file with the Court, a copy of this Certificate forthwith after issuance thereof.

THEREFORE, THE MONITOR CERTIFIES THE FOLLOWING:

A. The Sellers and the Purchaser have each delivered to the Monitor the Conditions Certificates evidencing that all applicable conditions under the Share Purchase Agreement have been satisfied and/or waived, as applicable.

B. The Closing Time is deemed to have occurred on at <TIME> on <*>, 2015.

THIS CERTIFICATE was issued by the Monitor at <TIME> on <*>, 2015.

FTI Consulting Canada Inc., in its capacity as Monitor of the CCAA Parties, and not in its personal capacity.

By:

Name:

Nigel Meakin

SCHEDULE "B"

REGISTRATIONS TO BE REDUCED OR STRICKEN

Nil.

[NTD: Updated searches will be run before motion is heard to confirm no registrations in Quebec.]

8453339.6

Footnotes

- 1 R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, as amended.
- 2 An article from the Globe & Mail dated September 17, 2014 was produced as Exhibit R-7.
- 3 The CCAA Parties formally engaged Moelis by engagement letter dated March 23, 2015, and the Court approved the engagement of Moelis by order dated April 17, 2015.
- 4 Exhibit R-9.
- 5 Exhibit R-17.
- 6 Exhibit R-18.
- 7 Exhibits R-19 to R-22.
- 8 Exhibit R-3 (redacted) and R-4 (unredacted).
- 9 The press release was provided to the Court during argument and was not given an exhibit number.
- 10 Exhibit R-23.
- 11 Exhibit R-24.
- 12 Exhibits R-25 and R-26.
- 13 Exhibits R-29 and R-30.
- 14 Exhibit R-11 (redacted) and R-12 (unredacted).
- 15 It was amended at the hearing to add two First Nations bands as objectors.
- 16 *White Birch Paper Holding Co., Re*, 2010 QCCS 4915 (C.S. Que.) (leave to appeal refused: 2010 QCCA 1950 (C.A. Que.), par. 48-49.
- 17 *AbitibiBowater Inc., Re*, 2009 QCCS 6460 (C.S. Que.), par. 36-38. See also *White Birch, supra* note 16, par. 53-54, and *Aveos Fleet Performance Inc./Aveos performance aéronautique inc., Re*, 2012 QCCS 4074 (C.S. Que.), par. 50.
- 18 *AbitibiBowater Inc., Re*, 2010 QCCS 1742 (C.S. Que.), par. 70-71. See also *White Birch Paper Holding Co., Re*, 2011 QCCS 7304 (C.S. Que.), par. 68-70.
- 19 *AbitibiBowater, supra* note 17, par. 59. See also *White Birch, supra* note 18, par. 73-74.
- 20 Exhibit R-9.
- 21 *Terrace Bay Pulp Inc., Re*, 2012 ONSC 4247 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]), par. 48.
- 22 Exhibit R-23.

- 23 Exhibits R-25 and R-26.
- 24 Exhibit CDM-1.
- 25 Exhibit R-30A.
- 26 Exhibit CDM-3.
- 27 Exhibit CDM-4.
- 28 Exhibit CDM-4.
- 29 Exhibit CDM-4.
- 30 Exhibit CDM-4.
- 31 Exhibit R-7.
- 32 Declaration of Intervention and Contestation (#87), par. 30.
- 33 See, for example, *Boutiques San Francisco Inc., Re*, [2004] R.J.Q. 965 (C.S. Que.), par. 11-25; *AbitibiBowater*, *supra* note 18, par. 72-73.
- 34 *Haida Nation v. British Columbia (Minister of Forests)*, 2004 SCC 73 (S.C.C.), par. 35, 56; *Carrier Sekani Tribal Council v. British Columbia (Utilities Commission)*, 2010 SCC 43 (S.C.C.), par. 79.
- 35 *Skeena Cellulose Inc., Re*, 2002 BCSC 597 (B.C. S.C. [In Chambers]), par. 14.
- 36 Exhibit O-1.
- 37 *Supra*, note 9.
- 38 *Crown Trust Co. v. Rosenberg* [1986 CarswellOnt 235 (Ont. H.C.)], 1986 CanLII 2760, p. 43; *Skyepharma PLC v. Hyal Pharmaceutical Corp.*, [2000] O.J. No. 467 (Ont. C.A.), par. 24-26, 30; *Consumers Packaging Inc., Re* [2001 CarswellOnt 3482 (Ont. C.A.)], 2001 CanLII 6708, par. 7; *BDC Venture Capital Inc. v. Natural Convergence Inc.*, 2009 ONCA 665 (Ont. C.A.), par. 7-8.
- 39 *AbitibiBowater*, *supra* note 18, par. 81-88; *White Birch*, *supra* note 16, par. 55-56.
- 40 Purchasers generally do not have a proprietary interest in the property they are buying.
- 41 *Canadian Airlines Corp., Re*, 2000 ABQB 442 (Alta. Q.B.), par. 95; *Canadian Red Cross Society / Société Canadienne de la Croix-Rouge, Re* [1998 CarswellOnt 3346 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List])], 1998 CanLII 14907, par. 50; *Anvil Range Mining Corp., Re*, 1998 CarswellOnt 5319 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]), par. 9; *Skydome Corp., Re*, 1998 CarswellOnt 5922 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]), par. 6-7.

End of Document

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TAB 4

2012 ONSC 4247
Ontario Superior Court of Justice [Commercial List]

Terrace Bay Pulp Inc., Re

2012 CarswellOnt 9470, 2012 ONSC 4247, [2012] O.J.
No. 3628, 218 A.C.W.S. (3d) 488, 92 C.B.R. (5th) 40

**In the Matter of the Companies' Creditors
Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, C. C-36, as Amended**

In the Matter of a Plan of Compromise or
Arrangement of Terrace Bay Pulp Inc. (Applicant)

Morawetz J.

Heard: July 16, 2012

Judgment: July 19, 2012

Docket: CV-12-9566-00CL

Counsel: Pamela Huff, Marc Flynn, Kristina Desimini for Applicant, Terrace Bay Pulp Inc.
Alec Zimmerman, James Szumski for Birchwood Trading, Inc.

M. Starnino for United Steelworkers

Alan Merksey for Tangshan Sanyu Group Xingda Chemical Fiberco Limited

Alex Ilchenko for Monitor, Ernst & Young Inc

Jacqueline L. Wall for Her Majesty The Queen in Right of Ontario as represented by the
Ministry of Northern Development and Mines

Janice Quigg for Skyway Canada Ltd.

Fred Myers for Township of Terrace Bay

Peter Forestell, Q.C. for Aditya Birla Group and AV Terrace Bay Inc.

Subject: Insolvency; Public; Property; Municipal

Related Abridgment Classifications

Bankruptcy and insolvency

[XIX](#) Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act

[XIX.3](#) Arrangements

[XIX.3.b](#) Approval by court

[XIX.3.b.iv](#) Miscellaneous

Municipal law

[XIV](#) Subdivision control

[XIV.1](#) Severance of land

XIV.1.f Miscellaneous

Headnote

Bankruptcy and insolvency --- Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act — Arrangements — Approval by court — Miscellaneous

T Inc. operated pulp mill — T Inc. sought protection of Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act — Initial order was granted — Court approved process for sale of T Inc.'s mill assets — Purchaser submitted bid to purchase T Inc.'s mill assets for \$2 million plus \$25 million concession from Province of Ontario — Deadline for bids passed — After deadline, Chinese company sought to bid \$35 million — T Inc. brought motion for, inter alia, approval of sales transaction with Purchaser — Motion granted — Approval and vesting order granted — Reasonable attempts were made to market opportunity to participate in sales process in international markets, including China — Based on information available at time Purchaser's offer was accepted, including risks associated with non-binding offer at that point in time, consideration in transaction was not so unreasonably low so as to warrant court entering into sales process by considering competitive bids — Receiver made sufficient effort to get best price, and did not act improvidently — In arriving at recommendation to seek approval of transaction, T Inc. and Monitor considered interests of all parties, including Province, impact on township and employees — There had been no unfairness in working out of process.

Municipal law --- Subdivision control — Severance of land — Miscellaneous

T Inc. operated pulp mill — T Inc. sought protection of Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act — Initial order was granted — Court approved process for sale of T Inc.'s mill assets — T Inc. brought motion for, inter alia, approval of sales transaction in which Purchaser would purchase T Inc.'s mill assets, and for declaration that subdivision control provisions contained in Planning Act do not apply to vesting of title to real property in Purchaser and that such vesting is not, for purposes of s. 50(3) of Planning Act, conveyance by way of deed or transfer — Motion granted on other grounds — Order to issue approving transaction — Granting of vesting order is not, for purposes of s. 50(3) of Planning Act, conveyance by way of deed or transfer — However, it was not necessary to comment on or to issue specific declaration that subdivision control provisions contained in Planning Act do not apply to vesting of title.

Table of Authorities

Cases considered by *Morawetz J.*:

Crown Trust Co. v. Rosenberg (1986), 60 O.R. (2d) 87, 1986 CarswellOnt 235, 22 C.P.C. (2d) 131, 39 D.L.R. (4th) 526, 67 C.B.R. (N.S.) 320 (note) (Ont. H.C.) — considered
Lama v. Coltsman (1978), 20 O.R. (2d) 98, 1978 CarswellOnt 1454 (Ont. Co. Ct.) — followed
Royal Bank v. Soundair Corp. (1991), 7 C.B.R. (3d) 1, 83 D.L.R. (4th) 76, 46 O.A.C. 321, 4 O.R. (3d) 1, 1991 CarswellOnt 205 (Ont. C.A.) — followed
724597 Ontario Inc. v. Merol Power Corp. (2005), 2005 CarswellOnt 6445, 37 R.P.R. (4th) 191 (Ont. S.C.J.) — followed

Statutes considered:

Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36

Generally — referred to

s. 36 — considered

s. 36(3) — considered

Planning Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. P.13

Generally — referred to

s. 50(3) — considered

MOTION by T Inc. for approval of sales transaction and other relief.

Morawetz J.:

1 Terrace Bay Pulp Inc. (the "Applicant") brought this motion for, among other things, approval of the Sales Transaction (the "Transaction") contemplated by an asset purchase agreement dated as of July 5, 2012 (the "Purchase Agreement") between the Applicant, as seller, and AV Terrace Bay Inc., as purchaser (the "Purchaser").

2 The Applicant also seeks authorization to take additional steps and to execute such additional documents as may be necessary to give effect to the Purchase Agreement.

3 Further, the Applicant seeks a Vesting Order, approval of the Fifth Report of the Monitor dated June 12, 2012 and a declaration that the subdivision control provisions contained in the *Planning Act*, R.S.O. 1990, c. P.13 (the "*Planning Act*") do not apply to the vesting of title to the Real Property (as defined in the Purchase Agreement) in the Purchaser and that such vesting is not, for the purposes of s. 50(3) of the *Planning Act*, a conveyance by way of deed or transfer.

4 Finally, the Applicant sought an amendment to the Initial Order to extend the Stay of Proceedings to October 31, 2012.

5 Argument on this matter was heard on July 16, 2012. At the conclusion of argument, on an unopposed basis, I extended the Stay of Proceedings to October 31, 2012. This decision was made after a review of the record which, in my view, established that the Applicant has been and continues to work in good faith and with due diligence such that the requested extension was appropriate in the circumstances.

6 On July 19, 2012, I released my decision approving the Transaction, with reasons to follow. These are the reasons.

7 With respect to the motion to approve the Transaction, the Applicant's position was supported by the United Steelworkers and the Township of Terrace Bay. Counsel to Her Majesty The Queen in Right of Ontario, as Represented by the Ministry of Northern Development and Mines, consented to the Transaction and also supported the motion.

8 The motion was opposed by Birchwood Trading, Inc. ("Birchwood") and by Tangshan Sanyu Group Xingda Chemical Fiberco Limited ("Tangshan").

9 Counsel to the Applicant challenged the standing of Tangshan on the basis that it was "bitter bidder". Argument was heard on this issue and I reserved my decision, indicating that it would be addressed in this endorsement. For the purposes of the disposition of this motion, it is not necessary to address this issue.

10 The Applicant seeks approval of the Transaction in which the Purchaser will purchase all or substantially all of the mill assets of the Applicant for a price of \$2 million plus a \$25 million concession from the Province of Ontario. The Monitor has recommended that this Transaction be approved.

11 Birchwood submits that the Applicant and the Monitor have taken the position that a competing offer from Tangshan for a purchase price of \$35 million should not be considered, notwithstanding that the Tangshan offer (i) is subject to terms and conditions which are as good or better than the Transaction; (ii) would provide dramatically greater recovery to the creditors of the Applicant, and (iii) offers significant benefits to other stakeholders, including the employees of the Applicant's mill.

12 Birchwood is a creditor of the Applicant. It holds a beneficial interest in the Subordinated Secured Plan Notes (the "Notes") in the face amount of approximately \$138,000 and is also the fourth largest trade creditor of the Applicant. If the Transaction is approved, Birchwood submits that it expects to receive less than 6% recovery on its holdings under the Notes and no recovery on its trade debt. In contrast, if the Tangshan offer were accepted, Birchwood expects that it would receive full recovery under the Notes, and that it may also receive a distribution with respect to its trade debt.

13 Birchwood also submits that the Tangshan offer provides substantial benefits to the creditors and other stakeholders of the Applicant which would not be realized under the Transaction. These include:

- (a) an increase in the purchase price for the mill assets, from an effective purchase price of \$27 million to a cash purchase price of \$35 million;
- (b) the potential for the Province of Ontario to be repaid in full or, if the Province is prepared to offer the same debt forgiveness concession under the Tangshan

offer that it is providing to the Purchaser, the potential to increase the "effective" purchase price of the Tangshan offer to \$60 million;

(c) as a consequence of (a) and (b), additional proceeds available for distribution to creditors subordinate to the Province of Ontario of between \$8 million and \$33 million;

(d) employment of approximately 75 additional employees, plus the existing management of the mill;

(e) conversion of the mill into a dissolving pulp mill in 18 months, rather than 4 years, with a higher expected yield once the conversion is complete and a business plan which calls for the production of a more lucrative interim product during the conversion process.

14 Counsel to Birchwood submits that the substantial increase in the consideration offered by the Tangshan offer, which is a binding offer with terms and conditions that are at least as favourable as the Transaction, is sufficient to call into question the integrity and efficacy of the Sales Process (defined below). Counsel suggests that the market for the mill assets was not sufficiently canvassed, and provides evidence to support a finding that the criteria for approval of the sale as set out in s. 36 (3) of the CCAA and *Royal Bank v. Soundair Corp.* (1991), 7 C.B.R. (3d) 1 (Ont. C.A.) has not been met.

15 Birchwood requests an adjournment of the Applicant's request for approval of the Transaction, or a refusal to approve the Transaction and a varying of the Sales Process to allow the Tangshan offer to be considered and, if appropriate, accepted by the Applicant. Tangshan supports the position of Birchwood.

16 For the following reasons, I decline Birchwood's request and grant approval of the Transaction.

Facts

17 The Applicant filed the affidavit of Wolfgang Gericke in support of this motion. In addition, there is considerable detail provided in the Sixth Report of the Monitor and in the Supplemental Sixth Report of the Monitor.

18 On January 25, 2012, the Initial Order was granted in the CCAA proceedings. The Initial Order authorized the Applicant to conduct, with the assistance of the Monitor and in consultation with the Province of Ontario, a sales process to solicit offers for all or substantially all of the assets and properties of the Applicant used in connection with its pulp mill operations (the "Sales Process").

19 The Applicant and the Monitor conducted a number of activities in furtherance of the Sales Process, as outlined in detail in the Sixth Report.

20 The Monitor received 13 non-binding Letters of Intent by the initial deadline of February 15, 2012. All of the parties that submitted Letters of Intent were invited to do further due diligence and submit binding offers by the March 16, 2012 deadline provided for in the Sales Process Terms (the "Bid Deadline").

21 The Monitor received eight binding offers by the Bid Deadline and, based on the analysis of the offers received, the Monitor and the Applicant, in consultation with the Province, determined that the offer of AV Terrace Bay Inc. was the best offer. The ultimate parent of the Purchaser is Aditya Birla Management Corporation Private Ltd. ("Aditya"), one of the largest conglomerates in India.

22 After identifying the Purchaser's offer as the superior offer in the Sales Process, and after extensive negotiations, the Applicant entered into the Purchase Agreement; executed July 5, 2012 for an effective purchase price in excess of \$27 million.

23 Counsel to the Applicant submits that in assessing the various bids, the Applicant and the Monitor, in consultation with the Province, considered the following factors:

- (a) the value of the consideration proposed in the Transaction;
- (b) the level of due diligence required to be completed prior to closing;
- (c) the conditions precedent to closing of a sale transaction;
- (d) the impact on the Corporation of the Township of Terrace Bay (the "Township"), the community and other stakeholders;
- (e) the bidder's intended use for the mill site including any future capital investment into the mill; and
- (f) the ability to close the Transaction as soon as possible, given the company's limited cash flow.

24 Four parties expressed an interest in Terrace Bay after the Bid Deadline.

25 The unchallenged evidence is that the Monitor informed each of the late bidders that they could conduct due diligence, but their interest would only be entertained if the Applicant could not complete a Transaction with the parties that submitted their offers in accordance with the Sales Process Terms (*i.e.* prior to the Bid Deadline).

26 The Monitor states in its Sixth Report that it reviewed materials submitted by each late bidder. Tangshan, as one of the late bidders, submitted a non-binding offer on July 5, 2012 (the "Late Offer"). The terms of the Late Offer were subject to change, and Tangshan required final approval from regulatory authorities in China before entering into a transaction.

27 It is also unchallenged that, before submission of the Late Offer, the Monitor had advised Recovery Partners Ltd., which submitted the Late Offer on Tangshan's behalf, that the Bid Deadline passed months before and that the Applicant was far advanced in negotiating and settling a purchase agreement with a prospective purchaser who submitted an offer in accordance with the Sales Process Terms.

28 As indicated above, the Applicant executed the Purchase Agreement on July 5, 2012.

29 The Monitor received a second non-binding offer from Recovery Partners Ltd., on behalf of Tangshan, on July 10, 2012 and a binding offer on July 12, 2012 (the "July Tangshan Offer") for a purchase price of \$35 million.

30 In its Sixth Report, the Monitor stated that it was of the view that it is not appropriate to vary the Sales Process Terms or to recommend the July Tangshan Offer for a number of reasons:

- (a) the Applicant, in consultation with the Province, had entered into a binding purchase agreement with the Purchaser, which does not permit termination by Terrace Bay to entertain a new offer;
- (b) the fairness and integrity of the Sales Process is paramount to these proceedings and to alter the terms of the court-approved Sales Process Terms at this point would be unfair to the Purchaser and all of the other parties who participated in the Sales Process in compliance with the Sales Process Terms;
- (c) the Sales Process terms have been widely known by all bidders and interested parties since the outset of the Sales Process in January 2012;
- (d) the Sales Process Terms provide no bid protections for the potential Purchaser;
- (e) the Purchaser had incurred, and continues to incur, significant expenses in negotiating and fulfilling conditions under the Purchase Agreement. The Applicant has advised the Monitor that there is a significant risk that the Purchaser would drop out of the Sales Process if there were an attempt to amend the Sales Process Terms to pursue an open auction at this stage;

(f) to consider any new bids might result in a delay in the timing of the sale of the assets of the mill which, in the view of the Monitor, poses a risk due to the Applicant's minimal cash position;

(g) the Province, with whom the Applicant is required to consult, and which has entered into an agreement with the Purchaser, supports the completion of the Transaction;

(h) the Purchaser has made progress satisfying the conditions to closing, including meeting with the Applicant's employees and negotiating collective bargaining agreements with the unions.

31 As set out in the affidavit of Mr. Gericke, the Purchaser is an affiliate of Aditya, a Fortune 500 company that intends to make a significant investment to restart the mill by October 2012 and invest more than \$250 million to convert the mill to produce dissolving grade pulp.

32 The purchase price payable is the aggregate of: (i) \$2 million, plus or minus adjustments on closing, and (ii) the amount of the assumed liabilities.

33 The obligation of the Applicant to complete the Transaction is conditional upon, among other things, all amounts owing by the Applicant to the Province pursuant to a Loan agreement dated September 15, 2010 (the "Province Loan Agreement") being forgiven by the Province and all related security being discharged (the "Province Loan Forgiveness").

34 The Province is the first secured creditor of the Applicant, and is owed in excess of \$24 million. The Province Loan Forgiveness is an integral part of the Transaction.

35 The Applicant submits that as the net sale proceeds, subject to any super-priority claims, flow to the Province in priority to other creditors upon completion, the effective consideration for the Transaction is in excess of \$27 million, namely the cash portion of the purchase price plus the Province Loan Forgiveness, plus the value of the assumed liabilities.

36 The Monitor recommends approval of the Transaction for the following reasons:

(a) the market was broadly canvassed by the Applicant, with the assistance of the Monitor;

(b) the Purchase Agreement will result in a cash purchase price of \$2 million, and will see the forgiveness of amounts outstanding, plus accrued interest and costs, under the Province Loan Agreement;

- (c) the Transaction contemplated by the Purchase Agreement will result in significant employment in the region, as well as a substantial capital investment;
- (d) the Transaction will also see a major multi-national corporation acquiring the mill, which will greatly improve the stability of the mill operations;
- (e) the Transaction involves the expected re-opening of the mill in October 2012 and the Applicant will be rehiring the employees of the mill;
- (f) the Monitor is aware of the late bids, including the July Tangshan Offer and has consulted the company and the Province in relation to same. The Monitor maintains that the Sales Process was conducted in accordance with the Sales Process Terms and provided an adequate opportunity for interested parties to participate, conduct due diligence, and submit binding purchase agreements and deposits within court-approved deadlines; and
- (g) several further factors have been considered by the Monitor including, without limitation: the importance of maintaining the fairness and integrity of the Sales Process in relation to all parties, including the Purchaser; the terms of the Purchase Agreement; the fact that it has taken many weeks to negotiate various issues, and; the importance of certainty in relation to closing and the closing date.

37 In its Supplement to the Sixth Report, the Monitor commented on the efforts that were made to canvass international markets. This Supplemental Report was prepared after the Monitor reviewed the affidavit of Yu Hanjiang (the "Yu Affidavit"), filed by Birchwood. The Yu Affidavit raised issues with the efficacy of the Sales Process. The Monitor stated, in response, that it is satisfied that the Sales Process was properly conducted and that international markets were canvassed for prospective purchasers. Specifically, one of the channels used by the Monitor to market the assets was a program managed by the Ministry of Economic Development in Innovation ("MEDI") for the Province of Ontario which had established an "international business development representative program" ("IBDR"). The IBDR program operates a network of contacts and agents throughout the world, including China, to enable the MEDI to disseminate information about investment opportunities in Ontario to a worldwide investment audience. The Monitor further advised that IBDR representatives provided the Sales Process documents to a global network of agents for worldwide dissemination, including in China.

38 The Monitor restated that it was satisfied that the Sales Process adequately canvassed the market, and continues to support the approval of the Transaction.

39 The Monitor also provided in the Supplemental Report an update with respect to the position of the Purchaser.

40 The Purchaser advised the Monitor that it has negotiated an agreement in principle with executives of the Terrace Bay union locals regarding the terms of revised collective bargaining agreements. The Purchaser further advised that it is confident that the revised collective bargaining agreements will be ratified. Ratification of the collective agreements will remove one of the last conditions to closing, exclusive of court approval. It is noted that s. 9.2(e) of the Purchase Agreement specifically provides that a condition precedent to performance by the Purchaser is that on or before July 24, 2012, the Purchaser shall have obtained a five (5) year extension of the existing collective bargaining agreements on terms acceptable to the Purchaser acting reasonably.

41 The Purchaser has further advised the Monitor that it is critical to complete the Transaction by the end of July 2012 in order that the mill can be restarted by October, prior to the onset of winter, to avoid increased carrying costs.

42 The Purchaser also advised the Monitor directly that, if the Sales Process and the Sales Process Terms were varied, it would terminate its interest in Terrace Bay.

Law and Analysis

43 Section 36 of the CCAA provides the authority to approve a sale transaction. Section 36(3) sets out a non-exhaustive list of factors for the court to consider in determining whether to approve a sale transaction. It provides as follows:

36(3) In deciding whether to grant the authorization, the court is to consider, among other things,

- (a) whether the process leading to the proposed sale or disposition was reasonable in the circumstances;
- (b) whether the Monitor approved the process leading to the proposed sale or disposition;
- (c) whether the Monitor filed with the court a report stating that in their opinion the sale or disposition would be more beneficial to the creditors than the sale or disposition under a bankruptcy;
- (d) the extent to which the creditors were consulted;
- (e) the effects of the proposed sale or disposition on the creditors and other interested parties; and
- (f) whether the consideration to be received for the assets is reasonable and fair, taking into account their market value.

44 I agree with the submission of counsel on behalf of the Applicant that the list of factors set out in s. 36(3) largely overlaps with the criteria established in *Royal Bank v. Soundair Corp.* (1991), 4 O.R. (3d) 1 (Ont. C.A.) [*Soundair*]. *Soundair* summarized the factors the court should consider when assessing whether to approve a transaction to sell assets:

- (a) whether the court-appointed officer has made sufficient effort to get the best price and has not acted improvidently;
- (b) the interests of all parties;
- (c) the efficacy and integrity of the process by which offers are obtained; and
- (d) whether there has been unfairness in the working out of the process.

45 In considering the first issue, namely, whether the court-appointed officer has made sufficient effort to get the best price and has not acted improvidently, it is important to note that Galligan J. A. in *Soundair* stated, at para. 21, as follows:

When deciding whether a receiver has acted providently, the court should examine the conduct of the receiver in light of the information the receiver had when it agreed to accept an offer. In this case, the court should look at the receiver's conduct in the light of the information it had when it made its decision on March 8, 1991. The court should be very cautious before deciding that the receiver's conduct was improvident based upon information which has come to light after it made its decision. To do so, in my view, would derogate from the mandate to sell given to the receiver by the order of O'Brien J. I agree with and adopt what was said by Anderson J. in *Crown Trustco v. Rosenberg* (1986), 60 O.R. (2d) 87 at p. 112 [*Crown Trustco*]:

Its decision was made as a matter of business judgment on the elements then available to it. It is of the very essence of a receiver's function to make such judgments and in the making of them to act seriously and responsibly so as to be prepared to stand behind them.

If the court were to reject the recommendation of the Receiver in any but the most exceptional circumstances, it would materially diminish and weaken the role and function of the Receiver both in the perception of receivers and in the perception of any others who might have occasion to deal with them. It would lead to the conclusion that the decision of the Receiver was of little weight and that the real decision was always made upon the motion for approval. That would be a consequence susceptible of immensely damaging results to the disposition of assets by court-appointed receivers.

46 In this case, the offer was accepted on July 5, 2012. At that point in time, the offer from Tangshan was of a non-binding nature. The consideration proposed to be offered by Tangshan appears to be in excess of the amount of the Purchaser's offer. The Tangshan offer is for \$35 million, compared with the Purchaser's offer of \$27 million.

47 The record establishes that the Monitor did engage in an extensive marketing program. It took steps to ensure that the information was disseminated in international markets. The record also establishes that a number of parties expressed interest and a number of parties did put forth binding offers.

48 Tangshan takes the position, through Birchwood, that it was not aware of the opportunity to participate in the Sales Process. This statement was not challenged. However, it seems to me that this cannot be the test that a court officer has to meet in order to establish that it has made sufficient effort to get the best price and has not acted improvidently. In my view, what can be reasonably expected of a court officer is that it undertake reasonable steps to ensure that the opportunity comes to the attention of prospective purchasers. In this respect, I accept that reasonable attempts were made through IBDR to market the opportunity in international markets, including China.

49 I now turn to consider whether the Monitor acted providently in accepting the price contained in the Purchaser's offer.

50 It is important to note that the offer was accepted after a period of negotiation and in consultation with the Province. The Monitor concluded that the Purchaser's offer "was the superior offer, and provided the best opportunity to position the mill, once restarted, as a viable going concern operation for the long term".

51 Again, it is useful to review what the Court of Appeal stated in *Soundair*. After reviewing other cases, Galligan J.A. stated at 30 and 31:

30. What those cases show is that the prices in other offers have relevance only if they show that the price contained in the offer accepted by the receiver was so unreasonably low as to demonstrate that the receiver was improvident in accepting it. I am of the opinion, therefore, that if they do not tend to show that the receiver was improvident, they should not be considered upon a motion to confirm a sale recommended by a court-appointed receiver. If they were, the process would be changed from a sale by a receiver, subject to court approval, into an auction conducted by the court at the time approval is sought. In my opinion, the latter course is unfair to the person who has entered *bona fide* into an agreement with the receiver, can only lead to chaos, and must be discouraged.

31. If, however, the subsequent offer is so substantially higher than the sale recommended by the receiver, then it may be that the receiver has not conducted the sale properly. In such circumstances, the court would be justified itself in entering into the sale process by considering competitive bids. However, I think that that process should be entered into only if the court is satisfied that the receiver has not properly conducted the sale which it has recommended to the court.

52 In my view, based on the information available at the time the Purchaser's offer was accepted, including the risks associated with a Tangshan non-binding offer at that point in time, the consideration in the Transaction is not so unreasonably low so as to warrant the court entering into the Sales Process by considering competitive bids.

53 It is noteworthy that, even after a further review of the Tangshan proposal as commented on in the Supplemental Report, the Monitor continued to recommend that the Transaction be approved.

54 I am satisfied that the Tangshan offer does not lead to an inference that the strategy employed by the Monitor was inadequate, unsuccessful, or improvident, nor that the price was unreasonable.

55 I am also satisfied that the Receiver made a sufficient effort to get the best price, and did not act improvidently.

56 The second point in the *Soundair* analysis is to consider the interests of all parties.

57 On this issue, I am satisfied that, in arriving at the recommendation to seek approval of the Transaction, the Applicant and the Monitor considered the interests of all parties, including the Province, the impact on the Township and the employees.

58 The third point from *Soundair* is the consideration of the efficacy and integrity of the process by which the offer was obtained.

59 I have already commented on this issue in my review of the Sales Process. Again, it is useful to review the statements of Galligan J.A. in *Soundair*. At paragraph 46, he states:

It is my opinion that the court must exercise extreme caution before it interferes with the process adopted by a receiver to sell an unusual asset. It is important that prospective purchasers know that, if they are acting in good faith, bargain seriously with the receiver and entering into an agreement with it, a court will not likely interfere with the commercial judgment of the receiver to sell the asset to them.

60 At paragraph 47, Galligan J.A. referenced the comments of Anderson J. in *Crown Trust Co. v. Rosenberg* [1986 CarswellOnt 235 (Ont. H.C.)], at p. 109:

The court ought not to sit as on appeal from the decision of the Receiver, reviewing in minute detail every element of the process by which the decision is reached. To do so would be a futile and duplicitous exercise.

61 In my view, the process, having been properly conducted, should be respected in the circumstances of this case.

62 The fourth point arising out of *Soundair* is to consider whether there was unfairness in the working out of the process.

63 There have been no allegations that the Monitor proceeded in bad faith. Rather, the complaint is that the consideration in the offer by Tangshan is superior to that being offered by the Purchaser so as to call into question the integrity and efficacy of the Sales Process.

64 I have already concluded that the actions of the Receiver in marketing the assets was reasonable in the circumstances. I have considered the situation facing the Monitor at the time that it accepted the offer of the Purchaser and I have also taken into account the terms of the Late Offer. Although it is higher than the Purchaser's offer, the increase is not such that I would consider the accepted Transaction to be improvident in the circumstances.

65 In all respects, I am satisfied that there has been no unfairness in the working out of the process.

66 In my opinion, the principles and guidelines set out forth in *Soundair* have been adhered to by the Applicant and the Monitor and, accordingly, it is appropriate that the Transaction be approved.

67 In light of my conclusion, it is not necessary to consider the issue of whether Tangshan has standing. The arguments put forth by Tangshan were incorporated into the arguments put forth by Birchwood.

68 I have concluded that the Approval and Vesting Order should be granted.

69 I do wish to comment with respect to the request of the Applicant to obtain a declaration that the subdivision control provisions contained in the *Planning Act* do not apply to a vesting of title to real property in the Purchaser and that such vesting is not, for the purposes of s. 50(3) of the *Planning Act* a conveyance by way of deed or transfer.

70 The Purchase Agreement contemplates the vesting of title in the Purchaser of the real property. Some of the real property abuts excluded real property (as defined in the Purchase Agreement), which excluded real property is subsequently to be realized for the benefit of stakeholders of Terrace Bay.

71 The authorities cited, *Lama v. Coltsman* (1978), 20 O.R. (2d) 98 (Ont. Co. Ct.) [*Lama*] and 724597 *Ontario Inc. v. Merol Power Corp.*, [2005] O.J. No. 4832 (Ont. S.C.J.) are helpful. In *Lama*, the court found that the vesting of land by court order does not constitute a "conveyance" by way of "deed or transfer" and, therefore, "a vesting order comes outside the purview of the *Planning Act*".

72 For the purposes of this motion, I accept the reasoning of *Lama* and conclude that the granting of a vesting order is not, for the purposes of s. 50(3) of the *Planning Act*, a conveyance by way of deed or transfer. However, I do not think that it is necessary to comment on or to issue a specific declaration that the subdivision control provisions contained in the *Planning Act* do not apply to the vesting of title.

73 The Applicants also requested a sealing order. I have considered the *Sierra Club* principle and have determined that disclosure of the confidential information could be harmful to stakeholders such that it is both necessary and appropriate to grant the requested sealing order.

Disposition

74 In the result, the motion is granted subject to the adjustment with respect to aforementioned *Planning Act* declaration and an order shall issue approving the Transaction.

Motion granted.

TAB 5

2010 QCCS 1742
Quebec Superior Court

AbitibiBowater, Re

2010 CarswellQue 4082, 2010 QCCS 1742, 190 A.C.W.S. (3d)
679, 71 C.B.R. (5th) 220, J.E. 2010-962, EYB 2010-173333

**In the Matter of A Plan of Compromise or Arrangement of:
AbitibiBowater Inc., Abitibi-Consolidated Inc., Bowater
Canadian Holdings Inc. and The other Petitioners listed on
Schedules "A", "B" and "C" (Debtors) and Ernst & Young
Inc. (Monitor) and The Land Registrar for the Land Registry
Office for the Registration Division of Montmorency, The Land
Registrar for the Land Registry Office for the Registration
Division of Portneuf, The Land Registrar for the Restigouche
County Land Registry Office, The Land Registrar for the
Thunder Bay Land Registry Office and The Registrar of the
Register of Personal and Movable Real Rights (mis en cause)**

Clément Gascon, J.C.S.

Heard: April 26, 2010

Judgment: May 3, 2010

Docket: C.S. Montréal 500-11-036133-094

Counsel: Me Sean Dunphy, Me Guy P. Martel, Me Joseph Reynaud, for the Debtors
Me Avram Fishman for the Monitor
Me Robert E. Thornton for the Monitor
Me Serge F. Guérette for the Term Lenders
Me Nicolas Gagné for Ville de Beaupré
Me Éric Vallière for the Intervenor, American Iron & Metal LP
Me Marc Duchesne for the Ad hoc Committee of the Senior Secured Noteholders and U.S.
Bank National Association, Indenture Trustee for the Senior Secured Noteholders
Me Frederick L. Myers for the Ad hoc Committee of Bondholders
Me Bertrand Giroux for the Intervenor, Recyclage Arctique Béluga Inc.

Subject: Insolvency; Civil Practice and Procedure

Related Abridgment Classifications

Bankruptcy and insolvency

[XVII](#) Practice and procedure in courts

XVII.9 Miscellaneous

Bankruptcy and insolvency

XIX Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act

XIX.5 Miscellaneous

Headnote

Bankruptcy and insolvency --- Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act — Miscellaneous
Pulp and paper corporation experienced financial problems and placed itself under protection of Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act (CCAA) — In context of its restructuring, it contemplated sale of four closed mills to American bidder — While most parties supported and recommended contemplated sale, including monitor, unsuccessful bidder objected to it — Corporation brought motion seeking approval of sale — Motion granted — Court had jurisdiction to approve sale of assets in course of CCAA proceedings — Criteria for determining whether sale should be approved were established in previous decision of Ontario Court of Appeal — Here, evidence showed that over sixty potential purchasers were contacted and provided with bid package during sale process — Evidence also showed that proposed transaction reflected current fair market value of assets — Court was of view that sale process was beyond reproach and that corporation sought to achieve best possible results — Therefore, nothing justified refusing corporation's request and setting aside monitor's recommendation.

Bankruptcy and insolvency --- Practice and procedure in courts — Miscellaneous
Pulp and paper corporation experienced financial problems and placed itself under protection of Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act (CCAA) — In context of its restructuring, it contemplated sale of four closed mills to American bidder — While most parties supported and recommended contemplated sale, including monitor, unsuccessful bidder objected to it — Corporation brought motion seeking approval of sale — Motion granted — As was decided by previous decision of Ontario Court of Appeal, when deciding upon sale approval motion, court should consider best interests of parties who have direct interest in proceeds of sale, i.e. creditors — Author recently confirmed validity of that precedent in both CCAA and US proceedings — Here, none of creditors supported unsuccessful bidder's contestation — As such, unsuccessful bidder's interest was merely commercial and its contestation actually delayed sale process — Therefore, unsuccessful bidder's legal standing appeared to be most probably inexistent.

Faillite et insolvabilité --- Loi sur les arrangements avec les créanciers des compagnies — Divers

Société papetière a connu des difficultés financières et s'est mise sous la protection de la Loi sur les arrangements avec les créanciers des compagnies — Dans le cadre de sa restructuration, elle a considéré la possibilité de vendre quatre usines désaffectées à un soumissionnaire américain — Tandis que la plupart des parties intéressées, y compris le contrôleur, étaient en faveur de la vente en question et la recommandaient, un soumissionnaire déçu s'y est opposé — Société a déposé une requête visant à obtenir

l'approbation de la vente — Requête accueillie — Tribunal avait la compétence pour approuver la vente des actifs dans le cadre de procédures entamées sous le régime de la Loi — Test servant à déterminer si une vente devrait être approuvée a été établi dans une décision antérieure de la Cour d'appel de l'Ontario — En l'espèce, la preuve démontrait qu'on avait contacté plus de soixante acheteurs potentiels et qu'on leur avait fourni une trousse d'appel d'offres au cours du processus de la vente — Preuve démontrait également que l'opération proposée reflétait la juste valeur marchande des actifs — Tribunal était d'avis que le processus de vente était sans reproche et que la société visait à obtenir les meilleurs résultats possibles — Par conséquent, rien ne justifiait que l'on refuse la demande de la société et que l'on fasse fi de la recommandation du contrôleur.

Faillite et insolvabilité --- Procédure devant les tribunaux — Divers

Société papetière a connu des difficultés financières et s'est mise sous la protection de la Loi sur les arrangements avec les créanciers des compagnies — Dans le cadre de sa restructuration, elle a considéré la possibilité de vendre quatre usines désaffectées à un soumissionnaire américain — Tandis que la plupart des parties intéressées, y compris le contrôleur, étaient en faveur de la vente en question et la recommandaient, un soumissionnaire déçu s'y est opposé — Société a déposé une requête visant à obtenir l'approbation de la vente — Requête accueillie — Tel que l'a décidé la Cour d'appel de l'Ontario dans une décision antérieure, lorsqu'il s'agit de rendre une décision concernant une requête visant l'autorisation d'une vente, le tribunal devrait prendre en considération les meilleurs intérêts des parties qui ont un intérêt direct dans le produit de la vente, soit les créanciers — Auteur a récemment confirmé la validité de ce précédent dans le cadre des procédures instituées sous le régime de la Loi ainsi que sous le régime américain — En l'espèce, aucun créancier n'appuyait l'opposition du soumissionnaire déçu — Comme tel, l'intérêt du soumissionnaire déçu était purement commercial et sa contestation avait en fait retardé le processus de la vente — Par conséquent, l'intérêt pour agir du soumissionnaire déçu était probablement inexistant.

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— considered

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Registry Act, R.S.N.B. 1973, c. R-6

Generally — referred to

MOTION by corporation seeking Court's approval of sale.

Clément Gascon, J.C.S:

***REASONS FOR JUDGMENT AND VESTING ORDER IN RESPECT OF THE
BEAUPRÉ, DALHOUSIE, DONNACONA AND FORT WILLIAM ASSETS (#513)***

Introduction

1 This judgment deals with the approval of a sale of assets contemplated by the Petitioners in the context of their CCAA restructuring.

2 At issue are, on the one hand, the fairness of the sale process involved and the appropriateness of the Monitor's recommendation in that regard, and on the other hand, the legal standing of a disgruntled bidder to contest the approval sought.

The Motion at Issue

3 Through their Amended Motion for the Issuance of an Order Authorizing the Sale of Certain Assets of the Petitioners (Four Closed Mills)(the "*Motion*"), the Petitioners seek the approval of the sale of four closed mills to American Iron & Metal LP ("*AIM*") and the issuance of two Vesting Orders¹ in connection thereto.

4 The Purchase Agreement and the Land Swap Agreement contemplated in that regard, which were executed on April 6, 15 and 21, 2010, are filed in the record as Exhibits R-1, R-1A and R-2A.

5 In short, given the current state of the North American newsprint and forest products industry, the Petitioners have had to go through a process of idling and ultimately selling certain of their mills that they no longer require to satisfy market demand and that will not form part of their mill configuration after emergence from their current CCAA proceedings.

6 So far, the Petitioners, with the assistance of the Monitor, have in fact undertaken a number of similar sales processes with respect to closed mills, including:

- (a) the pulp and paper mill in Belgo, Quebec that was sold to Recyclage Arctic Beluga Inc. ("*Arctic Beluga*"), as approved and authorized by the Court on November 24, 2009;
- (b) the St-Raymond sawmill that was sold to 9213-3933 Quebec Inc., as approved and authorized by the Court on December 11, 2009; and
- (c) the Mackenzie Facility that was sold to 1508756 Ontario Inc., as approved and authorized by the Court on March 23, 2010.

7 The transaction at issue here includes pulp and paper mills located in Dalhousie, New Brunswick (the "*Dalhousie Mill*"), Donnacona, Quebec (the "*Donnacona Mill*"), Fort William, Ontario (the "*Fort William Mill*") and Beaupré, Quebec (the "*Beaupré Mill*") (collectively, the "*Closed Mills*").

8 The assets comprising the Closed Mills include the real property, buildings, machinery and equipment located at the four sites.

9 The Closed Mills are being sold on an "as is/where is" basis, in an effort to (i) reduce the Petitioners' ongoing carrying costs, which are estimated to be approximately CDN\$12 million per year, and (ii) mitigate the Petitioners' potential exposure to environmental clean-up costs if the sites are demolished in the future, which are estimated at some CDN\$10 million based on the Monitor's testimony at hearing.

10 The Petitioners marketed the Closed Mills as a bundled group to maximize their value, minimize the potential future environmental liability associated with the sites, and ensure the disposal of all four sites through their current US Chapter 11 and CCAA proceedings.

11 According to the Petitioners, the proposed sale is the product of good faith, arm's length negotiations between them and AIM.

12 They believe that the marketing and sale process that was followed was fair and reasonable. While they did receive other offers that were, on their faces, higher in amount than AIM's offer, they consider that none of the other bidders satisfactorily demonstrated an ability to consummate a sale within the time frame and on financial terms that were acceptable to them.

13 Accordingly, the Petitioners submit that the contemplated sale of the Closed Mills to AIM is in the best interest of and will generally benefit all of their stakeholders, in that:

- a) the sale forms part of Petitioners' continuing objective and strategy to elaborate a restructuring plan, which will allow them (or any successor) to be profitable over

time. This includes the following previously announced measures of (a) disposing of non-strategic assets, (b) reducing indebtedness, and (c) reducing financial costs;

b) the Closed Mills are not required to continue the operations of the Petitioners, nor are they vital to successfully restructure their business;

c) each of the Closed Mills faces potential environmental liabilities and other clean-up costs. The Petitioners also incur monthly expenses to maintain the sites in their closed state, including tax, utility, insurance and security costs;

d) the proposed transaction is on attractive terms in the current market and will provide the Petitioners with additional liquidity. In addition to realizing cash proceeds from the Closed Mills and additional proceeds from the sales of the paper machines, the projected sale will also relieve the Petitioners of potentially significant environmental liabilities; and

e) the Petitioners' creditors will not suffer any prejudice as a result of the proposed sale and the issuance of the proposed vesting orders since the proceeds will be remitted to the Monitor in trust and shall stand in the place and stead of the Purchased Assets (as defined in the contemplated Purchase Agreement). As a result, all liens, charges and encumbrances on the Purchased Assets will attach to such proceeds, with the same priority as they had immediately prior to the sale.

14 In its 38th Report dated April 24, 2010, the Monitor supports the Petitioners' position and recommends that the contemplated sale to AIM be approved.

15 Some key creditors, notably the Ad Hoc Committee of the Bondholders, also support the Motion. Others (for instance, the Term Lenders and the Senior Secured Noteholders) indicate that they simply submit to the Court's decision.

16 None of the numerous Petitioners' creditors opposes the contemplated sale. None of the parties that may be affected by the wording of the Vesting Orders sought either.

17 However, Arctic Beluga, one of the unsuccessful bidders in the marketing and sale process of the Closed Mills, intervenes to the Motion and objects to its conclusions.

18 It claims that its penultimate bid² for the Closed Mills was a proposal for CDN\$22.1 million in cash, an amount more than CDN\$8.3 million greater than the amount proposed by the Petitioners in the Motion.

19 According to Arctic Beluga, the AIM bid that forms the basis of the contemplated sale is for CDN\$8.8 million in cash, plus 40% of the proceeds from any sale of the machinery

(of which only CDN\$5 million is guaranteed within 90 days of closing), and is significantly lower than its own offer of over CDN\$22 million in cash.

20 Arctic Beluga argues that it lost the ability to purchase the Closed Mills due to unfairness in the bidding process. It considers that the Court has the discretion to withhold approval of the sale where there has been unfairness in the sale process or where there are substantially higher offers available.

21 It thus requests the Court to 1) dismiss the Motion so that the Petitioners may consider its proposal for the Closed Mills, 2) refuse to authorize the Petitioners to enter into the proposed Purchase Agreement and Land Swap Agreement, and 3) declare that its proposal is the highest and best offer for the Closed Mills.

22 The Petitioners reply that Arctic Beluga has no standing to challenge the Court's approval of the sale of the Closed Mills contemplated in these proceedings.

23 Subsidiarily, in the event that Arctic Beluga is entitled to participate in the Motion, they consider that any inquiry into the integrity and fairness of the bidding process reveals that the contemplated sale to AIM is fair, reasonable and to the advantage of the Petitioners and the other interested parties, namely the Petitioners' creditors.

24 To complete this summary of the relevant context, it is worth adding that at the hearing, in view of Arctic Beluga's Intervention, AIM also intervened to support the Petitioners' Motion.

25 It is worth mentioning as well that even though he did not contest the Motion *per se*, the Ville de Beaufré's Counsel voiced his client's concerns with respect to the amount of unpaid taxes³ currently outstanding in regard to the Beaufré Mill located on its territory.

26 Apparently, part of these outstanding taxes has been paid very recently, but there is a potential dispute remaining on the balance owed. That issue is not, however, in front of the Court at the moment.

Analysis and Discussion

27 In the Court's opinion, the Petitioners' Motion is well founded and the Vesting Orders sought should be granted.

28 The sale process followed here was beyond reproach. Nothing justifies refusing the Petitioners' request and setting aside the corresponding recommendation of the Monitor. None of the complaints raised by Arctic Beluga appears justified or legitimate under the circumstances.

29 On the issue of standing, even though the Court, to expedite the hearing, did not prevent Arctic Beluga from participating in the debate, it agrees with Petitioners that, in the end, its legal standing appeared to be most probably inexistent in this case.

30 This notwithstanding, it remains that in determining whether or not to approve the sale, the Court had to be satisfied that the applicable criteria were indeed met. Because of that, the complaints raised would have seemingly been looked at, no matter what. As part of its role as officer of the Court, the Monitor had, in fact, raised and addressed them in its 38th Report in any event.

31 The Court's brief reasons follow.

The Sale Approval

32 In a prior decision rendered in the context of this restructuring⁴, the Court has indicated that, in its view, it had jurisdiction to approve a sale of assets in the course of CCAA proceedings, notably when such a sale was in the best interest of the stakeholders generally⁵.

33 Here, there are sufficient and definite justifications for the sale of the Closed Mills. The Petitioners no longer use them. Their annual holding costs are important. To insure that a purchaser takes over the environmental liabilities relating thereto and to improve the Petitioners' liquidity are, no doubt, valid objectives.

34 In that prior decision, the Court noted as well that in determining whether or not to authorize such a sale of assets, it should consider the following key factors:

- whether sufficient efforts to get the best price have been made and whether the parties acted providently;
- the efficacy and integrity of the process followed;
- the interests of the parties; and
- whether any unfairness resulted from the process.

35 These principles were established by the Ontario Court of Appeal in the *Royal Bank v. Soundair Corp.*⁶ decision. They are applicable in a CCAA sale situation⁷.

36 The *Soundair* criteria focus first and foremost on the "integrity of the process", which is integral to the administration of statutes like the CCAA. From that standpoint, the Court must be wary of reopening a bidding process, particularly where doing so could doom the transaction that has been achieved⁸.

37 Here, the Monitor's 38th Report comprehensively outlines the phases of the marketing and sale process that led to the outcome now challenged by Arctic Beluga. This process is detailed at length at paragraphs 26 to 67 of the Report.

38 The Court agrees with the Monitor's view that, in trying to achieve the best possible result within the best possible time frame, the Petitioners, with the guidance and assistance of the Monitor, have conducted a fair, reasonable and thorough sale process that proved to be transparent and efficient.

39 Suffice it to note in that regard that over sixty potential purchasers were contacted during the course of the initial Phase I of the sale process and provided with bid package information, that the initial response was limited to six parties who submitted bids, three of which were unacceptable to the Petitioners, and that the subsequent Phase II involved the three finalists of Phase I.

40 By sending the bid package to over sixty potential purchasers, there can be no doubt that the Petitioners, with the assistance of the Monitor, displayed their best efforts to obtain the best price for the Closed Mills.

41 Moreover, Arctic Beluga willingly and actively participated in these phases of the bidding process. The fact that it now seeks to nevertheless challenge this process as being unfair is rather awkward. Its active participation certainly does not assist its position on the contestation of the sale approval⁹.

42 In point of fact, Arctic Beluga's assertion of alleged unfairness in the sale process is simply not supported by any of the evidence adduced.

43 Arctic Beluga was not treated unfairly. The Petitioners and the Monitor diligently considered the unsolicited revised bids it tendered, even after the acceptance of AIM's offer. It was allowed every possible chance to improve its offer by submitting a proof of funds. However, it failed to do enough to convince the Petitioners and the Monitor that its bid was, in the end, the best one available.

44 Turning to the analysis of the bids received, it is again explained in details in the Monitor's 38th Report, at paragraphs 45 to 67.

45 In short, the Petitioners, with the Monitor's support, selected AIM's offer for the following reasons:

- (a) the purchase price was fair and reasonable and subjected to a thorough canvassing of the market;

- (b) the offer included a sharing formula, based on future gross sale proceeds from the sale of the paper machines located at the Closed Mills, that provided for potential sharing of the proceeds from the sale of any paper machines;
- (c) AIM confirmed that no further due diligence was required;
- (d) AIM had provided sufficient evidence of its ability to assume the environmental liabilities associated with the Closed Mills; and
- (e) AIM did not have any financing conditions in its offer and had provided satisfactory evidence of its financial ability to close the sale.

46 Both the Petitioners and the Monitor considered that the proposed transaction reflected the current fair market value of the assets and that it satisfied the Petitioners' objective of identifying a purchaser for the Closed Mills that was capable of mitigating the potential environmental liabilities and closing in a timely manner, consistent with Petitioners' on-going reorganization plans.

47 The Petitioners were close to completing the sale with AIM when Arctic Beluga submitted its latest revised bid that ended up being turned down.

48 The Petitioners, again with the support of the Monitor, were of the view that it would not have been appropriate for them to risk having AIM rescind its offer, especially given that Arctic Beluga had still not provided satisfactory evidence of its financial ability to close the transaction.

49 The Court considers that their decision in this respect was reasonable and defensible. The relevant factors were weighed in an impartial and independent manner.

50 Neither the Petitioners nor the Monitor ignored or disregarded the Arctic Beluga bids. Rather, they thoroughly considered them, up to the very last revision thereof, albeit received quite late in the whole process.

51 They asked for clarifications, sometimes proper support, finally sufficient commitments.

52 In the end, through an overall assessment of the bids received, the Petitioners and the Monitor exercised their business and commercial judgment to retain the AIM offer as being the best one.

53 No evidence suggests that in doing so, the Petitioners or the Monitor acted in bad faith, with an ulterior motive or with a view to unduly favor AIM. Contrary to what Arctic Beluga suggested, there was no "fait accompli" here that would have benefited AIM.

54 The Petitioners and the Monitor rather expressed legitimate concerns over Arctic Beluga ultimate bid. These concerns focused upon the latter's commitments towards the environmental exposures issues and upon the lack of satisfactory answers in regard to the funding of their proposal.

55 In a situation where, according to the evidence, the environmental exposures could potentially be in the range of some CDN\$10 million, the Court can hardly dispute these concerns as being anything but legitimate.

56 From that perspective, the concerns expressed by the Petitioners and the Monitor over the clauses of Arctic Beluga penultimate bid concerning the exclusion of liability for hazardous material were, arguably, reasonable concerns¹⁰. Mostly in the absence of similar exclusion in the offer of AIM.

57 Similarly, their conclusion that the answers¹¹ provided by that bidder for the funding requirement of their proposal were not satisfactory when compared to the ones given by AIM¹² cannot be set aside by the Court as being improper.

58 In that regard, the solicitation documentation¹³ sent to Arctic Beluga and the other bidders clearly stated that selected bidders would have to provide evidence that they had secured adequate and irrevocable financing to complete the transaction.

59 A reading of clauses 4 and 5 of the "funding commitment" initially provided by Arctic Beluga¹⁴ did raise some question as to its adequate and irrevocable nature. It did not satisfy the Petitioners that Arctic Beluga had the ability to pay the proposed purchase price and did not adequately demonstrate that it had the funds to fulfill, satisfy and fund future environmental obligations.

60 The subsequent letter received from Arctic Beluga's bankers¹⁵ did appear to be somewhat incomplete in that regard as well.

61 Arctic Beluga's offer, although highest in price, was consequently never backed with a satisfactory proof of funding despite repeated requests by the Petitioners and the Monitor.

62 In the situation at hand, the Phase I sale process was terminated as a result of the decision to remove the Mackenzie Mill from the process. However, prior to that, the successful bidder had failed to provide satisfactory evidence that it would be able to finance the transaction despite several requests in that regard.

63 If anything, this underscored the importance of requesting and appraising evidence of any bidder's financial wherewithal to close the sale.

64 The applicable duty during a sale process such as this one is not to obtain the best possible price at any cost, but to do everything reasonably possible with a view to obtaining the best price.

65 The dollar amount of Arctic Beluga's offer is irrelevant unless it can be used to demonstrate that the Petitioners, with the assistance of the Monitor, acted improvidently in accepting AIM's offer over theirs¹⁶.

66 Nothing in the evidence suggests that this could have been the case here.

67 In that regard, Arctic Beluga's references to the findings of the courts in *Beauty Counsellors of Canada Ltd., Re*¹⁷ and *Selkirk, Re*¹⁸ hardly support its argument.

68 In these decisions, the courts first emphasized that it was not desirable for a purchaser to wait to the last minute, even up to the court approval stage, to submit its best offer. Yet, the courts then added that they could still consider such a late offer if, for instance, a substantially higher offer turned up at the approval stage. In support of that view, the courts explained that in doing so, the evidence could very well show that the trustee did not properly carry out its duty to obtain the best price for the estate.

69 This reasoning has clearly no application in this matter. As stated, the process followed was appropriate and beyond reproach. The bids received were reviewed and analyzed. Arctic Beluga's bid was rejected for reasonable and defensible justifications.

70 That being so, it is not for this Court to second-guess the commercial and business judgment properly exercised by the Petitioners and the Monitor.

71 A court will not lightly interfere with the exercise of this commercial and business judgment in the context of an asset sale where the marketing and sale process was fair, reasonable, transparent and efficient. This is certainly not a case where it should.

72 In prior decisions rendered in similar context¹⁹, courts in this province have emphasized that they should intervene only where there is clear evidence that the Monitor failed to act properly. A subsequent, albeit higher, bid is not necessarily a valid enough reason to set aside a sale process short of any evidence of unfairness.

73 In the circumstances, the Court agrees that the Petitioners and the Monitor were "entitled to prefer a bird in the hand to two in the bush" and were reasonable in preferring

a lower-priced unconditional offer over a higher-priced offer that was subject to ambiguous caveats and unsatisfactory funding commitments.

74 AIM has transferred an amount of \$880,000 to the Petitioners' Counsel as a deposit required under the Purchase Agreement. It has the full financial capacity to consummate the sale within the time period provided for²⁰.

75 As a result, the Court finds that the Petitioners are well founded in proceeding with the sale to AIM on the basis that the offer submitted by the latter was the most advantageous and presented the fewest closing risks for the Petitioners and their creditors.

76 All in all, the Court agrees with the following summary of the situation found in the Monitor's 38th Report, at paragraph 79:

(a) the Petitioners have used their best efforts to obtain the best purchase price possible;

(b) the Petitioners have acted in a fair and reasonable manner throughout the sale process and with respect to all potential purchasers, including Arctic Beluga;

(c) the Petitioners have considered the interests of the stakeholders in the CCAA proceedings;

(d) the sale process with respect to the Closed Mills was thorough, extensive, fair and reasonable; and

(e) Arctic Beluga had ample opportunity to present its highest and best offer for the Closed Mills, including ample opportunity to address the issues of closing risk and the ability to finance the transaction and any future environmental liabilities, and they have not done so in a satisfactory manner.

77 The contemplated sale of the Closed Mills to AIM will therefore be approved.

The Standing Issue

78 In view of the Court's finding on the sale approval, the second issue pertaining to the lack of standing of Arctic Beluga is, in the end, purely theoretical.

79 Be it as a result of Arctic Beluga's Intervention or because of the Monitor's 38th Report, it remains that the Court had, in any event, to be satisfied that the criteria applicable for the approval of the sale were met. In doing so, proper consideration of the complaints raised was necessary, no matter what.

80 Even if this standing issue does not consequently need to be decided to render judgment on the Motion, some remarks are, however, still called for in that regard.

81 Interestingly, the Court notes that in the few reported decisions²¹ of this province's courts dealing with the contestation of sale approval motions, the standing issue of the disgruntled bidder has apparently not been raised or analyzed.

82 In comparison, in a leading case on the subject²², the Ontario Court of Appeal has ruled, a decade ago, that a bitter bidder simply does not have a right that is finally disposed of by an order approving a sale of a debtor's assets. As such, it has no legal interest in a sale approval motion.

83 For the Ontario Court of Appeal, the purpose of such a motion is to consider the best interests of the parties who have a direct interest in the proceeds of sale, that is, the creditors. An unsuccessful bidder's interest is merely commercial:

24 [...] If an unsuccessful prospective purchaser does not acquire an interest sufficient to warrant being added as a party to a motion to approve a sale, it follows that it does not have a right that is finally disposed of by an order made on that motion.

25 There are two main reasons why an unsuccessful prospective purchaser does not have a right or interest that is affected by a sale approval order. First, a prospective purchaser has no legal or proprietary right in the property being sold. Offers are submitted in a process in which there is no requirement that a particular offer be accepted. Orders appointing receivers commonly give the receiver a discretion as to which offers to accept and to recommend to the court for approval. The duties of the receiver and the court are to ensure that the sales are in the best interests of those with an interest in the proceeds of the sale. There is no right in a party who submits an offer to have the offer, even if the highest, accepted by either the receiver or the court: *Crown Trust v. Rosenberg*, supra.

26 Moreover, the fundamental purpose of the sale approval motion is to consider the best interests of the parties with a direct interest in the proceeds of the sale, primarily the creditors. The unsuccessful would be purchaser has no interest in this issue. Indeed, the involvement of unsuccessful prospective purchasers could seriously distract from this fundamental purpose by including in the motion other issues with the potential for delay and additional expense.

84 The Ontario Court of Appeal explained as follows the policy reasons underpinning its approach to the lack of standing of an unsuccessful prospective purchaser²³:

30 There is a sound policy reason for restricting, to the extent possible, the involvement of prospective purchasers in sale approval motions. There is often a measure of urgency to complete court-approved sales. This case is a good example. When unsuccessful purchasers become involved, there is a potential for greater delay and additional uncertainty. This potential may, in some situations, create commercial leverage in the hands of a disappointed would be purchaser which could be counterproductive to the best interests of those for whose benefit the sale is intended.

85 Along with what appears to be a strong line of cases²⁴, Morawetz J. recently confirmed the validity of the *Skyepharma* precedent in the context of an opposition to a sale approval filed by a disgruntled bidder in both Canadian proceedings under the CCAA and in US proceedings under Chapter 11²⁵.

86 Here, Arctic Beluga stood alone in contesting the Motion. None of the creditors supported its contestation. Its only interest was to close the deal itself, arguably for the interesting profits it conceded it would reap in the very good scrap metal market that exists presently.

87 Arctic Beluga's contestation did, in the end, delay the sale approval and no doubt brought a level of uncertainty in a process where the interested parties had a definite interest in finalizing the deal without further hurdles.

88 From that perspective, Arctic Beluga's contestation proved to be, at the very least, a good example of the "à propos" of the policy reasons that seem to support the strong line of cases cited before that question the standing of bitter bidder in these debates.

For these Reasons, The Court:

1 **AUTHORIZES** Abitibi-Consolidated Company of Canada ("*ACCC*"), Bowater Maritimes Inc. ("*BMI*") and Bowater Canadian Forest Products Inc. ("*BCFPI*" and together with *ACCC* and *BMI*, the "*Vendors*") to enter into, and Abitibi-Consolidated Inc. ("*ACT*") to intervene in, the agreement entitled *Purchase and Sale Agreement* (as amended, the "*Purchase Agreement*"), by and between *ACCC*, *BMI* and *BCFPI*, as Vendors, American Iron & Metal LP (the "*Purchaser*") through its general partner American Iron & Metal GP Inc., as Purchaser, American Iron & Metal Company Inc., as Guarantor, and to which *ACI* intervened, copy of which was filed as Exhibits R-1 and R-1(a) to the Motion, and into all the transactions contemplated therein (the "*Sale Transactions*") with such alterations, changes, amendments, deletions or additions thereto, as may be agreed to with the consent of the Monitor;

2 **ORDERS** and **DECLARES** that this Order shall constitute the only authorization required by the Vendors to proceed with the Sale Transactions and that no shareholder or regulatory approval shall be required in connection therewith, save and except for the satisfaction of the Land Swap Transactions and the obtaining of the U.S. Court Order (as said terms are defined in the Purchase Agreement);

3 **ORDERS** and **DECLARES** that upon the filing with this Court's registry of a Monitor's certificate substantially in the form appended as *Schedule "D"* hereto, (the "*First Closing Monitor's Certificate*"), all right, title and interest in and to the Beaupré Assets, Donnacona Assets and Dalhousie Assets (each as defined below and collectively, the "*First Closing Assets*"), shall vest absolutely and exclusively in and with the Purchaser, free and clear of and from any and all claims, liabilities, obligations, interests, prior claims, hypothecs, security interests (whether contractual, statutory or otherwise), liens, assignments, judgments, executions, writs of seizure and sale, options, adverse claims, levies, charges, liabilities (direct, indirect, absolute or contingent), pledges, executions, rights of first refusal or other pre-emptive rights in favour of third parties, mortgages, hypothecs, trusts or deemed trusts (whether contractual, statutory or otherwise), restrictions on transfer of title, or other claims or encumbrances, whether or not they have attached or been perfected, registered, published or filed and whether secured, unsecured or otherwise (collectively, the "*First Closing Assets Encumbrances*"), including without limiting the generality of the foregoing: (i) any encumbrances or charges created by the Order issued on April 17, 2009 by Justice Clément Gascon, J.S.C., as amended, and/or any other CCAA order; and (ii) all charges, security interests or charges evidenced by registration, publication or filing pursuant to the *Civil Code of Québec*, the *Ontario Personal Property Security Act*, the *New Brunswick Personal Property Security Act* or any other applicable legislation providing for a security interest in personal or movable property, excluding however, the permitted encumbrances, easements and restrictive covenants listed on *Schedule "E"* hereto (the "*Permitted First Closing Assets Encumbrances*") and, for greater certainty, **ORDERS** that all of the First Closing Assets Encumbrances affecting or relating to the First Closing Assets be expunged and discharged as against the First Closing Assets, in each case effective as of the applicable time and date set out in the Purchase Agreement;

4 **ORDERS** and **DECLARES** that upon the filing with this Court's registry of a Monitor's certificate substantially in the form appended as *Schedule "F"* hereto, (the "*Second Closing Monitor's Certificate*"), all right, title and interest in and to the Fort William Assets (as defined below), shall vest absolutely and exclusively in and with the Purchaser, free and clear of and from any and all claims, liabilities, obligations, interests, prior claims, hypothecs, security interests (whether contractual, statutory or otherwise), liens, assignments, judgments, executions, writs of seizure and sale, options, adverse claims, levies, charges, liabilities (direct, indirect, absolute or contingent), pledges, executions, rights of first

refusal or other pre-emptive rights in favour of third parties, mortgages, hypothecs, trusts or deemed trusts (whether contractual, statutory or otherwise), restrictions on transfer of title, or other claims or encumbrances, whether or not they have attached or been perfected, registered, published or filed and whether secured, unsecured or otherwise (collectively, the "*Fort William Assets Encumbrances*"), including without limiting the generality of the foregoing: (i) any encumbrances or charges created by the Order issued on April 17, 2009 by Justice Clément Gascon, J.S.C., as amended, and/or any other CCAA order; and (ii) all charges, security interests or charges evidenced by registration, publication or filing pursuant to the Ontario *Personal Property Security Act* or any other applicable legislation providing for a security interest in personal or movable property, excluding however, the permitted encumbrances, notification agreements, easements and restrictive covenants generally described in *Schedule "G"* (the "*Permitted Fort William Assets Encumbrances*") upon their registration on title. This Order shall not be registered on title to the Fort William Assets until all of such generally described Permitted Fort William Assets Encumbrances are registered on title, at which time the Petitioners shall be at liberty to obtain, without notice, an Order of this Court amending the within Order to incorporate herein the registration particulars of such Permitted Fort William Assets Encumbrances in *Schedule "G"*;

5 **ORDERS** the Land Registrar of the Land Registry Office for the Registry Division of Montmorency, upon presentation of the Monitor's First Closing Certificate, in the form appended as *Schedule "D"*, and a certified copy of this Order accompanied by the required application for registration and upon payment of the prescribed fees, to publish this Order and (i) to proceed with an entry on the index of immovables showing the Purchaser as the absolute owner in regards to the First Closing Purchased Assets located at Beaupré, in the Province of Quebec, corresponding to an immovable property known and designated as being composed of lots 3 681 089, 3 681 454, 3 681 523, 3 681 449, 3 682 466, 3 681 122, 3 681 097, 3 681 114, 3 681 205, 3 682 294, 3 681 022 and 3 681 556 of the Cadastre of Quebec, Registration Division of Montmorency, with all buildings thereon erected bearing civic number 1 du Moulin Street, Beaupré, Québec, Canada, G0A 1E0 (the "*Beaupré Assets*"); and (ii) proceed with the cancellation of any and all First Closing Assets Encumbrances on the Beaupré Assets, including, without limitation, the following registrations published at the said Land Registry:

- Hypothec dated February 17, 2000 registered under number 140 085 in the index of immovables with respect to lots 3 681 454 and 3 681 089 of the Cadastre of Quebec, Registration of Montmorency (legal construction);
- Hypothec dated April 1, 2008 registered under number 15 079 215 and assigned on January 21, 2010 under number 16 882 450 in the index of immovables with respect to lots 3 681 454 and 3 681 089 of the Cadastre of Quebec, Registration of Montmorency;

- Hypothec dated August 18, 2008 registered under number 15 504 248 in the index of immovables with respect to lot 3 681 089 of the Cadastre of Quebec, Registration of Montmorency;
- Hypothec dated October 30, 2008 registered under number 15 683 288 in the index of immovables with respect to lots 3 681 454 and 3 681 089 of the Cadastre of Quebec, Registration of Montmorency (legal construction);
- Hypothec dated April 20, 2009 registered under number 16 123 864 in the index of immovables with respect to lot 3 681 454 (legal construction) and Prior notice for sale by judicial authority dated July 23, 2009 registered under number 16 400 646 in the index of immovables with respect to lots 3 681 454 and 3 681 089 of the Cadastre of Quebec, Registration of Montmorency; and;
- Hypothec dated May 8, 2009 registered under number 16 145 374 and subrogated on January 1, 2010 under number 16 851 224 in the index of immovables with respect to lots 3 681 454 and 3 681 089 of the Cadastre of Quebec, Registration of Montmorency;
- Hypothec dated May 8, 2009 registered under number 16 145 375 and subrogated on January 1, 2010 under number 16 851 224 in the index of immovables with respect to lots 3 681 454 and 3 681 089 of the Cadastre of Quebec, Registration of Montmorency; and
- Hypothec dated December 9, 2009 registered under number 16 789 817 in the index of immovables with respect to lots 3 681 454 and 3 681 089 of the Cadastre of Quebec, Registration of Montmorency;

6 **ORDERS** the Land Registrar of the Land Registry Office for the Registry Division of Portneuf, upon presentation of the Monitor's First Closing Certificate, in the form appended as Schedule "D", and a certified copy of this Order accompanied by the required application for registration and upon payment of the prescribed fees, to publish this Order and (i) to proceed with an entry on the index of immovables showing the Purchaser as the absolute owner in regards to the First Closing Purchased Assets located at Donnacona, in the Province of Québec, corresponding to an immovable property known and designated as being composed of lots 3 507 098, 3 507 099, 3 507 101 and 3 507 106 of the Cadastre of Quebec, Registration Division of Portneuf, with all buildings thereon erected bearing civic number 1 Notre-Dame Street, Donnacona, Québec, Canada, G0A 1T0 (the "*Donnacona Assets*"); and (ii) proceed with the cancellation of any and all First Closing Assets Encumbrances on the Donnacona Assets, including, without limitation, the following registrations published at the said Land Registry:

- Hypothec dated March 9, 2009 registered under number 16 000 177 with respect to lot 3 507 098 (legal construction) and Notice for sale by judicial authority dated September

24, 2009 registered under number 16 573 711 with respect to lots 3 507 098, 3 507 099, 3 507 101 and 3 507 106 of the Cadastre of Quebec, Registration Division of Portneuf;

- Hypothec dated April 30, 2009 registered under number 16 122 878 and assigned on May 22, 2009 under number 16 184 386 with respect to lots 3 507 098, 3 507 099, 3 507 101 and 3 507 106 of the Cadastre of Quebec, Registration Division of Portneuf;

- Hypothec dated March 18, 1997 registered under number 482 357 modified on August 30, 1999 under registration number 497 828 with respect to lots 3 507 098, 3 507 101 and 3 507 106 of the Cadastre of Quebec, Registration Division of Portneuf; and

- Hypothec dated November 24, 1998 registered under number 493 417 and modified on August 30, 1999 under registration number 497 828 with respect to lots 3 507 098, 3 507 101 and 3 507 106 of the Cadastre of Quebec, Registration Division of Portneuf;

7 **ORDERS** the Quebec Personal and Movable Real Rights Registrar, upon presentation of the required form with a true copy of this Vesting Order and the First Closing Monitor's Certificate, to reduce the scope of the hypothecs registered under numbers: 06-0308066-0001, 08-0674019-0001, 09-0216695-0002, 09-0481801-0001 and 09-0236637-0016²⁶ in connection with the Donnacona Assets and 08-0163796-0002, 08-0163791-0002, 08-0695718-0002, 09-0481801-0002, 09-0256803-0016²⁷, 09-0256803-0002²⁸ and 09-0762559-0002 in connection with the Beaupré Assets and to cancel, release and discharge all of the First Closing Assets Encumbrances in order to allow the transfer to the Purchaser of the Beaupré Assets and the Donnacona Assets, as described in the Purchase Agreement, free and clear of any and all encumbrances created by those hypothecs;

8 **ORDERS** that upon registration in the Land Registry Office for the Registry Division of Restigouche County of an Application for Vesting Order in the form prescribed by the *Registry Act* (New Brunswick) duly executed by the Monitor, the Land Registrar is hereby directed to enter the Purchaser as the owner of the subject real property identified in *Schedule "H"* hereto (the "*Dalhousie Assets*") in fee simple, and is hereby directed to delete and expunge from title to the Dalhousie Assets any and all First Closing Assets Encumbrances on the Dalhousie Assets;

9 **ORDERS** that upon the filing of the First Closing Monitor's Certificate with this Court's registry, the Vendors shall be authorized to take all such steps as may be necessary to effect the discharge of all liens, charges and encumbrances registered against the Dalhousie Assets, including filing such financing change statements in the New Brunswick Personal Property Registry (the "*NBPPR*") as may be necessary, from any registration filed against the Vendors in the NBPPR, provided that the Vendors shall not be authorized to effect any discharge that would have the effect of releasing any collateral other than the Dalhousie Assets, and

the Vendors shall be authorized to take any further steps by way of further application to this Court;

10 **ORDERS** that upon registration in the Land Registry Office:

(a) for the Land Titles Division of Thunder Bay of an Application for Vesting Order in the form prescribed by the *Land Registration Reform Act* (Ontario), (and including a law statement confirming the filing of the Second Closing Monitor's Certificate, as set out in section 4 above, has been made) the Land Registrar is hereby directed to enter the Purchaser as the owner of the subject real property identified in *Schedule "I", Section 1* (the "*Fort William Land Titles Assets*") hereto in fee simple, and is hereby directed to delete and expunge from title to the Fort William Land Titles Assets all of the Fort William Assets Encumbrances, which for the sake of clarity do not include the Permitted Fort William Land Titles Assets Encumbrances listed on Schedule G, Section 1, hereto;

(b) for the Registry Division of Thunder Bay of a Vesting Order in the form prescribed by the *Land Registration Reform Act* (Ontario), (and including a law statement confirming the filing of the Second Closing Monitor's Certificate, as set out in section 4 above, has been made) the Land Registrar is hereby directed to record such Vesting Order in respect of the subject real property identified in *Schedule "I", Section 2* (the "*Fort William Registry Assets*");

11 **ORDERS** that upon the filing of the Second Closing Monitor's Certificate with this Court's registry, the Vendors shall be authorized to take all such steps as may be necessary to effect the discharge of all liens, charges and encumbrances registered against the Fort William Assets, including filing such financing change statements in the Ontario Personal Property Registry ("*OPPR*") as may be necessary, from any registration filed against the Vendors in the *OPPR*, provided that the Vendors shall not be authorized to effect any discharge that would have the effect of releasing any collateral other than the Fort William Assets, and the Vendors shall be authorized to take any further steps by way of further application to this Court;

12 **ORDERS** that the proceeds from the sale of the First Closing Assets and the Fort William Assets, net of the payment of all outstanding Taxes (as defined in the Purchase Agreement) and all transaction-related costs, including without limitation, attorney's fees (the "*Net Proceeds*") shall be remitted to Ernst & Young Inc., in its capacity as Monitor of the Petitioners, until the issuance of directions by this Court with respect to the allocation of said Net Proceeds;

13 **ORDERS** that for the purposes of determining the nature and priority of the First Closing Assets Encumbrances, the Net Proceeds from the sale of the First Closing Assets

shall stand in the place and stead of the First Closing Assets, and that upon payment of the First Closing Purchase Price (as defined in the Purchase Agreement) by the Purchaser, all First Closing Assets Encumbrances except those listed in Schedule E hereto shall attach to the Net Proceeds with the same priority as they had with respect to the First Closing Assets immediately prior to the sale, as if the First Closing Assets had not been sold and remained in the possession or control of the person having that possession or control immediately prior to the sale;

14 **ORDERS** that for the purposes of determining the nature and priority of the Fort William Assets Encumbrances, the Net Proceeds from the sale of the Fort William Assets shall stand in the place and stead of the Fort William Assets, and that upon payment of the Second Closing Purchase Price (as defined in the Purchase Agreement) by the Purchaser, all Fort William Assets Encumbrances except those listed in Schedule G hereto shall attach to the Net Proceeds with the same priority as they had with respect to the Fort William Assets immediately prior to the sale, as if the Fort William Assets had not been sold and remained in the possession or control of the person having that possession or control immediately prior to the sale;

15 **ORDERS** that notwithstanding:

- (i) the proceedings under the CCAA;
- (ii) any petitions for a receiving order now or hereafter issued pursuant to the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act ("*BIA*") and any order issued pursuant to any such petition; or
- (iii) the provisions of any federal or provincial legislation;

the vesting of the First Closing Assets and the Fort William Assets contemplated in this Vesting Order, as well as the execution of the Purchase Agreement pursuant to this Vesting Order, are to be binding on any trustee in bankruptcy that may be appointed, and shall not be void or voidable nor deemed to be a settlement, fraudulent preference, assignment, fraudulent conveyance, transfer at undervalue or other reviewable transaction under the BIA or any other applicable federal or provincial legislation, nor shall it give rise to an oppression or any other remedy;

16 **ORDERS AND DECLARES** that the Sale Transactions are exempt from the application of the *Bulk Sales Act* (Ontario);

17 **REQUESTS** the aid and recognition of any court, tribunal, regulatory or administrative body having jurisdiction in Canada or in the United States to give effect to this Order, including without limitation, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware, and to assist the Monitor and its agents in carrying out the terms of this Order. All

courts, tribunals, regulatory and administrative bodies are hereby respectfully requested to make such orders and to provide such assistance to the Monitor, as an officer of this Court, as may be necessary or desirable to give effect to this Order or to assist the Monitor and its agents in carrying out the terms of this Order;

18 **ORDERS** the provisional execution of this Vesting Order notwithstanding any appeal and without the necessity of furnishing any security;

19 **WITHOUT COSTS.**

Schedule "A" — Abitibi Petitioners

1. *ABITIBI-CONSOLIDATED INC.*
2. *ABITIBI-CONSOLIDATED COMPANY OF CANADA*
3. *3224112 NOVA SCOTIA LIMITED*
4. *MARKETING DONOHUE INC.*
5. *ABITIBI-CONSOLIDATED CANADIAN OFFICE PRODUCTS HOLDINGS INC.*
6. *3834328 CANADA INC.*
7. *6169678 CANADA INC.*
8. *4042140 CANADA INC.*
9. *DONOHUE RECYCLING INC.*
10. *1508756 ONTARIO INC.*
11. *3217925 NOVA SCOTIA COMPANY*
12. *LA TUQUE FOREST PRODUCTS INC.*
13. *ABITIBI-CONSOLIDATED NOVA SCOTIA INCORPORATED*
14. *SAGUENAY FOREST PRODUCTS INC.*
15. *TERRA NOVA EXPLORATIONS LTD.*
16. *THE JONQUIERE PULP COMPANY*
17. *THE INTERNATIONAL BRIDGE AND TERMINAL COMPANY*
18. *SCRAMBLE MINING LTD.*

19. *9150-3383 QUÉBEC INC.*

20. *ABITIBI-CONSOLIDATED (U.K.) INC.*

Schedule "B" — Bowater Petitioners

1. *BOWATER CANADIAN HOLDINGS INC.*

2. *BOWATER CANADA FINANCE CORPORATION*

3. *BOWATER CANADIAN LIMITED*

4. *3231378 NOVA SCOTIA COMPANY*

5. *ABITIBIBOWATER CANADA INC.*

6. *BOWATER CANADA TREASURY CORPORATION*

7. *BOWATER CANADIAN FOREST PRODUCTS INC.*

8. *BOWATER SHELBURNE CORPORATION*

9. *BOWATER LAHAVE CORPORATION*

10. *ST-MAURICE RIVER DRIVE COMPANY LIMITED*

11. *BOWATER TREATED WOOD INC.*

12. *CANEXEL HARDBOARD INC.*

13. *9068-9050 QUÉBEC INC.*

14. *ALLIANCE FOREST PRODUCTS (2001) INC.*

15. *BOWATER BELLEDUNE SAWMILL INC.*

16. *BOWATER MARITIMES INC.*

17. *BOWATER MITIS INC.*

18. *BOWATER GUÉRETTE INC.*

19. *BOWATER COUTURIER INC.*

Schedule "C" — 18.6 CCAA Petitioners

1. *ABITIBIBOWATER INC.*

2. *ABITIBIBOWATER US HOLDING 1 CORP.*

3. *BOWATER VENTURES INC.*
4. *BOWATER INCORPORATED*
5. *BOWATER NUWAY INC.*
6. *BOWATER NUWAY MID-STATES INC.*
7. *CATAWBA PROPERTY HOLDINGS LLC*
8. *BOWATER FINANCE COMPANY INC.*
9. *BOWATER SOUTH AMERICAN HOLDINGS INCORPORATED*
10. *BOWATER AMERICA INC.*
11. *LAKE SUPERIOR FOREST PRODUCTS INC.*
12. *BOWATER NEWSPRINT SOUTH LLC*
13. *BOWATER NEWSPRINT SOUTH OPERATIONS LLC*
14. *BOWATER FINANCE II, LLC*
15. *BOWATER ALABAMA LLC*
16. *COOSA PINES GOLF CLUB HOLDINGS LLC*

Schedule "D" — First Closing Monitor's Certificate

CANADA

PROVINCE OF QUEBEC DISTRICT OF MONTRÉL

No.: 500-11-036133-094

SUPERIOR COURT

Commercial Division (Sitting as a court designated pursuant to the *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*, R.S.C., c. C-36, as amended)

IN THE MATTER OF THE PLAN OF COMPROMISE OR ARRANGEMENT OF:

ABITIBIBOWATER INC., AND ABITIBI-CONSOLIDATED INC., AND BOWATER CANADIAN HOLDINGS INC., AND THE OTHER PETITIONERS LISTED HEREIN, PETITIONERS AND ERNST & YOUNG INC., MONITOR

CERTIFICATE OF THE MONITOR

Recitals:

WHEREAS on April 17, 2009, the Superior Court of Quebec (the "*Court*") issued an order (as subsequently amended and restated, the "*Initial Order*") pursuant to the *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act* (the "*CCAA*") in respect of (i) Abitibi-Consolidated Inc. ("*ACT*") and subsidiaries thereof (collectively, the "*Abitibi Petitioners*"),²⁹ (ii) Bowater Canadian Holdings Inc. and subsidiaries and affiliates thereof (collectively, the "*Bowater Petitioners*")³⁰ and (iii) certain partnerships³¹. Any undefined capitalized expression used herein has the meaning set forth in the Initial Order and in the Closed Mills Vesting Order (as defined below);

WHEREAS pursuant to the terms of the Initial Order, Ernst & Young Inc. (the "*Monitor*") was named monitor of, *inter alia*, the Abitibi Petitioners; and

WHEREAS on •, 2010, the Court issued an Order (the "*Closed Mills Vesting Order*") thereby, *inter alia*, authorizing and approving the execution by Abitibi-Consolidated Company of Canada ("*ACCC*"), Bowater Maritimes Inc. ("*BMI*") and Bowater Canadian Forest Products Inc. ("*BCFPI*" and together with ACCC and BMI, the "*Vendors*") of an agreement entitled *Purchase and Sale Agreement* (the "*Purchase Agreement*") by and between ACCC, BMI and BCFPI, as Vendors, American Iron & Metal LP (the "*Purchaser*") through its general partner American Iron & Metal GP Inc., as Purchaser, American Iron & Metal Company Inc., as Guarantor, and to which ACI intervened, copy of which was filed and into all the transactions contemplated therein (the "*Sale Transactions*") with such alterations, changes, amendments, deletions or additions thereto, as may be agreed to with the consent of the Monitor.

WHEREAS the Purchase Agreement contemplates two distinct closing in order to complete the Sale Transactions, namely a First Closing in respect of the First Closing Purchased Assets and a Second Closing in respect of the Fort William Purchased Assets (all capitalized terms as defined in the Purchase Agreement).

The Monitor Certifies that it has been Advised by the Vendors and the Purchaser as to the Following:

- (a) the Purchase Agreement has been executed and delivered;
- (b) the portion of the First Closing Purchase Price payable upon the First Closing and all applicable taxes have been paid (all capitalized terms as defined in the Purchase Agreement);

(c) all conditions to the First Closing under the Purchase Agreement have been satisfied or waived by the parties thereto.

This Certificate was delivered by the Monitor at ____ [TIME] on _____ [DATE].

Ernst & Young Inc. in its capacity as the monitor for the restructuring proceedings under the CCAA undertaken by AbitibiBowater Inc., Abitibi-Consolidated Inc., Bowater Canadian Holdings Inc. and the other Petitioners listed herein, and not in its personal capacity.

Name: _____

Title: _____

Schedule "E" — Permitted First Closing Assets Encumbrances

1. Beauré Mill

- a. Servitudes dated February 10, 1954 registered under numbers 34 173, 34 174, 34 175, 34 176, 34 177, 34 178, 34 179, 34 180 in the index of immovables with respect to lot 3 681 454 in the Registration Division of Montmorency, Cadastre of Québec;
- b. Servitude dated April 4, 1964 registered under number 45 815 in the index of immovables with respect to lot 3 681 454 in the Registration Division of Montmorency, Cadastre of Québec;
- c. Servitudes dated December 17, 1980 registered under numbers 83 049, 83 050, 83 051, 83 052 and 83 053 in the index of immovables with respect to lot 3 681 089 in the Registration Division of Montmorency, Cadastre of Québec;
- d. Servitudes dated December 18, 1980 registered under number 83 095, 83 096 and 83 097 in the index of immovables with respect to lot 3 681 089 in the Registration Division of Montmorency, Cadastre of Québec;
- e. Servitude dated December 23, 1980 registered under number 83 121 in the index of immovables with respect to lot 3 681 089 in the Registration Division of Montmorency, Cadastre of Québec;
- f. Servitudes dated December 24, 1980 registered under numbers 83 140, 83 141, 83 142, 83 143, 83 144, 83 145, 83 146 and 83 147 in the index of immovables with respect to lot 3 681 089 in the Registration Division of Montmorency, Cadastre of Québec;

- g. Servitude dated December 30, 1980 registered under number 83 182 in the index of immovables with respect to lot 3 681 089 in the Registration Division of Montmorency, Cadastre of Québec;
- h. Servitudes dated January 7, 1981 registered under numbers 83 196, 83 197, 83 198 and 83 199 in the index of immovables with respect to lot 3 681 089 in the Registration Division of Montmorency, Cadastre of Québec;
- i. Servitudes dated January 9, 1981 registered under numbers 83 215 and 83 216 in the index of immovables with respect to lot 3 681 089 in the Registration Division of Montmorency, Cadastre of Québec;
- j. Servitude dated March 20, 1981 registered under number 83 751 in the index of immovables with respect to lot 3 681 089 in the Registration Division of Montmorency, Cadastre of Québec;
- k. Servitude dated June 22, 1981 registered under number 84 426 in the index of immovables with respect to lot 3 682 466 in the Registration Division of Montmorency, Cadastre of Québec;
- l. Servitude dated November 13, 1981 registered under number 85 429 in the index of immovables with respect to lot 3 681 089 in the Registration Division of Montmorency, Cadastre of Québec;
- m. Servitude dated December 4, 1981 registered under number 85 555 in the index of immovables with respect to lot 3 681 089 in the Registration Division of Montmorency, Cadastre of Québec;
- n. Servitude dated December 9, 1981 registered under number 85 567 in the index of immovables with respect to lot 3 681 089 in the Registration Division of Montmorency, Cadastre of Québec;
- o. Servitude dated December 14, 1981 registered under number 85 602 in the index of immovables with respect to lot 3 681 089 in the Registration Division of Montmorency, Cadastre of Québec;
- p. Servitude dated December 16, 1981 registered under number 85 617 in the index of immovables with respect to lot 3 681 089 in the Registration Division of Montmorency, Cadastre of Québec;
- q. Servitude dated December 7, 1982 registered under number 87 882 in the index of immovables with respect to lot 3 681 089 in the Registration Division of Montmorency, Cadastre of Québec;

- r. Servitude dated December 20, 1982 registered under number 88 007 in the index of immovables with respect to lot 3 681 089 in the Registration Division of Montmorency, Cadastre of Québec;
- s. Servitude dated March 23, 1983 registered under number 91 937 in the index of immovables with respect to lot 3 681 089 in the Registration Division of Montmorency, Cadastre of Québec;
- t. Servitude dated September 9, 1983 registered under number 90 365 in the index of immovables with respect to lot 3 681 089 in the Registration Division of Montmorency, Cadastre of Québec;
- u. Servitude dated April 25, 1985 registered under number 91 154 in the index of immovables with respect to lot 3 681 089 in the Registration Division of Montmorency, Cadastre of Québec;
- v. Servitude dated July 7, 1986 registered under number 98 833 in the index of immovables with respect to lot 3 681 089 in the Registration Division of Montmorency, Cadastre of Québec;
- w. Servitude dated September 8, 1986 registered under number 99 187 in the index of immovables with respect to lot 3 681 089 in the Registration Division of Montmorency, Cadastre of Québec;
- x. Servitude dated December 23, 1997 registered under number 91 937 in the index of immovables with respect to lot 3 681 089 in the Registration Division of Montmorency, Cadastre of Québec;
- y. Servitude dated December 23, 1997 registered under number 134 993 in the index of immovables with respect to lots 3 681 089 and 3 681 097 in the Registration Division of Montmorency, Cadastre of Québec;
- z. Servitude dated December 23, 1997 registered under number 134 994 in the index of immovables with respect to lot 3 681 097 in the Registration Division of Montmorency, Cadastre of Québec; and
- aa. Servitude dated July 25, 2000 registered under number 141 246 in the index of immovables with respect to lots 3 681 089 and 3 681 097 in the Registration Division of Montmorency, Cadastre of Québec.

2. Dalhousie Mill

None

3. Donnacona Mill

- a. Servitude dated November 12, 1920 registered under number 68 747 in the index of immovables with respect to lot 3 507 106 in the Registration Division of Portneuf, Cadastre of Québec;
- b. Servitude dated October 26, 1931 registered under number 80007 in the index of immovables with respect to lots 3 507 098, 3 507 101 and 3 507 106 in the Registration Division of Portneuf, Cadastre of Québec;
- c. Servitude dated May 11, 1933 registered under number 87 789 in the index of immovables with respect to lot 3 507 106 in the Registration Division of Portneuf, Cadastre of Québec;
- d. Servitude dated April 10, 1946 registered under number 109891 in the index of immovables with respect to lots 3 507 098, 3 507 101 and 3 507 106 in the Registration Division of Portneuf, Cadastre of Québec;
- e. Servitude dated October 6, 1951 registered under number 125685 in the index of immovables with respect to lots 3 507 098, 3 507 101 and 3 507 106 in the Registration Division of Portneuf, Cadastre of Québec;
- f. Servitude dated February 16, 1961 registered under number 154 517 in the index of immovables with respect to lot 3 507 106 in the Registration Division of Portneuf, Cadastre of Québec;
- g. Servitude dated February 1, 1983 registered under number 272521 in the index of immovables with respect to lots 3 507 098, 3 507 101 and 3 507 106 in the Registration Division of Portneuf, Cadastre of Québec;
- h. Servitude dated April 14, 1986 registered under number 293891 in the index of immovables with respect to lots 3 507 098, 3 507 101 and 3 507 106 in the Registration Division of Portneuf, Cadastre of Québec;
- i. Servitudes dated March 25, 1987 registered under numbers 301930, 301931 and 302028 in the index of immovables with respect to lots 3 507 098, 3 507 101 and 3 507 106 in the Registration Division of Portneuf, Cadastre of Québec;
- j. Servitude dated October 30, 1990 registered under number 333377 in the index of immovables with respect to lots 3 507 098, 3 507 101 and 3 507 106 in the Registration Division of Portneuf, Cadastre of Québec;
- k. Servitude dated April 19, 1996 registered under number 476330 in the index of immovables with respect to lots 3 507 098, 3 507 101 and 3 507 106 in the Registration Division of Portneuf, Cadastre of Québec;

l. Servitude dated April 19, 1996 registered under number 476331 in the index of immovables with respect to lots 3 507 098, 3 507 101 and 3 507 106 in the Registration Division of Portneuf, Cadastre of Québec; and

m. Servitude dated May 20, 2003 registered under number 10 410 139 in the index of immovables with respect to lot 3 507 106 in the Registration Division of Portneuf, Cadastre of Québec.

Schedule "F" — Second Closing Monitor's Certificate

CANADA

PROVINCE OF QUEBEC DISTRICT OF MONTRÉL

No.: 500-11-036133-094

SUPERIOR COURT

Commercial Division (Sitting as a court designated pursuant to the *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*, R.S.C., c. C-36, as amended)

IN THE MATTER OF THE PLAN OF COMPROMISE OR ARRANGEMENT OF:

ABITIBIBOWATER INC., AND ABITIBI-CONSOLIDATED INC., AND BOWATER CANADIAN HOLDINGS INC., AND THE OTHER PETITIONERS LISTED HEREIN, PETITIONERS AND ERNST & YOUNG INC., MONITOR

CERTIFICATE OF THE MONITOR

Recitals:

WHEREAS on April 17, 2009, the Superior Court of Quebec (the "*Court*") issued an order (as subsequently amended and restated, the "*Initial Order*") pursuant to the *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act* (the "*CCAA*") in respect of (i) Abitibi-Consolidated Inc. ("*ACT*") and subsidiaries thereof (collectively, the "*Abitibi Petitioners*"),³² (ii) Bowater Canadian Holdings Inc. and subsidiaries and affiliates thereof (collectively, the "*Bowater Petitioners*")³³ and (iii) certain partnerships³⁴. Any undefined capitalized expression used herein has the meaning set forth in the Initial Order and in the Closed Mills Vesting Order (as defined below);

WHEREAS pursuant to the terms of the Initial Order, Ernst & Young Inc. (the "*Monitor*") was named monitor of, *inter alia*, the Abitibi Petitioners; and

WHEREAS on •, 2010, the Court issued an Order (the "*Closed Mills Vesting Order*") thereby, *inter alia*, authorizing and approving the execution by Abitibi-Consolidated Company of Canada ("*ACCC*"), Bowater Maritimes Inc. ("*BMI*") and Bowater Canadian Forest Products Inc. ("*BCFPI*" and together with ACCC and BMI, the "*Vendors*") of an agreement entitled *Purchase and Sale Agreement* (the "*Purchase Agreement*") by and between ACCC, BMI and BCFPI, as Vendors, American Iron & Metal LP (the "*Purchaser*") through its general partner American Iron & Metal GP Inc., as Purchaser, American Iron & Metal Company Inc., as Guarantor, and to which ACI intervened, copy of which was filed and into all the transactions contemplated therein (the "*Sale Transactions*") with such alterations, changes, amendments, deletions or additions thereto, as may be agreed to with the consent of the Monitor.

WHEREAS the Purchase Agreement contemplates two distinct closing in order to complete the Sale Transactions, namely a First Closing in respect of the First Closing Purchased Assets and a Second Closing in respect of the Fort William Purchased Assets (all capitalized terms as defined in the Purchase Agreement).

The Monitor Certifies that it has been Advised by the Vendors and the Purchaser as to the Following:

- (a) the Purchase Agreement has been executed and delivered;
- (b) the portion of the Second Closing Purchase Price payable upon the Second Closing and all applicable taxes have been paid (all capitalized terms as defined in the Purchase Agreement);
- (c) all conditions to the Second Closing under the Purchase Agreement have been satisfied or waived by the parties thereto.

This Certificate was delivered by the Monitor at ____ [TIME] on _____ [DATE].

Ernst & Young Inc. in its capacity as the monitor for the restructuring proceedings under the CCAA undertaken by AbitibiBowater Inc., Abitibi-Consolidated Inc., Bowater Canadian Holdings Inc. and the other Petitioners listed herein, and not in its personal capacity.

Name: _____

Title: _____

Schedule "G" — Permitted Fort William Assets Encumbrances

Section 1 Permitted Fort William Land Titles Assets Encumbrances

1. Notification Agreement in favour of the City of Thunder Bay, registered on PIN 62261-0314, PT Fort William Indian Reserve [No. 52 \(Grand Trunk Pacific\)](#) 1600 acres; PT Water LT in front of Indian Reserve [No. 52 \(Grand Trunk Pacific Railway Company\)](#) PT 1, 2, 3, 55R-10429; Thunder Bay, save and except Parts 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 22, 23 and 24, 55R-13027
2. Water Easement in favour of the City of Thunder Bay registered on Part of PIN 62261-0314, PT Fort William Indian Reserve [No. 52 \(Grand Trunk Pacific\)](#) 1600 acres; PT Water LT in front of Indian Reserve [No. 52 \(Grand Trunk Pacific Railway Company\)](#) PT 1, 2,3, 55R-10429; Thunder Bay, save and except Parts 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 22, 23 and 24, 55R-13027, being Part 10, 55R-13027


Section 2 Permitted Fort William Registry Assets Encumbrances

3. Notification Agreement in favour of the City of Thunder Bay, Part of PIN 62261-0533 , PT Fort William Indian Reserve [No. 52 \(Grand Trunk Pacific\)](#) 1600 acres, being Parts 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16 and 25, 55R-13027
4. Telephone Easement in favour of the City of Thunder Bay registered on Part of PIN 62261-0533 , PT Fort William Indian Reserve [No. 52 \(Grand Trunk Pacific\)](#) 1600 acres, being Part 20, 55R-13027
5. Water Easement in favour of the City of Thunder Bay, registered on Part of PIN 62261-0533, PT Fort William Indian Reserve [No. 52 \(Grand Trunk Pacific\)](#) 1600 acres, being Parts 12 and 15, 55R-13027
6. Easement in favour of Union Gas, registered on Part of PIN 62261-0533 , PT Fort William Indian Reserve [No. 52 \(Grand Trunk Pacific\)](#) 1600 acres, being Parts 20 and 25, 55R-13027
7. Agreement registered as Instrument #403730 on July 14, 1999
8. Easement registered as Instrument #403729 on July 14, 1999

The said registered reference plan 55R13027 is attached as Annex A to this Schedule G (the "*Reference Plan*").

Motion granted.

Annex A



Graphic 1

Schedule "H" — Dalhousie Assets

Municipal address:

451 William St., Dalhousie, New Brunswick, Canada, E8C 2X9

Legal description (Property Identifier No.):

50173616, 50172030, 50173715, 50172667, 50172634, 50173574, 50173582, 50173590, 50172626, 50173640, 50173624, 50173632, 50173657, 50173681, 50173673, 50173665, 50173749, 50173756, 50173764, 50105394, 50251354, 50172774, 50173566, 50173707

Save and Except for


The surveyed land bounded by the bolded line in the plan attached in Annex A to this Schedule H (the "*Dalhousie Plan*").

For greater certainty, the following property is not included in the sale:

Legal description (Property Identifier No.): 50191857, 50191865, 50191881, 50191873, 50191899, 50191915, 50191931, 50192384, 50192400, 50068832, 50193002, 50192996, 50192988, 50192970, 50192418, 50260538, 50260520, 50260512, 50072131, 50340959, 50340942, 50340934, 50340926, 50340918, 50340900, 50340892, 50340884, 50340645,

50340637, 50340629, 50340611, 50339779, 50192392, 50191949, 50191923, 50191907, 50172949, 50172931, 50172907, 50056506, 50241611, 50172899, 50172881, 50172873, 50172865, 50172857, 50172840, 50172832, 50172824, 50172444, 50171966, 50171958, 50173699, 50104553, 50173731, 50172923, 50172915.

Annex A — Dalhousie Plan



Graphic 2

Schedule "I" — Fort William Assets

Municipal address:

1735 City Road, Thunder Bay, Ontario, Canada, P7B 6T7

Legal description:

Section 1 Fort William Land Titles Assets

PIN 62261-0314, PT Fort William Indian Reserve [No. 52 \(Grand Trunk Pacific\)](#) 1600 acres; PT Water LT in front of Indian Reserve [No. 52 \(Grand Trunk Pacific Railway Company\)](#) PT 1, 2 ,3, 55R-10429; Thunder Bay, save and except Parts 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 22, 23 and 24, 55R-13027

Section 2 Fort William Registry Assets

Part of PIN 62261-0533, PT Fort William Indian Reserve No. 52 (Grand Trunk Pacific) 1600 acres, being Parts 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16 and 25, 55R-13027

Footnotes

- 1 Namely, a first Vesting Order in respect of the Beaupré, Dalhousie, Donnacona and Fort William closed mills assets (Exhibit R-3A) and a second Vesting Order in respect of the corresponding Fort William land swap (Exhibit R-4A).
- 2 Dated March 22, 2010 and included in Exhibit I-1.
- 3 Exhibits VB-1 and I-5.
- 4 *AbitibiBowater Inc., Re*, 2009 QCCS 6460 (C.S. Que.), at para. 36 and 37.
- 5 See, in this respect, *Rail Power Technologies Corp., Re*, 2009 QCCS 2885 (C.S. Que.), at para. 96 to 99; *Nortel Networks Corp., Re*, 2009 CarswellOnt 4467 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]), at para. 35; *Boutique Euphoria inc., Re*, 2007 QCCS 7128 (C.S. Que.), at para. 91 to 95; *Calpine Canada Energy Ltd., Re* (2007), 35 C.B.R. (5th) 1 (Alta. Q.B.), and *Boutiques San Francisco Inc., Re* (2004), 7 C.B.R. (5th) 189 (C.S. Que.).
- 6 *Royal Bank v. Soundair Corp.* (1991), 7 C.B.R. (3d) 1 (Ont. C.A.), at para. 16.
- 7 See, for instance, the decisions cited at Note 5 and *Tiger Brand Knitting Co., Re* (2005), 9 C.B.R. (5th) 315 (Ont. S.C.J.), leave to appeal refused (2005), 19 C.B.R. (5th) 53 (Ont. C.A.); *PSINET Ltd., Re*, 2001 CarswellOnt 3405 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]), at para. 6; and *Canadian Red Cross Society / Société Canadienne de la Croix-Rouge, Re*, 1998 CarswellOnt 3346 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]), at para. 47.
- 8 *Grant Forest Products Inc., Re*, 2010 ONSC 1846 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]), at para. 30-33.
- 9 See, on that point, *Consumers Packaging Inc., Re* (Ont. C.A.), at para. 8, and *Canwest Global Communications Corp., Re*, 2010 ONSC 1176 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]), at para. 42.
- 10 See Exhibit I-1 and general condition # 5 of the Arctic Beluga penultimate bid.
- 11 See Exhibits I-6, I-8 and I-9.
- 12 See Exhibit I-7.
- 13 See Exhibit I-2.
- 14 See Exhibit I-6.
- 15 See Exhibit I-9.
- 16 *Royal Bank v. Soundair Corp.* (1991), 7 C.B.R. (3d) 1 (Ont. C.A.), at para. 30.
- 17 (1986), 58 C.B.R. (N.S.) 237 (Ont. S.C.)

- 18 (1987), 64 C.B.R. (N.S.) 140 (Ont. S.C.)
- 19 *Rail Power Technologies Corp., Re*, 2009 QCCS 2885 (C.S. Que.), at para. 96 to 99, and *Boutique Euphoria inc., Re*, 2007 QCCS 7128 (C.S. Que.), at para. 91 to 95.
- 20 Exhibits AIM-1 and AIM-2.
- 21 See, for instance, the judgments rendered in *Rail Power Technologies Corp., Re*, 2009 QCCS 2885 (C.S. Que.); *Boutique Euphoria inc., Re*, 2007 QCCS 7128 (C.S. Que.); and *Boutiques San Francisco Inc., Re* (2004), 7 C.B.R. (5th) 189 (C.S. Que.).
- 22 *Skyepharma PLC v. Hyal Pharmaceutical Corp.*, [2000] O.J. No. 467 (Ont. C.A.), affirming (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) ("Skyepharma").
- 23 *Id.*, at para. 30. See also, *Consumers Packaging Inc., Re* (Ont. C.A.), at para. 7.
- 24 See *Consumers Packaging Inc., Re* (Ont. C.A.), at para. 7; *BDC Venture Capital Inc. v. Natural Convergence Inc.*, 2009 ONCA 637 (Ont. C.A. [In Chambers]), at para. 20; *BDC Venture Capital Inc. v. Natural Convergence Inc.*, 2009 ONCA 665 (Ont. C.A.), at para. 8.
- 25 *In the Matter of Nortel Networks Corporation*, 2010 ONSC 126, at para. 3.
- 26 Assigned to Law Debenture Trust Company of New York registered under number 09-0288002-0001.
- 27 Assigned to U.S. Bank National Association and Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. under number 10-0018318-0001.
- 28 *Ibid.*
- 29 The Abitibi Petitioners are Abitibi-Consolidated Inc., Abitibi-Consolidated Company of Canada, 3224112 Nova Scotia Limited, Marketing Donohue Inc., Abitibi-Consolidated Canadian Office Products Holdings Inc., 3834328 Canada Inc., 6169678 Canada Incorporated., 4042140 Canada Inc., Donohue Recycling Inc., 1508756 Ontario Inc., 3217925 Nova Scotia Company, La Tuque Forest Products Inc., Abitibi-Consolidated Nova Scotia Incorporated, Saguenay Forest Products Inc., Terra Nova Explorations Ltd., The Jonquière Pulp Company, The International Bridge and Terminal Company, Scramble Mining Ltd., 9150-3383 Québec Inc. and Abitibi-Consolidated (U.K.) Inc.
- 30 The Bowater Petitioners are Bowater Canadian Holdings Incorporated., Bowater Canada Finance Corporation, Bowater Canadian Limited, 3231378 Nova Scotia Company, AbitibiBowater Canada Inc., Bowater Canada Treasury Corporation, Bowater Canadian Forest Products Inc., Bowater Shelburne Corporation, Bowater LaHave Corporation, St. Maurice River Drive Company Limited, Bowater Treated Wood Inc., Canoxel Hardboard Inc., 9068-9050 Québec Inc., Alliance Forest Products (2001) Inc., Bowater Belledune Sawmill Inc., Bowater Maritimes Inc., Bowater Mitis Inc., Bowater Guérette Inc. and Bowater Couturier Inc.
- 31 The partnerships are Bowater Canada Finance Limited Partnership, Bowater Pulp and Paper Canada Holdings Limited Partnership and Abitibi-Consolidated Finance LP.
- 32 The Abitibi Petitioners are Abitibi-Consolidated Inc., Abitibi-Consolidated Company of Canada, 3224112 Nova Scotia Limited, Marketing Donohue Inc., Abitibi-Consolidated Canadian Office Products Holdings Inc., 3834328 Canada Inc., 6169678 Canada Incorporated., 4042140 Canada Inc., Donohue Recycling Inc., 1508756 Ontario Inc., 3217925 Nova Scotia Company, La Tuque Forest Products Inc., Abitibi-Consolidated Nova Scotia Incorporated, Saguenay Forest Products Inc., Terra Nova Explorations Ltd., The Jonquière Pulp Company, The International Bridge and Terminal Company, Scramble Mining Ltd., 9150-3383 Québec Inc. and Abitibi-Consolidated (U.K.) Inc.

- 33 The Bowater Petitioners are Bowater Canadian Holdings Incorporated., Bowater Canada Finance Corporation, Bowater Canadian Limited, 3231378 Nova Scotia Company, AbitibiBowater Canada Inc., Bowater Canada Treasury Corporation, Bowater Canadian Forest Products Inc., Bowater Shelburne Corporation, Bowater LaHave Corporation, St. Maurice River Drive Company Limited, Bowater Treated Wood Inc., Canxel Hardboard Inc., 9068-9050 Québec Inc., Alliance Forest Products (2001) Inc., Bowater Belledune Sawmill Inc., Bowater Maritimes Inc., Bowater Mitis Inc., Bowater Guérette Inc. and Bowater Couturier Inc.
- 34 The partnerships are Bowater Canada Finance Limited Partnership, Bowater Pulp and Paper Canada Holdings Limited Partnership and Abitibi-Consolidated Finance LP.

End of Document

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SCHEDULE "A"
APPLICANTS

3310 Kingston Development Inc.
1296 Kennedy Development Inc.
1326 Wilson Development Inc.
5507 River Development Inc.
4439 John Development Inc.
2358825 Ontario Ltd.
250 Danforth Development Inc.
159 Carrville Development Inc.
169 Carrville Development Inc.
189 Carrville Development Inc.
27 Anglin Development Inc.
29 Anglin Development Inc.

IN THE MATTER OF THE *COMPANIES' CREDITORS ARRANGEMENT ACT*, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, AS AMENDED

AND IN THE MATTER OF A PLAN OF COMPROMISE OR ARRANGEMENT OF FORME DEVELOPMENT GROUP INC. AND THE OTHER COMPANIES LISTED ON SCHEDULE "A" HERETO (the "Applicants")

**ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
(COMMERCIAL LIST)**

Proceeding commenced at Toronto

**BOOK OF AUTHORITIES OF THE MONITOR
(Returnable July 2, 2019)**

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Court-appointed monitor and not in its personal capacity