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9	IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT	
10	FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA	
11	In re:	In Proceedings Under Chapter 15
12	ELEVATION GOLD MINING CORPORATION, et at.	Case No. 2:24-bk-06359-EPB
13		Jointly Administered with:
14	Debtors in a Foreign Proceeding.	Case No. 2:24-bk-06364-EPB
15	PATRIOT GOLD CORP.,	Case No. 2:24-bk-06367-EPB Case No. 2:24-bk-06368-EPB
16	Plaintiff,	Case No. 2:24-bk-06370-EPB Case No. 2:24-bk-06371-EPB
17	V.	Adv. No. 2:24-ap-00253-EPB
18	GOLDEN VERTEX CORP., et al.,	REPLY IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR
19		PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND RESPONSE TO DEFENDANTS'
20	Defendants.	CROSS-MOTION FOR PARTIAL
21		SUMMARY JUDGMENT
22	Plaintiff Patriot Gold Corp. ("Patriot") files this Reply/Response (a) in further	
23	support of Plaintiff's Motion For Partial Summary Judgment [Adv. Dkt. 57] (the "Patriot	
24	MSJ") and in reply to Defendants' Response To Plaintiff's Motion For Partial Summary	
25	Judgment [D.E. 58] And Defendants' Cross-Motion For Partial Summary Judgment	
26	[Adv. Dkt. 75] (the "Response-Cross Motion") filed by Defendants; and (b) in response to	
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# Defendants' cross motion for partial summary judgment contained in their Response-Cross Motion.<sup>1</sup>

### I. <u>INTRODUCTION</u>.

The Court has already found in this Adversary Proceeding that "[i]t is undisputed that Sandstorm and Patriot each hold an interest in the minerals and proceeds generated therefrom at GVC's Moss Mine located in Arizona." *See* Minute Entry/Order dated August 15, 2025 (denying Patriot's motion for preliminary injunction) [Adv. Dkt. 68], p. 2. There also is no dispute regarding what the Patriot Royalty Deed says -- both parties agree that its terms are unambiguous. In this context, Patriot requests partial summary judgment on two basic points: (a) that pursuant to its duly recorded Royalty Deed, GVC granted and conveyed to Patriot a royalty interest in the mineral estate at the Moss Mine that runs with the land (which is a real property interest); and (b) as an inherent part of the royalty grant, Patriot owns the proceeds produced from the subject minerals in the amount of the Royalty once they are extracted and produced.

Defendants' Response-Cross Motion does not refute either of these points. Rather, the entirety of their argument boils down to the following theory -- (a) all royalties that use a production metric are "accrued royalties" and therefore cannot be real property interests (which is legally wrong); and (b) because the Royalty Deed uses a "Net Smelter Return" metric to calculate the amount of the Royalty conveyed to Patriot, the Royalty Deed cannot have conveyed a real property interest (which is both legally wrong and contrary to the terms of the Royalty Deed and the parties' expressly stated intent that Patriot's royalty interest runs with the Mine Property). The fundamental flaw in Defendants' argument is their failure to recognize that, under a mineral royalty conveyance such as the Royalty Deed, the royalty holder owns **both** a real property interest in the mineral estate for future royalties, in particular when the parties intend to convey a real

Unless specifically defined herein, capitalized defined terms used in this Reply/Response will have the same meanings as defined in the Patriot MSJ, Patriot's *Memorandum Of Law In Support Of Plaintiff's Motion For Partial Summary Judgment* [Adv. Dkt. 58] (the "Memorandum"), or the *Statement Of Facts In Support Of Plaintiff's Motion For Partial Summary Judgment* [Adv. Dkt. 59] (the "SOF") filed by Patriot, as applicable.

property interest (an "unaccrued royalty") **and** ownership of the proceeds in the amount of the royalty once the minerals are extracted and produced (an "accrued royalty").

In a recent case, the Third Circuit addressed these very issues in *In re Ursa Operating Company, LLC*, 2024 WL 278397 (3rd Cir., January 25, 2024). In the context of a bankruptcy of Ursa Operating Company, LLC, an operator of oil and gas wells, the Third Circuit considered the rights of certain royalty holders that had been granted royalty interests. The Third Circuit held that (i) the grant of a royalty in minerals created a real property interest that vested in the royalty holder, among other things, the right to the proceeds therefrom in the amount of the royalties;<sup>2</sup> and (ii) royalties due to the royalty holder were owned by the royalty holder and thus never became part of Ursa's bankruptcy estate (citing Bankruptcy Code §541(d)).<sup>3</sup> *Id.* at \*2-3. The Third Circuit's analysis applies equally in this case, and requires that the Patriot MSJ be granted.

Both parties agree that, in determining the nature of the Royalty granted to Patriot under the Royalty Deed, the parties' intent regarding whether the Royalty interest is a real property interest is important. As discussed below, the Royalty Deed states expressly that the Royalty and all of GVC's related obligations are a covenant running with the Mine Property which is binding on GVC and all future owners of the Mine Property. In other words, the Royalty is a real property interest that runs with the land, not "just" a personal property interest or mere contract right. Defendants do not point to any language in the Royalty Deed indicating the parties' intent to the contrary.

In support of their cross-motion for summary judgment, Defendants try to reference extrinsic evidence regarding the parties' purported intent to somehow controvert the dispositive statement of intent in the Royalty Deed itself. This is improper as a matter of law. In all events, and as established in the Declarations filed by Patriot in support of its

The Third Circuit cited to a Colorado statute that states that a conveyance of a royalty interest in minerals creates a real property interest held by the royalty holder, but noted that this statute simply codifies longstanding Colorado common law on the nature of royalties.

Section 541(d) recognizes that interests in assets that are not owned by a debtor are excluded from the debtor's bankruptcy estate.

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response to the cross-motion,<sup>4</sup> all of the summary judgment evidence before the Court supports and confirms the parties' intent that the Royalty Deed conveyed to Patriot a real property interest in the mineral estate comprising the Mine Property.

Accordingly, Patriot is entitled to entry of partial summary judgment and Defendants' cross-motion for partial summary judgment should be denied in its entirety.<sup>5</sup>

#### II. PATRIOT'S REPLY TO DEFENDANTS' RESPONSE.

#### The Royalty Deed By Its Terms Grants And Conveys A Property A. **Interest In The Mineral Estate.**

As all authorities cited to the Court recognize, determination of Patriot's interests starts with the terms of the Royalty Deed itself. Its terms are dispositive. The Royalty Deed:

- is styled and structured as a deed for the present conveyance of an interest (a) in real property;
- states expressly that GVC "grants and conveys" to Patriot "a Royalty of (b) THREE PERCENT (3%) OF Net Smelter Returns the production of minerals from the Property";
- (c) clearly identifies by legal description the real property mining patents which are subject to the Royalty under the Royalty Deed (defined as the "Property" in the Royalty Deed);

Patriot filed the following Declarations in support of its response to Defendants' crossmotion for summary judgment: (i) Declaration of Trevor B. Newton (the "Newton Declaration"), and (ii) Declaration of Randall E. Hubbard (the "Hubbard Declaration"). The Newton Declaration and the Hubbard Declaration are attached as Exhibits "A" and "B," respectively, to the Supplemental Appendix Of Exhibits Cited In Controverting Statement Of Facts (the "Supplemental

Irrespective of how the Royalty interest conveyed to Patriot is characterized, Defendants have not identified any basis under which Patriot's rights and interests can be terminated or eliminated. Patriot fully reserves all of its rights and arguments regarding its Royalty interest and the inability of Defendants (or anyone else) to avoid or recharacterize its interest (if one is ever articulated by Defendants).

- (d) defines "Net Smelter Returns" and how they are calculated based on the minerals produced from the Property that is subject to the Royalty; and
- (e) was properly recorded in the real property records of Mohave County, Arizona.

See Memorandum at p. 4; SOF at ¶¶ 5-8, 11.

Moreover, GVC states expressly its intent that the Royalty conveyed under the Royalty Deed "shall be a covenant running with the Property and shall be binding on [GVC] and its successors and assigns, including any third party who acquires any interest in any portion of the Property." *See* Memorandum at p. 4; SOF at ¶ 14.

In short, it is clear from the four corners of the Royalty Deed that (i) it is a present grant and conveyance of a Royalty interest in identified real property (the mining claims identified as the "Property" in the deed); and (ii) GVC states expressly its intent that the conveyed Royalty is an interest that runs with the mineral estate and is binding on both GVC and all future owners of the Property. Further, and as GVC agreed in the underlying Purchase Agreement, the Royalty Deed was duly recorded in the proper real property records and therefore is part of the title to the Property and puts any future owner of the Property on notice of the Royalty that encumbers the Property.

Defendants do not (nor could they) dispute these clear terms, nor that these terms track the requirements for a conveyance of a real property interest under Arizona law. In fact, Defendants have admitted in the Sandstorm Adversary Proceeding that the Royalty Deed contains the hallmarks of a real property conveyance. *See* Memorandum at p. 5, SOF at ¶ 25. Defendants' claim that the Royalty Deed somehow does not really state an intent to create an interest in real property is ludicrous. *See* Response-Cross Motion at pp. 8-11. The Royalty Deed states expressly that the Royalty conveyed under the deed "shall be a covenant running with the Property" and the "Property" is clearly identified as the real property mining claims identified in the deed. To accept the Defendants' contorted claim on this point would require the Court to improperly ignore these provisions of the Royalty Deed in their entirety. Further, Defendants' claim that the Royalty conveyance is

not really perpetual because that word does not appear in the deed is equally ludicrous. *See* Response-Cross Motion at pp. 12-13. The Royalty Deed has no expiration date and it states expressly it is binding on "[GVC] and its successors and assigns, including any third party who acquires any interest in any portion of the Property."

The only material response Defendants assert to these terms is their claim that, because the Royalty Deed expresses the conveyed Royalty in terms of a "Net Smelter Return" metric, the Court should ignore every other term of the deed, including GVC's own stated intent, and construe the deed to not be a conveyance of a real property interest (*i.e.*, the exact opposite of what it says). This would violate every principal of contract construction under Arizona law. *See* Memorandum at p. 3 (and authorities cited therein). Moreover, as discussed below and in the Memorandum, the "Net Smelter Return" metric used in the Royalty Deed is entirely consistent with the fact that the deed conveys a real property interest.

### B. The Entirety Of Defendants' Response-Cross Motion Is Based On A False Legal Premise.

Defendants' opposition to the Patriot MSJ is based entirely on the following premise: that a mineral royalty that uses a production metric to calculate the amount of the royalty somehow does not convey a real property interest because "accrued royalty interests are personal property". See Response-Cross Motion at p. 4. This is simply wrong as a matter of law because a mineral royalty grant conveys to the royalty holder a real property interest in the subject mineral estate (the right to future royalty payments or an "unaccrued royalty") and, as an inherent part of the conveyance, an ownership interest in the proceeds from the subject minerals in the amount of the royalty when the subject minerals are extracted (an "accrued royalty"). The two are not different or exclusive "types" of royalties, they are the aggregate rights of the royalty holder as minerals are

Defendants' reference to the provision in the Royalty Deed that allows an owner of the Property to abandon certain unpatented mining claims that are subject to the deed after 25 years also gets them nowhere. *See* Response-Cross Motion at 10. This provision (if ever employed by an owner of the Property) does not terminate the Royalty grant under the Royalty Deed, it would simply reduce some of the Property that is subject to the Royalty.

extracted from a mineral estate subject to a royalty grant. The universal use of production metrics in mineral royalties does not change either of these interests, or somehow make the underlying royalty interest in the mineral estate go away. <sup>7</sup>

Despite the length of their response, Defendants do not successfully challenge any of the following points:

- 1. Arizona law recognizes the separate nature of mineral estates and surface estates. See Spurlock v. Santa Fe Pacific R. Co., 143 Ariz. 469, 478 (App. 1985); see also Paulden Indus. LLC v. Big Chino Materials LLC, 249 Ariz. 442, 445, ¶ 14 (App. 2020) (approving severance of mineral estate from surface estate).<sup>8</sup>
- 2. A mineral estate severed from the surface estate has five general attributes: (1) the right to develop (the right to ingress and egress), (2) the right to lease (the executive right), (3) the right to receive bonus payments, (4) the right to receive delay rentals, and (5) the right to receive royalty payments. Lyle v. Jane Guinn Revocable Trust, 365 S.W.3d 342, 354 (Tex. App. 2010) (citing Hamilton v. Morris Resources, Ltd, 225 S.W.3d 342, 344 (Tex. App. 2007) (emphasis added); see also In re Murray Energy Holdings Co., 638 B.R. 588, 594 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 2022) (identifying the same five rights that may be conveyed with respect to a mineral estate).
- 3. The different interests comprising a mineral estate, including the right to receive royalty payments, can be conveyed in whole or in part by the owner of the mineral estate. "The right to receive *royalty payments* is one of the five attributes comprising a severed mineral estate and is a 'separate, distinct property interest that may be conveyed or reserved in connection with a conveyance of a mineral interest." *Lyle*, 365 S.W.3d at

To state the obvious, most or all percentage mineral royalties must be calculated based on the production of the mineral in question as a practical matter. Royalties cannot, for instance, be based on the gross amount of rock mined given the very wide discrepancies in the concentration of minerals in various rock.

Mining claims, which are the Property subject to the Royalty Deed, are real property interests. *See Kasey v. Molybdenum Corp. of America*, 336 F.2d 560, 564 (9th Cir. 1964); *Bradford v. Morrison*, 10 Ariz. 214, 215 (1906) ("[T]he estate which the owner of an unpatented mining claim has therein must be held to be real property.").

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354 (quoting *Hamilton*, 225 S.W.3d at 344)) (emphasis added). Arizona law also recognizes that a fee owner can convey or reserve parts of a fee interest rather than the entirety of same. *See* A.R.S. § 33-432; *Phoenix Title & Tr. Co. v. Smith*, 101 Ariz. 101, 106 (1966) (A.R.S. § 33-432 provides that "[a] grantor has the right to make a reservation of an interest in real property" by its presumption of passing fee simple title while allowing for a lesser conveyance).

for a lesser conveyance). 5. Because the royalty right attribute of a mineral estate is an economic right, essentially all mineral royalties (including those analyzed by Arizona courts) are expressed in terms of a production metric, with one of the most common for hard rock mineral royalties being some version of a "Net Smelter Return" metric. Memorandum at pp. 7-8 (and authorities cited therein). The expression of a royalty in terms of a production metric does not somehow "transform" a mineral royalty into a nonreal property conveyance. Rather, the courts in Arizona and essentially everywhere else recognize that royalties using a production metric grant the royalty holder a present real property interest in the right to receive royalty payments (which is one component of the mineral estate) when the subject minerals are extracted from the property. Memorandum at pp. 6-7 (and authorities cited therein). The law on this point is overwhelming. See, e.g., Peppertree Farms, L.L.C. v. Thonen, 188 N.E.3d 1069, 1074 (Ohio 2022) (a "present right to a future royalty is real property"); Angichiodo v. Cerami, 28 F. Supp. 720, 722 (W.D. La. 1939) ("An oil and mineral lease, or a royalty interest, is an interest in real property. . . . "); Laughran v. Bank of Am. Nat. Tr. & Sav. Ass'n, 88 F.2d 551, 554 (9th Cir. 1937) (assignments of royalty interest "were conveyances of an interest in real property"); Palmer v. Crews, 35 So. 2d 430, 434 (Miss. 1948) ("[a] royalty is an interest in real estate, entitling the royalty owner to a share in the production of oil, gas, or other minerals therefrom."); Venable Royalty, LTD v. EQT Prod. Co., 908 S.E.2d 501, 508 (W. Va. Ct. App. 2024) (mineral royalty in oil and gas measured by "one sixteenth of all the oil and one half the royalty of gas produced from the [...] premises[,]" was a real property interest); Lyle v. Jane Guinn Revocable Tr., 365 S.W.3d 341, 352 (Tex. App.

2010) (mineral royalty measured by percentage of profit realized by extraction of oil and gas from underlying property was a real property interest); *Hanson v. Ware*, 274 S.W.2d 359, 363 (Ark. 1955) (mineral royalty measured by percentage of oil and gas produced and saved from underlying property a real property interest); *Corbett v. La Bere*, 68 N.W.2d 211, 214 (N.D. 1955) (same); *Mounger v. Pittman*, 108 So.2d 565, 566 (Miss. 1959) (same); *Duvall v. Stone*, 213 P.2d 212, 214 (N.M. 1949) (same); *Uhden v. New Mexico Oil Conservation Comm'n*, 817 P.2d 721, 723, ¶ 8 (N.M. 1991) ("royalty interest of 6.25 percent of [mineral] production" was "itself real property.").

6. Since at least 1942, the Arizona Supreme Court (like courts in essentially all other states) has recognized that mineral royalties, including those using a calculation metric based on production, create a real property interest (in particular when the parties state it is their intent to do so). *See* Memorandum at pp. 5-6 (discussing *Shreck v. Coates*, 59 Ariz. 269, 279 (1942) (a 5% overriding royalty in production from Arizona gold mine found to be a real property interest) and *Paloma Inv. Ltd. P'ship v. Jenkins*, 194 Ariz. 133, 138 (App. 1998) (mineral royalty in water rights, calculated by percentage of proceeds generated from sale of same, found to be a real property interest)).

Defendants try to distinguish the authorities cited by Patriot because some of these courts have observed that an accrued royalty is an interest in personal property. *See* Response-Cross Motion at pp. 14-17. But this simply proves the point: the case authorities recognize that a holder of a production based mineral royalty holds **both** a real property interest in the mineral estate for future royalties **and** a personal property interest in the proceeds generated from the subject minerals in the amount of the royalty once the minerals are extracted and produced. It should surprise no one that the proceeds themselves from the sale of extracted minerals are personal property (*e.g.*, cash, accounts and the like).

Defendants' efforts to distinguish *Shreck* go nowhere because, whatever else the Court assessed in its decision, it found that a royalty interest conveyed in an Arizona gold mine, with the amount of the royalty calculated as a percentage of the gold produced from the mine, was an incorporeal hereditament that constituted an interest in the real property mineral estate that followed the reversion of same. *See Shreck*, 59 Ariz. at 279.

The cases cited by Defendants for the point that "an accrued royalty is a personal property interest" show the same thing, as these cases also recognize that under the same royalty the royalty holder **also** holds a real property interest in the mineral estate for future royalties.

- -- In *U.S. v. Noble*, 237 U.S. 74 (1915), the U.S. Supreme Court found that a "royalty of 5 percent of the market value of all minerals mined or removed" from the subject property was a conveyance of a real property interest.
- In *Peppertree Farms, L.L.C. v. Thonen*, 188 N.E.3d 1061 (Ohio 2022), the court recognized that a reserved royalty right in a mineral estate is a real property interest that can be separately conveyed or reserved by the estate owner, and this is not altered by the fact that once the subject minerals are extracted they or their proceeds become the personal property of the royalty owner. *Id.* at 1067-68. This same court held expressly that a "present right to a future royalty is real property." *Peppertree Farms, L.L.C. v. Thonen*, 188 N.E.3d 1069, 1074 (Ohio 2022).
- Defendants cite the Illinois case of *Hardy v. Greathouse*, 94 N.E.2d 134 (Ill. 1950) for the unexceptional proposition that once minerals are extracted from property they become personal property. Had Defendants bothered to check, they would have found that subsequent Illinois authorities reviewing *Hardy* and other Illinois cases hold that the "rule in Illinois, therefore, is that a perpetual reservation of the royalties in the mineral estate or part thereof creates a real property right in the land." *See Logue v. Marsh*, 365 N.E.2d 1159, 1161 (Ill. App. 1977).
- -- In Sabine Prod. Co. v. Frost Nat'l Bank of San Antonio, 596 S.W.2d 271, 276 (Tex. Civ. App. 1980), the court stated expressly that "[a] right to a future royalty payment is an interest in land." (citing Clyde v. Hamilton, 414 S.W.2d 434 (Tex. Sup. 1967). There is no suggestion in the case that once minerals are extracted from the mineral estate and generate proceeds or other personal property that the underlying real property interest in future royalties evaporates.

-- In *Finstrom v. First State Bank of Buxton*, 525 N.W.2d 675, 677 (N.D. 1994), the court recognized that "an unaccrued royalty . . . is an interest in real property."

The law is equally clear that when the royalty becomes payable (*i.e.*, "accrues") the royalty holder **owns** the proceeds subject to the royalty grant. See In re Ursa Operating Co., LLC, No. 22-1729, 2024 WL 278397, at \*1–3 (3d Cir. Jan. 25, 2024). In Ursa, the Third Circuit ruled that a holder of a mineral royalty owns a real property interest in the minerals and the proceeds therefrom, and that property owned by the royalty holder is not included as property of the debtor's bankruptcy estate under Bankruptcy Code § 541(d); therefore the debtor that operates property subject to the royalty does not own or "have an equitable interest in the Royalty Claimants' designated share of the proceeds that it received from the sale of those resources" and the claimants are entitled to assert a constructive trust claim against the debtor to prevent unjust enrichment. Id. at 3-5 (emphasis added). See also Boyd v. Martin Exploration Co., 56 B.R. 776, 779–80 (E.D. La. 1986) (overriding oil and gas royalty interests conveyed by debtor prepetition were property of royalty holders and not estate property; royalty owners entitled to, and estate held royalties owed in, constructive trust for benefit of royalty holders). <sup>10</sup>

Even the cases cited by Defendants recognize that the royalty holder **owns** the proceeds subject to a royalty grant and can sue for conversion of same when they are not paid over to the royalty holder. *See Ferguson v. Coronado Oil Company*, 884 P.2d 971, 977-78 (Wyo. 1994). This is the same court that has subsequently found that mineral royalties "are also universally recognized as real property rights." *Powder River Coal Co. v. Wyo. State Board of Equalization*, 38 P.3d 423, 428 (Wyo. 2002) (citing Robert E. Sullivan, *All About Royalties*, 16 Rocky Mtn. Min. L. Inst. 227, 237 (1971)).

Defendants try to distinguish *Ursa* on the ground that it was applying Colorado law. *See* Response-Cross Motion at 16 and n. 2. This goes nowhere as Colorado law is consistent with the law in Arizona and essentially all other states as discussed above. Defendants just ignore *Boyd* completely.

## III. <u>PATRIOT'S RESPONSE TO DEFENDANTS' CROSS MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT</u>.

As an initial matter, Defendants' cross-motion for partial summary judgment (the "<u>Cross-MSJ</u>" (which is part of Defendant's Response-Cross Motion)) should be denied as a matter of law for all of the reasons discussed above and in the Memorandum.

In conjunction with their Cross-MSJ, Defendants ask the Court to consider certain documents extrinsic to the Royalty Deed as purported "evidence" that the parties did not intend for the Royalty Deed to convey to Patriot a real property interest. *See* Response-Cross Motion at 11. It is notable that, while Defendants were free to present any summary judgment evidence they wanted, they did not present a single under oath statement by any representative of Defendants about GVC's intent with respect to the Royalty conveyance under the Royalty Deed. This complete lack of evidence on GVC's purported intent itself speaks volumes.

Defendants' reference to other documents extrinsic to the Royalty Deed in an effort to re-write the clear statement of intent contained in the Royalty Deed itself is prohibited as a matter of law. *See Goodman v. Newzona Inv. Co.*, 101 Ariz. 470, 472 (1966) (when "the intent of the parties is expressed [in the contract] in clear and unambiguous language, there is no need or room for construction or interpretation."); *Aquaquim SA de CV v. Envtl. Fluids Inc.*, 667 F. Supp. 3d 1003, 1007 (D. Ariz. 2023) (". . . when the terms of a contract are clear, the intent of the parties must be ascertained from the contract itself."); Memorandum at 11.

Moreover, the extrinsic materials cited by Defendants do not advance their argument in any event -- the cited materials are consistent with the GVC's stated intent that the Royalty Deed conveyed a property interest to Patriot that runs with the Property. Defendants reference a grand total of three (3) items of "evidence" extrinsic to the Royalty Deed that Defendants allege show the parties did not intend for the Royalty Deed to create a real property interest: (a) the warranty deed executed in conjunction with the Purchase Agreement under which Patriot sold the Moss Mine to GVC; (b) a demand letter from

Patriot to GVC regarding GVC's failure to pay and deliver to Patriot the required royalties; and (c) form 10-K reports filed by Patriot with the SEC. As shown by these documents themselves, and by the Newton Declaration and the Hubbard Declaration filed by Patriot in conjunction with its response to the Defendants' cross-motion, these materials are fully consistent with the parties' stated intent that the Royalty Deed conveyed a property interest to Patriot that runs with the land:

First, both Mr. Newton (the principal of Patriot who negotiated the Purchase Agreement, the Royalty Deed and related matters) and Mr. Hubbard (a nationally known mining attorney who represented Patriot in the negotiation and documentation of the Purchase Agreement, the Royalty Deed, and the related transactions) testify directly that the Royalty Deed was intended to grant and convey to Patriot a real property interest in the mineral estate at the Moss Mine that runs with the Mine Property, and that at no time did anyone for GVC ever state or suggest any different or contrary intent. See Newton Declaration at ¶¶ 12-13; Hubbard Declaration at ¶ 23.

Second, the Purchase Agreement under which Patriot sold the Mine Property to GVC (and pursuant to which both the warranty deed and the Royalty Deed were issued) states expressly that the sale was subject to GVC conveying back to Patriot the royalty interest documented in the Royalty Deed. See Mining Claims Purchase Agreement at Sections 1.1; 2.3, 6.4 and its attached Exhibit F; Hubbard Declaration at ¶ 16.

Third, Patriot had stated and disclosed its interests under the Royalty Deed in the "Minerals Properties" section of its Form 10-Ks; it understood that disclosure to be a disclosure of its real property royalty interest; at the request of the SEC, Patriot added detail to its disclosures and listed the royalty interest under description of properties as requested by the SEC; and that the changes to the descriptions of its Royalty interest from earlier Form 10-Ks, including the timing of same, had nothing whatsoever to do with Patriot's claims against GVC for failing to make Royalty payments when due. See Newton Declaration at ¶ 15.

In short, and even if the Court considers extrinsic summary judgment evidence, 1 there is no triable fact dispute issue regarding the parties' intent because **all** of the summary 2 judgment evidence is clear that the parties intended for the Royalty Deed to convey a real 3 property interest to Patriot as stated in the Royalty Deed. 4 IV. **CONCLUSION.** 5 For all of the reasons discussed above, and in the Patriot MSJ and supporting 6 Memorandum, Patriot respectfully requests that the Court enter an order: 7 Granting the Patriot MSJ and entering partial summary judgment in favor of A. 8 Patriot as requested in the Patriot MSJ; 9 Denying Defendants' cross-motion for partial summary judgment in its B. 10 entirety; and 11 C. Granting Patriot such other and further relief as is proper under the facts of 12 this Adversary Proceeding. 13 DATED this 4th day of September, 2025. 14 **QUARLES & BRADY LLP** 15 Renaissance One, Suite 600 Two North Central Avenue 16 Phoenix, AZ 85004-2391 17 By /s/ John A. Harris 18 John A. Harris Anthony F. Pusateri 19 Dallin B. Hendricks 20 Attorneys for Patriot Gold Corp. **COPIES** of the foregoing sent via 21 e-mail this 4th day of September, 2025, to: 22 Anthony W. Austin 23 Tyler Carlton Stacy Porche 24 FENNEMORE CRAIG, P.C. 2394 E. Camelback Road, Suite 600 25 Phoenix, Arizona 85016 26 Email: aaustin@fennemorelaw.com Email: tcarlton@fennemorelaw.com 27 Email: sporche@fennemorelaw.com Attorneys for Debtor Golden Vertex Corporation 28

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5	COPY of the foregoing served via CM/ECF this 4th day of September,
6	2025 upon all parties registered to
7	receive notice via CM/ECF.
8	/s/ Lisa Childress
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